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Abstract
This thesis reports the results of f ifteen months of
participant observation study of a major technological research 
and development project. The project, in the area of advanced 
factory automation, was part of the British government's Alvey 
Programme.
The findings bear upon two main bodies of theorectical 
literature. The first is Marxist literature on technology, the state 
and the labour process. Participant observation study of this 
project reveals technological change to be a much more chaotic 
process than this literature assumes. The process, for example, is 
not guided by clear capita list interests. The other body of
literature is the 'actor-network' approach of Callon, Latour and
Law. In common with them, it is found that technological change 
is not merely a technica l process - it is 'he te rogeneous 
engineering' of both 'technical' and the 'social' s imultaneously.
However, the actor network theorists overstate the possibilities 
for this 'heterogeneous engineering'. It is neither as thoroughgoing 
or as successful as these writers might be read as asserting.
A further conclusion is that the significance of gender for 
participant observation studies of science and technology has been 
underestimated. In particular, the gender of the researcher 
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Preface
This thesis reports the results of fifteen months of 
participant observation study of a major technological research 
and development project. The project, in the area of advanced 
factory automation, was part of the British government's Alvey 
Programme. This preface provides the reader with a map of the 
thesis.
Chapter one describes the theoretical background to the 
thesis. Two main bodies of theory are looked at; Marxist 
literature and the 'actor-network' approach. In chapter two, I 
review the UK Alvey Programme. This was a state programme set 
up to support the deve lopm ent of advanced In form ation 
Technology in un ivers ities  and industry. I look at the 
organization of the Programme, the particular technologies being 
supported and one particular method of funding collaborative 
developments in these areas, the large scale dem onstra tor 
projects, one of which is the subject of this thesis. This 
particular demonstrator project was called the Manufacture from 
Design project. Chapter three describes the factory of the future
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and the role of the Manufacture from Design project in this vision.
It is in chapter four that I begin to detail my participant 
observation study of the Manufacture from Design project. In this 
chapter I describe how the project was put together, the 
d ifferent co llaborators involved and the im portant characters 
who appear throughout the study. The social process of 
technological change begins to be revealed.
In chapter five I look at the technical resources selected 
for the project. I show that for the participants, the choice of 
these hardware and software tools could not be separated from a 
range of social concerns. We see that the partic ipants are 
engaging in 'heterogeneous engineering' - mixing the 'technical' 
with the 'social'.
During my participant observation study I was based at the 
Department of Artificial Intelligence at Cally University. In. 
chapter six we see that within the Cally team, there were 
competing definitions of what they themselves should be doing on 
the Manufacture from Design project. We see that d ifferent
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members of the team had different approaches as to how 
'techn ica lly ' revolutionary their work should a ttem pt to be. 
Although some members of the team considered a technically 
'conservative' approach was chosen, the Cally project manager 
envisaged quite 'radical' changes would be needed in the social 
world for the Cally system to 'work'.
These projected changes are described in chapter seven. In 
chapter seven we also see that the industrial collaborators held a 
different opinion of how the Manufacture from Design project 
could be useful, which was based on their view that the existing 
social world was not as malleable as Cally portrayed it. With 
these different approaches to the 'technical' and the 'social' we 
see the Cally team involved in a process of 'heterogeneous 
engineering' to try and bring the industrialists around to their 
way of thinking.
Central to the rhetoric surrounding the establishment of the. 
Alvey programme was the area of Man-Machine Interface. In 
chapter eight, I trace what happened as attempts were made to 
translate this rhetoric into the reality of the Manufacture from
4
Design project.
Chapter nine concludes the presentation of the material 
collected in this participant observation study. Obviously, it was 
important for those involved in the Manufacture from Design 
project that it be a successful project. But what 'success' meant 
differed radically from group to group and context to context. In 
this chapter, I review some of these d iffe rent meanings of 
success, and how the participants sought to achieve it.
This thesis began by reviewing some important theoretical 
approaches which have attempted to explain technological change. 
In the final chapter of the thesis, chapter ten, I draw together the 
empirical material of my case-study in order to see how these 
approaches bear up in the light of such a study. Finally, I 
consider the implications of gender for a participant observation 
study of science and technology.
Chapter One 
Theory and Methodology
When the British Government announced in 1983 that it was 
about to fund one of the largest programmes ever in the area of 
advanced information technology - the Alvey programme - it 
seemed appropria te to consider the role of the state in 
technological change. The way I thought that issue should be 
looked at reflected my background in sociology up to that point. 
Fresh from a degree that included courses on Marxist theory and 
its relevance to the 1980s, a class in contemporary social theory 
that included the likes of Althusser, and an undergraduate project 
that looked at the efforts of one m ulti-nationa l e lectronics 
company to weather the storm of economic crisis in the 1970s 
through rationalization and investment in new technology, it 
made sense to think of technology as shaped  by a broad social 
milieu and especially a capitalist one.
But shaped how? In my new postgraduate environment of 
social studies of science where the concern is with the 
production  of techn ica l and sc ien tif ic  know ledge  it was
appropriate to ask: how does the state make itself felt at the
level of technical practice, to influence and shape technology to 
suit its goals? Existing theories, mostly Marxist, offered little 
on this, concentra ting  on the role of techno logy  in the 
restructuring of capital and neglecting to look at the role of the 
state in the process  of technological development. Typically, 
Marxist theorists have been concerned with understanding the 
form of 'the political', to understand why the state does what it 
does at particular moments in history. As regards government 
programmes in the 1980s to fund the research and development of 
particular technologies we would expect these theorists to ask: 
why is the state taking this political form? But their approach to 
the state and technology has been d isappoin ting from the 
perspective of the sociology of knowledge. For example, H irsch  
argues that the state's intervention in science and technology has 
been made increasingly necessary by the ins tab il ity  of a 
capitalist mode of production, subject as it is to periodic crises. 
Individual capitals become 'unable to produce and to realize (from 
the point of view of production technique) the mass of scientific 
and technological knowledge necessary to stabilize the system as 
a whole' (Hirsch, 1978, p.80). And so state organized and financed
sc ience and techno logy become the p rinc ipa l m eans of 
counteracting the fall in the rate of profit. Hirsch describes the 
state as an organizational power which, as capitalism advances, 
'not only furnishes the general scientific potential necessary for 
reproduction (basic research, scientific qualif ication of labour 
power), but also finances techno log ica l d e ve lo p m e n ts  in 
individual industr ies ’ (Ibid, p.96). But the shaping of that 
knowledge as it is practised by a community of scientists or 
technologists does not feature in this theoretical framework. It 
is taken for granted that technology embodies the social relations 
of capitalism.
David Noble, however, is a Marxist who has moved away 
from the theoretical abstractions which plague much Marxist 
theory and has argued in concrete detail how the technology of 
numerically controlled machine tools was shaped, and chosen 
instead of the equally viable record-play-back method (Noble, 
1986b). That choice reflected the social relations within which, 
the technology developed. Numerical control won the day as the 
best means of automating machine tools not as a result of its 
inherent superiority but because it removed control of production
from the workers and put it in the hands of management. In this 
way the technology mirrored capital's desire for control over 
labour.
The implication in Noble's work, however, is that actors are 
clear about their goals and how to go about satisfying them. 
Accord ing to Noble the techno log is ts  v iew the world  as 
management does and management in turn represents the 
interests of capital. Technolog ists are unlike ly to design 
something that will not find favour with the dominant group who 
can put their technology into practice. They share the same 
ideology and consider only those solutions which are compatible 
with the existing distribution of power. A technology will be 
viable only if it conforms to existing social relations: 'So when an 
engineer begins to design a top-down technical system, he or she 
reasonably assumes from the outset that the social power of 
management will be available to make the system work ... their 
own interests become ind is tingu ishab le  from the ir  patrons' 
(Noble, 1986a, p.24). The dominant groups in the political and 
commercial arenas k n o w  what they want and they choose the 
technology that best reflects their goals and interests. The 
shared culture of those developing the technology and those
- 8 -
- 9 -
requesting its production ensures that both sets of goals can be 
satisfied by the same artefact. That culture, claims Noble, is the 
pre-existing and permanently influential one of capital's desire 
for control.
An influential non-Marxist approach to explaining technical 
change is put forward by Pinch and Bijker in their Social 
Construction of Technology programme (SCOT) (Pinch, & Bijker, 
1984). Pinch and Bijker have proposed that the 'socia l 
construction of technology' can be analyzed in the same relativist 
manner adopted in the 'Strong Programme' of the sociology of 
scientific knowledge (Bloor, 1976). Technology, they argue, like 
science, is underdetermined by the physical world, and needs to 
be explained by reference to social factors. Success and failure 
must be analyzed in an impartial and symmetrica l manner, 
without any reference to 'truth': 'The success of an artefact is 
precisely what needs to be explained. For a sociological theory of 
technology it should be the explanandum, not the explanans' 
(Pinch, et al., 1984, p.406).
Pinch and Bijker seek to explain technological outcomes in
10
the same way that the sociology of scientific knowledge explains 
the 'c losure ' of sc ien tif ic  d isagreem ents . F irs tly , the
technological or scientific issue in question is shown to display 
'interpretative flexibility' - for example, that there is more than 
one way to design an artefact, or that more than one conclusion 
can be drawn from a particular set of experiments. Such 
conditions are usually apparent only during scientific controversy 
or in the early stages of the development of a technology, but are 
always there in principle. A consensus will usually form around 
one design or one interpretation. This 'closure' is effected by 
social mechanisms, not simply compelled by logic, or rationality, 
or efficiency.
Pinch and Bijker, unlike Noble, do not spe ll out 
systematically what these mechanisms might be, nor how they 
relate to the structure of the wider society. Their approach and 
Noble 's are not wholly  inconsis tent, however. A more 
fundamental challenge to any Marxist in terpretation, to any 
attempt to explain technical change in terms of a cap ita lis t 
structure, comes from the network theorists. Indeed the network 
theorists also attack the SCOT programme for its treatment of
11
'the social' as an external influence on the design of a technology 
and as the mechanism reducing in terpreta tive  f le x ib i l i ty  by 
means of closure. The leading network theoris ts  are the 
sociologyists John Law (, 1987), Michel Callon (, 1980), and Bruno 
Latour (, 1987) though there are s im ila r it ies  between the ir
position and that of the historian of technology Thomas Hughes 
(, 1983). Instead of there being a society which intervenes to 
choose between competing technologies and select those objects 
which reflect the goals and interests of that society, the social 
world and the interests of actors within it are created by 
technologists and scientists. To have their technology accepted 
as workable or inevitable technologists must engineer the social, 
econom ic and po lit ica l world as pa rt-and -pa rce l of the ir  
technological enterprise. Indeed, according to the network 
theorists the conventional dichotomy between 'the technical' and 
'the social' must be abandoned (Hughes, 1986). For those who 
juggle around with and rearrange the socia l world - the 
heterogeneous engineers (Law, 1987) - there are no distinctions. 
The implication of such a 'seamless web', as Thomas Hughes has 
described the interweaving of the social, economic and political, 
is that those categories are quite literally up for grabs. External
factors, say the network theorists, do not appear at the 
proverbial 'end of the day' to shape and determine a technological 
path: technological choice is neither settled by the immutable 
laws of capitalism nor by the external factors that belong to the 
empirical programme of relativism's third stage (Collins, 1981). 
The time of technological change is when the social, political and 
economic world is in flux. The task of the scientist or the 
technologist is to convince and persuade people and objects alike 
to take part in the construction of incontestable facts and 
technologies: to build black boxes. The system-builder will
create new social groups, translate interests and tranform 
recalictrant forces and keep them arranged and in place long 
enough to build and disseminate a technology or scientific fact. 
The result of such activity is a network of associated elements, 
which, depending on the skill and cunning of heterogeneous 
engineers to do what is necessary in the pursuit of their goals, 
may be strong (resistant to dissociating forces) or weak. The 
ensemble of such networks constitu tes both 'society ' and ' 
technology*.
Like Marxists, the network theoris t Michel Callon is 
interested in the form of the state. But he does not agree that
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state action has to be analysed in terms of the contradictions of 
capital, contradictions which arise out of the struggle between 
the classes that form the basic relation of conflict in capitalist 
society, capital and labour. According to Callon, both social and 
technical features were apparent in France in the struggle 
between Electricité de France, Renault and other government 
groups about the future of the electric vehicle car. He seeks to 
treat 'the state' and 'electrons' symmetrically. And when he 
seeks to understand the state's intervention in technology he sees 
it as the outcome of various actors such as industrialists, state 
agencies and scientists who struggle to have their interests met 
(note, not the two c la s s e s  of capital and labour). The state, 
claims Callon, does not possess the means of deciding which 
technology to fund in the face of 'technological pluralism' (Callon, 
1980, p.375). What the state does lies at the intersection of all 
these competing actions. Callon would disagree radically with 
almost all the concepts in Hirsch's assertion that: 'considerable 
technological backwardness ... can lead to the state apparatus, 
vigorously promoting technological developments when they are 
of fundemental importance for the reproduction of total capital.' 
(Hirsch, 1978, p.96)1-
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Callon is not unique in his disagreement with formulations 
such as this. Latour would also deny that technology is something 
to be pulled along the various stages of progressiveness to the 
point of use by an authoritative state. His work on Pasteur shows 
how it was the scientist who had to persuade the farmers, 
hygeneists, vets and even rats, fleas and cattle, to take part in 
the creation of a reliable vaccine that even tua lly  became 
indispensable to vets, farmers, cattle and the French state 
(Latour, 1983).
What the network theorists suggest is that different actors
are not obliged to share the same goals or interests by virtue of
any dominant ideology or needs of capital. That actors come to
share the same views on technology, that an artefact may be
IC allon 's refusal to privilege the state as the organizer of science and technology 
has parallels with the Marxist theory I have described. Hirsch also recognises that 
'individual monopolies can compel the state to take measures to promote technology 
which are in their special valorization interest, determined by competition on the 
world market, but which stand opposed to the reproduction of the particu lar 
"national" total capital. State technology policy can therefore not be interpreted as 
the smooth reaction to the objective requirements of reproduction; it is rather 
moulded in a particular way by the conflict between the partia l interests of 
monopolies and the general reproduction demands of capital as a whole.' (Hirsch, 
1978, p.96) However, unlike Callon, Hirsch does privilege the mode of production. 
Unlike 'networking' this m ou ld ing  is always rooted in the material conditions of 
capital. Similiarly, Hirsch does not include scientists and technologists as a group 
who might find a way of having interests at odds with capital.
accepted as working or its results believed, that the state exists 
and can act, Is the outcome of much persuasion, negotiation and 
even conniving.
An important tool in that persuasion, according to the 
network theorists, is the scientific text (Gilbert, 1977; Latour, 
et a!., 1979; Law, & W illiam s, 1982). The sc ien tis t or
technologist in their laboratory seeks to turn the graphs and 
tables - the output of the 'inscription devices' - into scientific 
papers which will solidify into an indisputable fact the claims 
made for a scientific process or technological artfact. Citing the 
work of others in the form of references is a strategy used by 
scientists to tie the results of their laboratory to established 
fields of work. The reader will be led down the path to accepting 
the claims as statements of fact as it becomes more and more 
difficult to dispute the black boxes which are brought in to lend 
support to the laboratory results. If Marxists admire, however 
ambivalently, the power of capital, Latour admires with equal 
ambivalence the power of the laboratory.
- 15 -
Methodology
My methodology is partic ipant observation. It is an
16 -
approach favoured by many in the socio logy of sc ientif ic  
knowledge and technology (Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Lynch, 1982). But 
that preference is largely rhetorical; there is actually very little 
ethnography practiced. And what is done is nearly all on science, 
not technology.2 When I began my fieldwork in 1984 I knew of 
only one other researcher studying technology in this way. Since 
then the field has grown to include studies by Forsythe (, 1987), 
Walker (, 1988) but it is still very small.
A standard issue concerning participant observation is the
effect of the observer on the social setting: to what extent do the
native members behave d ifferently  in the presence of the
observer and have their way of life affected? Harry Collins
(, 1983) has argued that it is inevitable that a situation will be
disturbed by an observer who is amongst the native members for
a long time but that it is something which should not cause
concern. The goal of the enterprise is not an 'objective' account
of events: the sociologist is not a detective. What is aimed at,.
claims Collins, is partic ipant c o m p r e h e n s io n  whereby the
sociologist has absorbed the culture to the extent of having
2See the 'Laboratory Studies', theme section in Social Sudies of Science. 12 (4), 
1982
17
learned what could reasonably 'count as an account of action' in 
that social setting.
How does a researcher observe or comprehend another 
culture? Some ethnographers in the socio logy of scientif ic  
knowledge have emphasized the use of video camera and audio 
machines in an attempt to record the practices and talk which are 
embedded in scientific work. The claimed necessity for such 
complete recording is, however, based on an empiricist tendency. 
It implies that the world of science and technology is 'knowable' 
(Willis, 1977) and that it presents itself em pirica lly to those 
observing, as a life-form might to an observing naturalist. At the 
very least, however, technological work is not restricted to sites 
where the video and tape-recorder can be present. Many events, 
perhaps of some importance, in the project I studied took place in 
locations that I think are definitely off-limits for the video or 
the tape recorder - most notably, the pub). The video lens and 
the tape machine are of course also more intrusive in practice 
than the 'human' observer. Wishing that subjects might relax 
with me, I relied on my ability to listen, to talk with them, 
record with my eyes and take notes. Such an approach has stood
18 -
other ethnographers in good stead - most notably F.W Whyte in 
his sociological classic Street Corner Society (Whyte, 1955).
Partic ipant observation is a popular method - again, 
rhetorically at least - with the network theorists who advocate
following scientists and technologists around in the course of 
their work.3 However, most of those doing ethnographic work 
are men and I am woman. And so just how important gender 
would be in an ethnography of science and techno logy is
something worth keeping in mind for this thesis. I will discuss 
this below in Chapter 10.
Being close to the participants means that we are in a good
position to witness the extent to which they engineer the world
around them as they try to bring it into line with their own goals,
if that is what they do. But, of course, in participant observation
the observers are not in a vacuum. Participant observation is a
mutual process: so at the same time as I set out to understand
them and their actions they were making sense of me. There  are
a couple of people I haven't seen round this table before,' one
3 One major ethonography has of course emerged from this group, (Latour, 
1979). But that was written before Latour became a network theorist, at least in 
quite the sense ascribed above, and lacks a real successor.
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researcher announced loudly at a staff departmental meeting. I 
was one of the unknowns. The head of the department explained 
my presence; I was a sociologist. That registered a few blank 
faces. (My face was probably fairly blank also. I had only 
recently finished my degree and so I thought of myself as 
someone 'with a degree in Sociology', not a sociologist.)
But in spite of my title some within the particular group of 
researchers I was going to be working with ascribed me the 
status of project psychologist in spite of my repeated attempts 
to correct them. There was no distinction as far as they could 
see. Somehow what I was doing was easier for them to make 
sense of as psychology. That in itself is interesting for what it 
says about the accessibility of psychology and sociology outside 
of the social sciences. I was assumed to be doing a project on 
different personality-types and how that bore on the success of 
the project. I was assumed to be interested in finding out what 
sort of person made a good group leader, what were 'his', 
attributes and why some people were bound to be leaders. It was 
amusing to see one of those who cast me as the psychologist turn 
up in smart suits, shirt and ties and sometimes a regimental type
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blazer! He stood out amongst the jeans and T-shirts. Being cast 
as the psychologist meant they would sometimes reply to my 
questions with what is best described as a taunt, 'You tell us why 
we did that, you're the psychologist.'
I need not have worried about getting on their nerves with 
the questions which researchers are expected to ask all the time 
(Knorr-Cetina, 1981). The project leader told me that he found 
talking to me useful and my questions a way of helping him to 
formulate what he wanted to say to collaborators, in papers and 
at conferences. It was as though I were a sounding-board, an aid 
in his preparations for accounting for or interpreting his work to 
others. If I seemed to follow his reasons for doing what they 
were doing then others should also understand.
The observation was not one way. Another team researcher 
who I was to meet later viewed me, as he said he did 'everything 
that exists outside of my head.' Similarly he treated me as. 
though I were an object outside his head to be explored. Just as 
he would have liked more ways to test his programs, similarly I 
was something to be poked and prodded with argum ent and
counter-argument. In a display of radical empiricism he asked 
how I could espouse views on anti-apartheid. I had not been to 
South Africa, how did I know what went on, how could I offer any 
views. In what got to be quite heated he 'settled' the debate by 
consoling me that he was only prodding and made a gesture with 
his finger at me that was reminiscent of those school physics 
experiments with billiard balls; a sequence of action and 
reaction.
Whatever the d iff icu lties of partic ipant observation, its 
desirability - even necessity - for this study was overwhelming. 
A group of people with a variety of skills and from different 
backgrounds had been brought together to develop a new 
technological system in a project under the government's Alvey 
programme. This represented a chance to witness in 'real time' 
the social shaping of the technology and to ask what we mean by 
the 'social': is it the technologists who shape the technological 
path, a task which at the same time would involve them in 
rearranging the social world, setting up new social groups and 
interests? The rationale of Alvey was to involve the state, 
industry and academia in the shaping of a technology. Would their 
goals diverge? Did the state hold general interests of capital
- 21 -
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which differed from industry? What about the technologists?
How did those playing a part in the development of a new 
technology see their world: was it something to manipulate, that 
they could engineer and wanted to engineer? Or did the path laid 
done by the Alvey programme clearly direct technologists in how 
they should both research and develop the technology of the 
future?
In other words, when large sums of money are devoted to 
the research and development of advanced information technology 
- the so-called 'fifth generation' computer technology - in not 
just the UK but also the US, the EEC and Japan, we need to know 
as much as we can about how technology and society interact. We 





State intervention in technological change is a growing 
phenomenon in the twentieth century. Its presence has been most 
notable in the sponsorship of military techno logy but it is 
increasingly apparent in civil fields as well. What is striking 
about the Fifth Generation programme - the programm e to 
advance the state of computer technology beyond the existing 
state-of the-art - is that states throughout the world, in the 
West and Japan, are attempting to encourage and d irect the 
technology on a massive scale, involving national, supra-national 
and co-operative projects. This intervention does not stop at 
financial support. As well as targeting specific technologica l 
areas it also involves the organization and education of the 
people taking part. In other words intervention involves a great 
deal of social engineering, to create the conditions in which the 
challenges of the Fifth Generation can be met.
24
The Fifth Generation  Project: 'the space shuttle in the world of 
knowledge’
The Alvey Programme was the UK's strategy for research 
and development in advanced information technology. But it was 
not an isolated event: it was a response to the Japanese 
announcem ent in 1981 of its Fifth G enera tion  com pute r 
technology programme which would, it was claimed, make 'a 
quantum leap over the technology of the last th irty  years' 
(Feigenbaum, & McCorduck, 1983, p.30).
Research projects in computer science, however, are not 
normally major news. But Japan's national research and 
development project was claimed to be different. It h a d  hit the 
headlines, and no hyperbole was too grand to describe it. It was a 
'technological coming-out party' that was about to herald the 
start of the 'second epoch' in computer technology (B u s in e s s  
W-g g k , 1981, p.66). In more threatening tones it was described as 
a 'computer science Pearl Harbor' (Quoted in North-Holland, 1984,. 
p.80). This new generation of computer technology would, it was 
claimed, make a break with the past by introducing something 
conceptua lly  and functiona lly  d iffe ren t from the f irs t four
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generations the world is familiar with' (Feigenbaum, et a l., 1983, 
p.30). In this way the Japanese fifth generation project was 
ambitious in its aim. One contributor to the British study on how 
to respond to Japan described the programme as an unprecedented 
attempt to: 'leapfrog current computer systems by developing 
machines that process 'knowledge' and support human-oriented 
interaction through natural language, speech and p ic tures.' 
(Computer Architecture Group, 1983).
Up until this point computers were used to process large 
amounts of numerical data; data-processing or number-crunching. 
But in the wake of the fifth generation these computers were to 
be described as 'nothing more than ca lcu la ting  m achines' 
(B u s in e ss  W e e k . 1981, p .66). Fifth Generation com puter 
technology, however, was the 'space shuttle in the world of 
knowledge' (ibid.). The ambiguity of the metaphor however, 
became ambiguous only five years later with the Challenger 
disaster.
The rest of the world was being asked to take notice. To sit 
back and do nothing was argued not to be a realistic option. A UK
response was therefore necessary, according to the report of the 
Aivey Committee, to compete in ternationa lly  and to avoid 
watching a lucrative market in Information Techno logy go 
entirely to Japan and the US To this end industry, academia and 
government representatives contributed to formulating a strategy 
for a Fifth Generation technology programme in the UK.
The Fifth Generation Technology
It seemed that in the Fifth Generation project no area of 
software or hardware had escaped attention in the quest for 
change: there were to be new languages and new ways of 
organizing computer hardware. And, theoretically at least, the 
various aspects of software and hardware were interconnected.
VLSI, Very Large Scale Integration, was central to all the 
national strategies. The attempt to place something in the region 
of one million electronic components on a single microchip was a 
research aim with its path believed to be most assured. Then, 
some argued, it would be possible to use this power to 'enable' a 
move to a different design architecture for computers: to move 




But computers are useless without the software to run 
them. Processing power alone was not the key to fulfilling the 
hype of 'computers that th ink' which the Japanese  Fifth 
Generation was hailed as. Indeed A rt if ic ia l In te ll igence  
(henceforth referred to as 'Al') was centra l to the Fifth 
G enera tion 's  au tom ation  of d is t inc t ive  ' in te l l ig e n t '  human 
capabilities such as the ability to make inferences. Most of what 
we do cannot be processed using conventional data-processing 
techniques. (The skills and tasks and knowledge that we 
associate with human beings mean that a human toddler in many 
respects is more soph is t ica ted  than the m ost pow erfu l 
supercomputer.) Al is concerned with how human knowledge - 
and ability to understand language, move objects, and reason - 
can be represented and manipulated within a computer. When we 
think, it is claimed by some researchers that we think in parallel. 
In the Alvey programme, 'Intelligent Knowledge Based Systems' 
(or IKBS), became a major focus of attention: it was termed 
'applied AT and was claimed by the academics to be 'widely 
acknowledged to be of crucial importance for the fu ture of 
Information Technology.' (Sloman, 1983, p.1).
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I KBS systems use different languages from the ones with 
which most of computer science is familiar. And in Japan it was 
'the promise of innovations in architectures that has encouraged 
them to bank on incorporating sophisticated Al functions in the 
fifth generation machines' (S c ie n ce , Vol. 220 6 May 1983 p.582). 
The von Neumann architecture was being claimed to 'impose a 
view of programming as the creation of a sequence of state 
changes in a von-Neumann computer.' (Kowalski, et al., 1983, p.2) . 
It limited advances to be made in p rogram m ing .1 I n s t e a d  
parallelism would enable programs to be written in languages 
that resembled the way we think and therefore process the 
symbols we associate with knowledge.
For these languages and programs to be more than research
1See Eloina Pelaez's Ph.D thesis University of Edinburgh 1988, for a history of 
software in the 1960s. The separation of software and hardware that she describes 
is undergoing a further transformation in the 1980s as part of the Fifth generation.
'The programming languages in production today are much the same as they were 
when high-level languages were first introduced twenty-five years ago. These 
languages are called "high level", because of their independence from the details of 
the instruction set of any one particular computer. In fact they are e n tire ly  
machine-oriented, because they impose a view of programming as the creation of a 
sequence of state changes in a von-Neumann computer. Today there is increasing 
doubt as to the future viability of these procedural languages, both because of the 
'software cris is ' to which the ir use had led and because the von-N eum ann 
architecture on which they were based is likely to be replaced by new developments 
in computer hardware.' (Kowalski, 1984, p.2)
results within the Al community and go beyond the walls of the 
laboratory they would have to be reliable. So besides allowing a 
computer to function, software was important within Alvey to 
the marketing of Fifth Generation technology. To market a 
product it should meet specifications in terms of behaviour, 
performance and price. So the next crucial technology, software 
engineering, would focus on the use of methods formally to prove 
reliability. In theory such methods rely on logical deduction 
rather than the expensive (and possibly fatal in the case of some 
programs for military purposes) technique of trial and error.
The technologies of VLSI, IKBS, and software engineering 
were crucial to the products the Alvey Programme would want to 
produce. They would be synthesized into what were known as 
deliverables: concrete products geared towards specific ends 
with economic significance and in areas that had so far evaded 
a ttem pts  to rad ica lly  ra ise  p ro d u c t iv i ty :  des ign  w ork ,
c le r ic a l /s e c re ta r ia l  w ork , c o u n s e l l in g  s e rv ic e s ,  m ed ica l 
diagnosis, assembly work in unpredictable environments (DOI,
1982). This synthesis would be incomplete, however, without one 
further enabling technology. That technology was known as 'Man- 
Machine Interface' (or MMI). Broadly speaking MMI is concerned
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with the interface between a technological system and the user. 
Its place in the project was seen as essential to the design of 
user-interfaces and to the evaluation of systems. As far as the 
Alvey Report was concerned, MMI was crucial to the commercial 
success of the project in its efforts to make technology usable. 
Indeed I.B.M.'s policy of applying 'usability plans' to its product 
development was an important factor in giving MMI a prominent 
place in the programme: 'We want more easily built and used
computing systems, and this implies a better fit between humans 
and computers.’ (Sparck Jones, 1982, p.2) But in the UK, MMI was 
said to lack good general theories about interface design which 
had led in turn to 'commercial immaturity.' (Fox, 1983). That 
situation was due partly to the concentration of MMI work in 
government and industrial defence laboratories where MMI was 
tied to specific defence applications. The MMI strategy document 
seemed to recognize that MMI would not be widely known to all 
members of the information technology com m unity  and so 
introduced its s tra tegy with the question 'W hat is MMI?'. 
However, the generic problems that were said to underly MMI 
needed to come out of the defence laboratories because they were
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'of w ider s ignificance and relevant to com mercia l activ it ies. 
(Alvey Directorate, 1984)2.
Forging a good relationship between the user and their
machine was fundamental to Information Technology but nowhere
more so, it was said, than in IKBS technology. IKBS was claimed
to be an obscure and difficult area and had to be turned into an
acceptable one. The commercial orientation would mean new
ways of thinking about MMI and especially how it related to IKBS.
Together then, MMI, IKBS, VLSI and Software Engineering were
selected as the four technologies that would enable the UK to
market competitive products. MMI, it was hoped, would help to
shape IKBS for the market by taking account of the human user.
One way to obtain an understanding of the user was to make
provision for the user in co llaborative pro jects. Reliab le
software and industrial interest in creating re levant products
were also reckoned by Alvey to be crucia l to successfu l
technology transfer. But, according to the Alvey report, a critical
way to 'maximize technology transfer' was in the organization of
2There is an interesting contrast here between the US program m e for Fifth 
Generation and the Alvey programme at the level of strategy for MMI. In the US, 
technology was being geared specifically toward military applications. In the U.K. we 
see with MMI an attempt to turn military applications into generic problem s for 
commercial purposes (EIU Informatics, 1984 ).
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Alvey projects: bringing academics together with industria l 
teams on jo in t projects (DOI, 1982). Indeed this type of 
collaboration was a key aspect of the social engineering involved 
in the programme.
Until this point I have been giving a 'top down', account of 
the Alvey programme - its rationale as a form of state 
intervention in technology. However, an alternative 'bottom up', 
Latourian account is possible. Why did there have to be a 
response to the Japanese initiative? Was it just a response to 
international competition? A simple phrase like 'international 
competition' suggests something out there impinging on us: it is 
no different from a technological determinist position. It does 
not explain the form of competition: why this technology is being 
promoted at this time in history and why it should be organized
on such a scale. What of the social relations that generate this
specific form of state intervention? Is it a 'response' to the
struggle between capital and labour manifested in a fall in the.
rate of profit?
One explanation, given to me by a researcher responsible for
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assessing the success of the Alvey programme, was that the 
'response' (and the form of the state) was in fact the result of 
one man's negotiations within the corridors of power. It is a 
Latourian explanation that makes the eventual d irector of the 
Alvey programme, Brian Oakley, responsible for magnifying the 
scale of the Japanese programme and constructing it in such a 
way as to be perceived as new and threatening by British 
ministers who would then have to fund a similar UK programme. 
However, given that many countries besides Britain responded to 
the fifth generation announcement it seems unlikely that it h a d  
to be made to appear as a threat. But this did not mean that all 
countries responded in similar ways. While the Alvey programme 
emphasized the importance of designing technologies for the 
com m erc ia l m arket, the US S tra teg ic  C o m p u tin g  Plan 
concentrated on technology geared towards the needs of the 
m i l i ta ry .
So what of the part played by the academics, the Al 
community, in fostering the interest in Al and its relevance to 
advanced information technology (indeed how did Al get to be part 
of the Information Technology programme?). The Alvey money
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was not a special sum of funding put aside for Fifth Generation 
technology. One of the workers on my project explained how the 
Alvey money was made available for fifth generation technology: 
'The Alvey pot was a pot made from raiding other pots'. In a little 
known area like IKBS, the academic community was crucial to the 
form ulation of s trategy and they s tressed the econom ic  
importance of IKBS work: there was claimed to be a need for IKBS
if the UK was to stay ahead of the competition in Information
Technology. But it was not always like this.
In the 1970s, Al had faced problems of credibility. For 
example, a 1973 report written for the Science Research Council
by James Lighthill was critical of Al (SRC, 1973). Robotics in
particular was criticized on the grounds that it was not possible 
to build a general purpose machine. And in general Al was 
criticized for not being 'socially relevant'. It created a stir
throughout the Al community worldw ide and it affected the 
financing of Al in Britain.
But now Al was being hailed as central to the fifth
generation programme. That turnaround was ra tiona lized
historically by some who had been critical of Al earlier: time, it 
was said, had not been right for Al in the 1970s. The situation 
now was said to be different. There was recognition of a need to 
expand research, development and training in Al. Al techniques 
were now central to the achievement of the intelligent knowledge 
based systems which the industrial and commercial world was 
said to expect to begin exploiting during the latter years of the 
1980s.
But how did time get to be right for Al? Had the Al 
community changed its emphasis? Certainly it was said to be 
less 'blue-sky' and to be concentrating on more attainable goals 
(industrially relevant). And it had also experienced some 
commercial success with expert systems, which was said to be 
responsible for interest in IKBS or, applied Al. Again, a Latourian 
account is possible. Donald Michie, a founding member of the Al 
community in Britain, responded v igorously  to the L ighth ill 
Report. He complained it was unfair and in the late 70s and early 
80s he set about the promotion of expert systems. (Expert 
Systems are based on Al frameworks for representing knowledge. 
The knowledge is specialized, for example medical knowledge and 
can be encoded in the form of rules.) Michie's activities appear to
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be typical of the heterogeneous engineer. In order to get industry 
interested in expert systems he organized conferences and a 
summer school and directed research into re levant areas. 
Besides that he used his column in the magazine Computer Weekly 
to promote Al as an important subject.3
*
The Al community, however, was somewhat confused by 
recent in terest.4 On the whole, it did not uphold the view that 
in formulating strategy long term and fundamental Al issues 
should be sacrificed at the expense of applied work for 
commercial payoff: that certainly is my impression based on 
conversations with workers within Al. My contact with them 
largely post-dates the establishment of the Alvey Programme, 
but certain ly they did not speak as researchers who had 
engineered a large scale programme.
Their reception of the programme was indeed ambivalent.
For some, their concern was with the commercialization of the
programme. Alvey was not welcomed unreservedly: they would,
3For a detailed account of the history of Al see (Fleck, 1982). Also under way at 
Edinburgh University is research into the commercialization of Al.
4See the article in Science April,1984 "Al leaves the laboratory".
they feared lose their research interests. In the university 
which is the focus of this thesis they were now being asked to be 
aware of their place in the real world where they would have to 
sell themselves and their results and to tune up on some key 
areas of industrial relevance: expert systems, learning and vision 
systems. Alvey was welcomed by this head of department as the 
'kiss of life' for Al. But for others there was confusion in the 
shape of: 'Why do they want us? What is it they think they are 
going to get?
The issue of explaining the Alvey Programme and how it 
came into being is not the subject of this thesis, however. It 
bears upon my research to the extent that the project I studied 
was part of the Alvey Programme. That programme, it is 
important to note, was not a clear set of guidelines to be given to 
the technical practitioners on how to shape Fifth Generation 
technology in the UK: 'Considerable confusion about concepts and
terminology exists, and it is important that this be cleared up as 
soon as possible' (Bundy, 1983). There was a need, therefore, for 
some social engineering beginning with the organisation of the Al 
community. For that confusion was one aspect of what a leading 




'(a) differences among referees and critics as to the criteria for 
judging Al research (b) the fragility of Al programs (c) the 
difficulty of rebuilding Al programs from published descriptions' 
(Ibid, p.3). But the malaise was something Bundy felt could be 
cured if researchers could, 'agree on the nature of Al, on the 
methodology for pursuing it and on the criteria for assessing it' 
(Ibid.). A step in that direction was Bundy's catalogue of Al which 
had been produced to encourage members of the Al community to 
communicate. That would be achieved by 'announcing the 
existence of techniques and portable software, and acting as a 
pointer into the literature5 . Thus the Al community will have 
access to a common, extensional definition of the field, which 
will: provide a common terminology, discourage the reinvention of 
the wheel, and act as a c learing house fo r ideas and 
so ftw are '( lb id -) .
Similarily, it was claimed by the the jo in t Science and.
Engineering Research Council and Department of Industry ’s
Industrial Awareness group that industrialists were not clear on
5This catalogue was firs t com piled as part of the IKBS A rch itecture Study, 
(Bundy, 1983), and was later published seperately as a book, (Bundy, 1986 ).
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what benefits they could get from Al. A major obstacle to 
getting IKBS taken up by industry was said to be a lack of 
awareness among industry's decision makers - senior executives 
- about the benefits of IKBS. A report on IKBS marketing and
awareness stated that, 'An IKBS initiative must have the support 
of a wide subset of UK industry - IT users and potential IT users. 
A prerequisite commitment from wide sectors of industry is a 
real understanding of the issues of IKBS and the potential 
benefits to be accrued from their use. We argue that this
understanding is at present deficient. In the absence of a 
minimum th resho ld  of understand ing, any m ajor pub lic ity  
initiatives are to be unsuccessful by failing to reach and convince 
industrial sectors responsible for executive decision' (Industrial 
Group Report, 1983). This process of social engineering it was 
claimed 'will not be easy or informal. It will require a great deal
of thought, organisation and preparation: because IKBS is an
obscure, difficult area of which most senior m anagement will 
know virtually nothing' (Fox, 1983, Vol. 1, p.30). And so the 
education of executives was considered to be a necessary 
component of successful technology transfer.
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The programme's industrial awareness, marketing and 
demonstrator group recommended that there be 'real EXEMPLARS 
of large knowledge based systems' to provide statistics and 
benchmarks for acceptable 1KBS on which executives in industry 
could base decisions. Awareness programmes were to run 
alongside the research and development programme. Uncertainty 
as to the benefits would involve education of industry: educating 
the technical community about user needs; getting potential user 
companies and other organisations to educate researchers in 
universities and industry about their real requirements for IKBS.
The so-called Demonstrator projects would be one such 
benchmark important in helping to render IKBS availab le for 
decision making by senior executives to use and consume 
information technology. The Demonstrator projects were to be 
prototypes of possible future systems'. The Science and 
Engineering Research Council and Department of Trade and 
Industry IKBS Arch itecture  Study made it c lea r tha t the
'initiative for Demonstrator Projects  [setting them up in the
real Alvey world].... must come from Industry, ra ther than 
Academia.' (Wilks, 1983, p.2). The Demonstrators were not to be
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stages involved in the production of a very complicated electro­
mechanical product, meant that it was taking on board the 
building of what was known as the 'The Factory of the Future'. In 
order to provide background to this particu lar Large Scale 




The Factory of the Future
The 'Manufacture-from-Design' project that I studied for 
fifteen months was one of the Alvey programme's four Large 
Scale Demonstrator projects. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter these were large scale projects designed to produce 
proto type advanced inform ation techno logy p roducts . The 
intention was to demonstrate the utility of the products and 
thereby create 'market puli' for fully com m erc ia l products  
produced by the companies involved in the programme. They were 
show pieces for IKBS and the other targeted technologies to 
demonstrate that this technology could be shaped into products 
worthwhile to industry. A vital element of the demonstrators 
was their composition: a mix of industrialists and academics 
with the hope that the former could shape results in the 
laboratory into commercially valid products. The demonstrators 
were not complete without a 'user', an industrial co llaborator 
who would intend to use the finished system. That way, it was 
claimed, the utility of the project could be demonstrated.
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My first introduction to the M anufacture from Design 
project was a description of it in an early issue of Alvpy Npwg: 
'["Manufacture from Design"] is the title of the system proposed 
by the Factory Automation System Technology division of [British 
Electronic Businesses] working with the Artif ic ia l Intelligence 
Department of [Cally Univers ity ]...The system will u lt imately 
allow design concepts to be input at one end and the product 
which includes maintenance data, to come out at the other. The 
demonstrator will provide a skeleton system for the whole 
process, with human intervention being kept to a minimum. The 
system will do automatically most of the detailed design work, 
process planning, machining of parts and assembly ' (Clarke,
1983).1
A Response to Industry's Needs?
The project's goal was claimed to be a response to growing
interest and concern about m anufacturing industry: ' This
ambitious project addresses an area of the highest importance to
British manufacturing industry.... the aim is to develop a new
1 Manufacture from Design is a pseudonym. So too are British Electrical 
Businesses and Cally University. A complete table of collaborators appears in 
chapter four.
generat ion of computer integrated manufacturing. This integrated 
approach  is applied from the design stage through production 
planning and automated assembly to field m aintenance and 
support. At all these stages IKBS techniques will be used to 
capture and apply the skills and knowledge of human operators' (,
1984). The way things happened on the factory floor affected 
productivity and it was that which was said to need changing in 
an environment of increasing competition: 'Nations that have 
enjoyed com petitive  advantages in the past find that the 
technologies they previously exploited so successfully can no 
longer give them the margin of profit required to remain 
competitive. These industrialized nations are re-discovering that 
they need more advanced manufacturing technologies ' (Suh, 
1984b).
A 'factory of the future' was fast becoming a fam iliar 
rallying cry to manufacturing industry. New journa ls  were 
claiming to have been 'born in this challenging climate ... hoping 
to provide the intellectual base that can accelerate the practical 
implementation of industrial manufacturing technology based on 
computers and flexible manufacturing technologies' (ibid.). To be 
competitive, it was claimed, most companies would be forced to
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adopt new manufacturing technologies. And for the technologists 
themselves Advanced Manufacturing Technology gave them much 
to look forward to, 'The thought of the "Factory of the Future" is 
certainly exciting and enticing to engineers and technologists. It 
will enable us to put into practice all those wonderful technical 
accomplishments of the past and which are possible through 
further research and development' (Suh, 1984a). Conferences on 
manufacturing were also dedicated to encouraging changes in 
manufacturing and offered advice on how to build the factory of 
the future2.
All these sources claimed that the key to success was to
see the whole of the manufacturing process as a to ta lly
integrated activity from the arrival of the raw material to the
delivery of the finished product. When envisaged this way,
manufacturing was not a series of discrete physical operations
that went into making a product but a process of information
tlow, where 'machines and people are told what to do on the basis
of creating, sorting, transmitting, analyzing and modifying all the
data involved' (Financial T im es. March 14, 1983). For such an
2 For example, a Conference organized by Arthur D. Little Inc., "The Strategic 
Benefits of Computer Aided Manufacturing" London, March 1983. (1983 )
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information flow the various aspects of production would have to 
have access to a common database. That was the so-called 
essence of Computer Integrated Manufacture: 'an e lectron ic 
co llection of all the relevant information about the design, 
production and materials of the product - to which all the 
interested people and machines have immediate access' (ibid.). 
As information moves between the stages of manufacture - 
design, planning, machining and assembly - so it moves from 
com pute r aided design systems, to num erica lly  con tro lled  
machine tools to robots. This requires the instructions to set the 
appropriate machine tool in motion, then to perform operations 
like drilling, milling or turning in an appropriate order before 
moving onto the assembly stage where the various components 
are put together. All that requires a great deal of management: 
machines have to be scheduled to receive the material at the 
planned time. That in turn requires a lot of knowledge about the 
process as a whole.
In a computer-controlled network Al had a role to play in 
this management. Activity in industry was said to be at present a 
piecemeal activity guided and coordinated in an approximate
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manner by the judgements, experience and interactions of the 
management and the workforce. But the application of Advanced 
M anufacturing  Technology could be a means of assisting 
judgements and decision-making by processing information in a 
predictive way and reducing the dependence on intuition. And 'In 
the future the use of artificial intelligence, including "expert 
systems" where human experience and know-how are incorporated 
w ithin a computational framework can be looked on as an 
im portan t deve lopm ent of AMT, aimed at im prov ing the 
exploitation of industrial methods and/or retrieving information' 
(Heginbotham, 1985)
'Automate,  emigrate,  or evap grate'
Not only could what the collaborators were attempting to do 
be p resen ted  as part of a recogn ised prob lem  facing 
manufacturing industry but also the Manufacture from Design 
collaborators themselves were not unique in attempting to build a 
factory of the future. There were others interested in what was. 
being described as 'The race for the automatic factory' (F o r tu n e . 
21 February, 1983). In the United States major companies like 
General Electric, Westinghouse and IBM were all making plans for
future factories. For General Electric the move into 'the emerging 
megamarket of factory automation' seemed inevitable. Employees 
sported T-shirts that read 'Automate, emigrate, or evaporate,' the 
slogan used...to jolt customers into modernizing their factories' 
( Fo r t u  n e . November 11, 1985). By getting into automated 
factories General Electric was changing its corporate strategy 
away from consumer products, nuclear power plants and je t 
engines. It was aiming to become the biggest supplier of factory 
automation equipment in the US and Europe. An announcement 
which the Mayor of Lynn, Massachusetts called the 'greatest thing 
that ever happened' (Schlefer, 1985, p.24).
A Crisis of Profit?
These participants' views are echoed by those of academic 
analysts, though these naturally often do not share the Mayor's 
facile optimism. The economist Raphael Kaplinsky cites the 
growth in competition, the faltering of global economic expansion 
and the emergence of depression brought about by the twin 
problems of conflict between capitals and the conflict between 
cap ita l and labour as the motivating forces for cap ita l 's  




The Manufacture from Design project can easily be seen as 
fitting within this framework of explanation. The collaborators, 
it could be said, are being swept along, by the tide of economic 
necessity, to introduce automation technologies in the hope of 
making suffic ient margins of profit to survive an increasingly 
com petitive environment. Kaplinsky has tried to explain the 
'progression' of automated technology as separate processes to 
the eventual 'factory of the future' where the various 'spheres' of 
production are integrated: under computer control the operations
of design, planning, machining and assembly are co-ordinated. 
This in turn would allow m anufacturers to be flex ib le  in 
production: they can change the batches of a product from large
to small by altering the programming instructions. This would 
mean that machinery would not have to be reconfigured or 
disbanded everytime a production run changed. It was in the area 
of small batch production that Computer Integrated Manufacture 
would, it was claimed, make a big impact. The small batch 
producers could respond quickly and easily to the market 
whenever demand for a product changed. Kaplinsky's historical 
argum ent interprets the strategies of firms such as General 
Electric, IBM and Westinghouse as a response to a global
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economic crisis which has its roots in a post-war economy.
A Crisis of Control?
David Noble has argued that technical change in the 
workplace is shaped by managements wish to control and deskill 
labour (Noble, 1986b) . In his view, the drive to the factory of the 
future is no different: motivated by the desire to control labour, 
technologists, the military and management proceed to subject 
more work on the shop floor to the control of management. Al is 
just a further development in the continuing trend to turn human 
experience and skills, the 'know-how' of manufacturing into a 
machine-readable form. Indeed Al makes it possible to wrest 
control from so-called mental labour: the designers (Cooley, 
1981). For David Noble profit is not the motive for the change in 
technology, but instead it is the continued desire of capital to 
control and dominate labour which feeds the drive for total 
automation: 'Propelled anew by intensifying competition and the 
increasing cost not only of labour but of energy, raw materials, 
and capital, and driven as before by the interwoven impulses of 
management, the military, and technical enthusiasts, the rush 
toward the automatic factory and the queer quest for a perfectly
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ordered universe continue unabated' (Noble, 1986, p.328).
'Inside tomorrow's factory'
What then were Manufacture from Design's collaborators' 
plans for a factory of the future? An early description of the 
Manufacture from Design project put the collaborators goals 
somewhere in the past instead of the future: the article explained 
that the drive to tomorrow's technology was an attempt to get 
back to the days of the 'craftsman' when the knowledge of design 
and manufacturing were combined in a single person. A history of 
mechanization, it was claimed, had separated those tasks and 
created the problems manufacturing was now faced with today. 
The aim of the project was therefore: 'to re-integrate design and 
manufacture in the highly automated workshop of the future' 
(Financial T im es. April, 1983).
The project was considered to be challenging and ambitious 
in its plan to get back to this time but with advanced technology, 
specifically the techniques of Al. Al may have been thought of by 
many people as a subject 'for the birds' but the Manufacture from 
Design p ro jec t was, according to a BEB spokesm an, a
collaboration between 'some hard-headed firms' and universities 
intended to address the 'real' problems of manufacturing industry 
(ibid.).
The factory of tomorrow, however, was far from being
anything like a working ensemble of the sophisticated Fifth 
Generation software and hardware applied to manufacturing. The 
Manufacture from Design system began life as something more 
like a child's toy. A wooden table-top model showed a designer
sitting in front of a control terminal issuing commands which
automatically translated into instructions for the stages between 
the arrival of the raw material to its final appearance as a
salable product. But this wooden model, which must have looked 
so out of place on a desk in Britain's largest electronics company, 
was an ideal, a projection into the future. The collaborators of 
Manufacture from Design had five years to 'breathe life into this 
wooden model, and make it the world's first fully integrated 
factory...under the guidance of a thinking computer' (ibid.). I was 
going to witness them perform this metamorphosis. But how was 
it to be accomplished?
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Although almost every article about Computer Integrated
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Manufacturing, or CIM, was accompanied by a block diagram 
depicting elements of production connected up to one another by 
arrows, showing an ideal state of integration, the route to CIM 
was acknowledged to be uncertain and not without hitches. There 
seemed less certainty about what that next move would consist 
of or how far off the factory of the future would be: 
' A M L + P C = C IM ? ' 3 asked one article, while another stated 
Tom orrow appears to have run into a little trouble' as customers 
resisted taking on board the output of robotics manufacturers 
(Financial T imes, September 8, 1983)4.
As we follow the actors trying to breathe life into the 
wooden model, will we find what they do determ ined by 
something outside of them - an autonomous logic of technology, 
economic process or the demands of capitalist domination? Or 
will they be like Latour's system builders, creating technological 
trajectories, markets and social groups as they go along?
3 A  Manufacturing Language plus a Eersonal Computer equals Computer in tegrated 
M anufacturing? (Sharon, 1985).
4Equating assembly with robotics exaggerates the extent of their use. For example 
one article on factory automation is entitled: 'Robots: why tomorrow has been 
delayed'. (Financial T im es. September 8, 1983)
To start with, however, we need to know something more 




Building a Project and a Team
The Project Proposal
One of my earliest introductions to this drama and its 
players came in the shape of several large ring binders: the so- 
called 'Study Report'. The following is a list of the principal
actors who feature in my story.
Dramatis Personas.
Cally University: Peter Crigbank
(Artificial Intelligence Department) (Chief Investigator)
Working on designer system.
Jim Watson (site manager) 
Tony Innes (programmer)
Craig Ward (programmer) 
Howard Jacobs (programmer) 
Mark Robbins (programmer) 
Helen (1 st secretary)
Paula (2nd secretary)
Professor Smith (head of dept.)
British Electrical Business (BEB): 
(Industrial Collaborators)
Managing Manufacture from Design 
p ro jec t
Bill Wilkie (1st overall manager) 
Tracey Hall (software manager) 
Alan Rogers (systems manager)





Nancy Thomas (site manager) 
David Curtis
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BEB M achines: 
(D iv is io n  o f BEB)
Factory  C ontro l:
G ordon  C o llins  (1s t s ite  m anager) 
Reg S co tt (2nd s ite  m anager)
Reams:
( In d u s tr ia l c o lla b o ra to r )
End-user o f the system : p rov id ing  
fa c to ry  env iro nm en t fo r dem onstra tion  
o f m anufacture from design. A lso  
prov id ing  know ledge about design o f 
fue l in jection pum p: the end-user 
p roduc t.
E ric  C a te r(s ite  m an ag e r)
H um an and Techno logy
In te rfa c e  In s titu te  (H A T I): C oncern is w ith so c io -tech n ica l
. system s and  the usab ility  o f the 
des igne r system .
F rank Ja ckson  (1st s ite  m anager) 
C live  M in t (s ite  m a n a g e r/re s e a rc h e r)
Deen U n ive rs ity : W orking on so lid  m odelling.
Joe B la ir (s ite  m a n a g e r/p ro g ra m m e r)
T a lc o t  U n iv e rs ity : W orking on process planning.
Sam P arsons (s ite  m a n a g e r/p ro g ra m m e r)
NB: O th e r c o lla b o ra to rs in c lu d e : BEB A v io n ics  w o rk ing  on m a in tenance . A nd 
a G o ve rn m e n t L a b o ra to ry  re s p o n s ib le  fo r ro b o t c a lib ra tio n . T h ey  do no t 
fe a tu re  in th is  s to rys in ce  th e ir  in flu e n ce  a t th is  in it ia l s ta g e  o f the  p ro je c t 
w a s  m in im al?
1 But for those on the project - and more often m anagement - it must be 
remembered that there were often uncertainties about when a site should be making 
a contribution. Concerns were something like; when should the maintenance group 
be contributing? The uncertainty was with whether Alvey would be expecting to see 
maintenance work tackled as reports were submitted on the progress of individual 
site work.
The study report was the proposal put to Alvey for 
acceptance as a large scale demonstrator project and as such it 
was a compilation of the 'technical' contributions to be made by 
the, initially, nine collaborators. Each particular expertise would 
correspond to a different aspect of the manufacturing life-cycle, 
from design through to machining, assembly and maintenance. 
The aim was to create a manufacturing system 'where all the 
stages are a lmost all automatic ' in order to 'allow human 
intervention to be kept to a minimum' (Study Report).
In pursuit of this goal it was necessary 'to capture the 
skills and knowledge of the human operatives used in the manual 
counterpart.' It was current practice, the report claimed, for 
m anufacturing in form ation to be transferred by means of 
engineering drawings. >The human producer and recipient of 
engineering drawings converted 2-D lines into orders for raw 
materials, instructions for machine tools to perform operations, 
and information about how to assemble the component. In other 
words, more and more information is derived from and added to a 
drawing. This is possible, the Report suggested, because the 
various people involved in turning a drawing into a functioning 
component share a 'large common knowledge base'; everyone in
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the process shares the language and the ability to understand and 
interpret the conventions, implied instructions and manufacturing 
p rac t ices .
But that, according to one spokesman for the project, was a 
process 'fraught with problems.' With so many people involved 
'Mismatch between their work results in faults. There is the 
ever-present possibility of human error. Often design problems 
remain undetected until the cost of their error is considerable.' 
The task of the co llaborators, then, was to by-pass the 
engineering drawing by letting a design knowledge base - the 
designer system - talk directly to the machines which cannot 
read drawings. To achieve automation it was going to be 
necessary, the Report claimed, to convert that human knowledge 
into a form that could be used by an automatic plant. Therefore, 
it was suggested, since this common knowledge base was set in 
motion from the moment the designer put pen to paper it was 
crucial to begin the automation process at that stage. The. 
purpose of the project - to demonstrate that a system could be 
developed that would 'capture and use such a common knowledge 
base' - meant that the producer and the recipient of engineering
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knowledge were not going to be human beings but computer 
hardware and software. In the Manufacture from Design project, 
therefore, it would be computer hardware and software which 
would have to share a common knowledge base. And that was the 
principle of Computer Integrated Manufacture.
Thought to be im portant to the pro ject by all the 
collaborators was the designer system to be developed by the 
team of Al researchers at Cally university. They were going to be 
responsible for building the intelligent knowledge base through 
which it was suggested the other collaborators programs would 
be required to interact. The knowledge base would essentially 
have to represent the knowledge of mechanical engineering 
designers in a way that would make this possible. Deen 
University were to work with Cally on geometric modelling of the 
design of a component. Talcot University were to write the 
process planning program which worked out what machine tool 
operations were needed and in what sequence to machine the 
component described in the design. Talcot's program would need 
access to the information about the shape of a component 
provided by the geometric modeller developed by Deen. After the
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machining operations have been planned, this information is used 
with the machining knowledge provided by another BEB company, 
BEB Machining to drive the machine tools. BEB Assemblers were 
responsible for the assembly of the parts by their Bluebottle 
robot. Parts in turn may have to be conveyed between machines; 
in this case Automated Guided Vehicles (AGV's) were to do the 
transporting.
In order to make the project 'realistic' it included the user 
group, Reams, a large producer of fuel pumps. Reams would 
contribute their design expertise in building fuel pumps to build 
the knowledge base for a fuel injection pump composed of over 
200 parts. How these parts were designed and went together to 
pump fuel at a certain pressure was the task of the designer 
system. The pump, which was believed to have a great deal of 
market potential, was to provide the data for the knowledge base.
These contributions were intended to break down the. 
barriers to integrated automation by creating, at the design 
stage, the instructions necessary to set in motion the operations 
of planning, machining and assembly. In the Study Report these
various contributions culminated in cartoon-like block diagrams: 
a possible factory layout of the future and the flow of knowledge 
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A lot of the Study Report made no sense whatsoever to me. 
It was really only the introduction and the conclusions I could 
follow. They seemed to justify the existence of the project in 
language and with reasons with which I was fam ilia r: the 
dictates of international competition and a response to the calls 
made by British manufacturing industry to do something about 
inflexibility in manufacturing - especially in the areas of small- 
batch manufacturing and mechanical engineering. The emphasis 
was on 'products of relevance to British industry'.
Competition would get steadily fiercer and the UK market 
would remain stagnant, the Study Report claimed: 'Manufacturing 
industry is not in a good position to meet this challenge, not just 
because our p roductiv ity  lags behind tha t of our major 
competitors, but more importantly because the UK is suffering 
from a crit ica l shortage of production and m anufacturing  
engineers and designers ... It is essential to make use of new 
technology in our traditional business areas to improve our 
competitiveness.'
At this stage there seemed to be an overlap between the
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project and the outside world with which I could make some 
connection. The project was claimed to be a response to this 
problem. Somehow the bits and pieces described in the middle of 
the Study Report would have to go together to solve the problem.
But was the M anu fac tu re  from Design p ro jec t a 
s t r a ig h t fo r w a rd  t e c h n i c a l  answer to the prob lem s of 
m anufacturing? Manufacture from Design had a history, a 
background, which suggests that the formation of the Study 
Report and the relationships which were said to exist between 
the various aspects of manufacturing were much more complex 
than that.
From little to large: the antecedents to 'Manufacture from Design'
1: Putting the cart before the horse: The Relationship between Design and Assembly.
The Manufacture from Design project had a precursor in the 
shape of a project entitled Design and Make. That project, I was 
told, had been hatched from an association between Cally's chief 
investigator Peter Crigbank and staff from BEB Assemblers who 
met on the Robot Working Party funded by the Science and 
Engineering Research Council. BEB and Cally had initially been
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interested in the robot language Rapt developed at Cally as a way 
of representing the information necessary to drive the BEB force- 
sensing robot. The Rapt language was a high-level Al language for 
robots. Rapt described the way objects went together to
com plete  an assembly operation in terms of the ir spatia l
re lationships: 'In RAPT we need to describe assemblies of
complex bodies and the actions required to bring them together. 
A situation is a state of bodies composing the robot's world,
which state the programmer has chosen to describe, usually by 
specifying spatial relationships between features of some of the 
bodies. ... Bodies are described in terms of their features which 
are plane faces, and cylindrical shafts and holes.'
F I G .A . 3
RAPT CODE AND BODIES BEING 
RELATED 
MINROB = SUBASS/AGENT,PERM;
AGAINST/HTOP1 OF SLIDE1,RLTO P1;
A G A IN S T/HFR 01 OF SLIDE1.RLFR01;
REMARK. These tw o  statements specify that the square rail 
fi ts the square hole in the SL ID E 1 ; 
FITS/RGPEG1.SHOLE1;
FITS/RGPEG2.SHOLE2;
REMARK These last two statements determine that the 
rignt gripper is only able to move vertically with 
respect to the slide;
FITS/RGPEG3.LGHOLE 1 ;
FITS/RGPEG4.LGHOLE2;
REMARK So the left gripper can only move horizontally 
w ith  respect to the right gripper; 
T IE D/R IG H TG 1,LEFTG 1;
REMARK The left and right gripper are in it ia lly tied; 
TERSUB
Fig.4 MINROB: The (hypothetical) robot used ii 
example.
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Cally and BEB, however, stopped talking about robot 
languages per se and started talking about design, said Cally's 
chief investigator Peter Crigbank. An application was needed for 
RAPT and so RAPT became a way of talking about the design 
process.
The search for that application led to the Design and Make 
project proposal. Design and Make proposed a different way of 
considering the relationship between design and assembly (and to 
a limited extent machining). And that, Crigbank suggested, 'partly 
arose from my observation, that others had made, of course, that 
how you tell robots what to do is tied up with what they think 
they are doing which means knowing what they are assembling or 
what they are working on. Therefore it's useful if they have 
access to design information. Most people who considered the 
relationship between design and assembly had put the horse 
before the cart. I, however, put the cart before the horse. When 
the horse is in front most people would say we've got this design 
information, we will use it to drive robots: I said that this way of 
talking about the way things go together, how parts are related to 
one another captures a lot about design ... spatial relationships
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which is actually a good way of talking about design.' No longer 
confined to just robots, the RAPT language was put forward as a 
way of dealing with the integration of design and assembly.
To prove the feasibility of this relationship the Design and 
Make project was to involve only a few collaborators (principally 
Cally and BEB), concentrating on the design and assembly of a 
robot gripper for a period of 3 years. However, the Design and 
Make project had failed to convince the Science and Engineering 
Research Council that there was a place for it within any of its 
existing categories: each department saw Design and Make as the 
business of another with the result that Design and Make ended up 
’falling between two stools', as it was historically referred to 
within the project. However, not long after Design and Make's 
fa ilure an opportunity  came along for it to get funded as 
som eth ing  e lse. That was M anu fac tu re  from Design. 
Manufacuture from Design, I was told, had grown out of Design 
and Make. But in what way?
2; A shower of gold and a big bucket to catch it.
'When Alvey came along', as Crigbank put it, it represented a
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'shower of gold' to the failed Design and Make project. However, 
according to one of Design and Make's original founder's, David 
Curtis from BEB Assemblers (research), there was no Computer 
Integrated Manufacturing slot within the Alvey programme into 
which the Design and Make proposal could fit. Not wishing to see 
it again fall in between two stools (i.e. not wishing to see it 
suffer the same fate as it had done previously) there had to be a 
way of getting the project accepted. Large Scale Demonstrator 
money was seen to be a way to get funding. There was never any 
doubt about what should be a demonstrator project, according to 
Crigbank: 'The Al department at Cally had not discussed several 
possibilities for a demonstrator project - it was Design and Make 
from the beginning.' According to Crigbank, 'Alvey had postulated 
the existence of Large Scale Demonstrators and we wanted our 
paws on some of that money.' To that end Design and Make became 
Manufacture from Design.
BEB and Cally set about changing Design and Make's spots in 
order to get the money. As Crigbank put it, 'Alvey was a shower 
of gold and we needed a big bucket to catch it.' An important step 
was to change the name from the homely, 'Design and Make' to
'M an u fa c tu re  from  Design' because as C rigbank put it: 
'manufacture sounded much more commercial.' The change of 
name was much lamented by Crigbank. A big bucket needed to be 
constructed: 'because we wanted to paint a canvas of a Large 
Scale Demonstrator for Alvey and we wanted more money.' The 
project, Crigbank told me, was dealing with the problems of
British manufacturing and competition, 'because we wanted the 
m o n e y . ’ A bigger bucket was an increase in the number of 
co llabora tors  from Design and Make's two, to the nine of
Manufacture from Design's project proposal: 'There was more 
money so therefore it had to be larger scale. If there is more
money and you can't spend it all on computers you are going to
have to involve more people. We couldn't spend it on trips to the 
Bahamas. That was enough money to do the technical work. I'm 
not a frenetic empire builder: that was enough to get on with it.'
A mixture of considerations seem to have been involved in 
the selection of collaborators. For example, a lthough Cally 
wanted the modelling skills of Deen, they also wanted to work 
with another university, believing that way they would have more 
in common, and get along better than if they got the modeller and 
modeller skills from a commercial firm. (However what it meant
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to get on with is not always explicit. BEB choose Reams on the 
grounds that they were likely to get on well with them as a user 
group: there could be few fights over exploitation.)
And involving a user company meant a different product to 
be made. Indeed it was a product for which Reams had high hopes 
of commercia l success. A robot gripper is not uncomplicated in 
its composition but it is a lot less daunting than a fuel injection 
pump whose 200 parts must synchronise to pump fuel at the right 
pressure at the right time.
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That a place was established for Manufacture from Design
within the Alvey programme was most likely helped along by the
role of BEB personnel within the Alvey programme. As Crigbank
put it: 'Corporations are not monoliths, indeed some would say
that BEB was Alvey. After all BEB had a lot of involvement in the
programme.' That an ex-BEB worker was in control of the Large
Scale Dem onstra to r pro jects may have helped to secure
Manufacture from Design's place in the programme. This was a
point noted by Crigbank at a meeting to choose whether
M anufacture from Design or another s im ilar project should
receive the Demonstrator funds. The Manufacture from Design
co llabo ra to rs  were apparently  in com petit ion  with another
consortium  who were also tackling integrated manufacture.
Crigbank remarked on the d iff icu lt task faced by the BEB
employee in control of the Large Scale Demonstrator funds. A
meeting was held to choose which of the two consortiums were
to get the funding for a Large Scale Demonstrator project.
Crigbank looked back on the episode and recalled with a laugh, 'To
give Lawrence his due he did try his best to be impartial!'2 The
2The role of BEB within the programme raises some important questions about the 
relationship between big business and the state. It was afterall a frequent complaint 
of the programme by small businesses that the big electronics companies were 
dominating Alvey funding and held a disproportionate share of the projects. By June
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process p lanning co llabora to r that Cally had wanted was 
forfeited for a BEB choice, Talcot university. It was, said Peter, 
just one of those things. BEB Machines were going to be working 
c losely with the process planning collaborators. They were 
friends, 'we decided to work together over a drink one night', a 
member of the BEB Machines team told a gathering of 
co l la b o ra to rs .
However, the Manufacture from Design's project was not a
complete moulding of the Alvey programme's Demonstrator funds.
In one important respect the original Manufacture from Design's
project proposal was not quite a big enough bucket to appear
'complete ' to the policy planners. One technical factor was
missing from the scenario: Man Machine Interface, MMI. Without
this contribution the Study Report was deemed to be incomplete
since MMI was being hailed as crucial to the success of the
programme, specifically its commercial success. A technology
which could be used  by real designers was a technology which
would sell. And so with the Manufacture from Design's inclusion
1987 BEB held the most number of projects, 51 out of a total of 197 projects in a 
programme involving 115 firms. Although not chronological with this case-study it 
is a statistic that throws some light on what is meant by a national programme.
of the team of MMI specialists, from the Human and Technology 
Interaction centre, HATI, the proposal was nearly complete. 
H o w e v e r ,  one final crucial p iece of he te rogeneous activ ity  
remained in order to secure the project. That was to convince 
Alvey that the technologies in the proposal together constituted a 
Large Scale Demonstrator project and not Enabling Technology.
K no w le d ge  C re a tion  o r K now ledge  A p p lic a tio n ?
The central issue was to define the status of the project. 
Was it to be the creation of new knowledge, or the application of 
existing knowledge? Where was the project to be located on the 
continuum  from 'sc ience ' to 'technology', from 'fundam enta l 
research' to 'development of a product?'
It may sound strange that this was an issue at all, that it 
was not self-evident. But, as studies of the relationship between 
science and technology have shown there is no clear-cut cognitive 
d iffe rence between these apparently quite d istinct activ ities. 
Rather, the boundary between them is a constructed one (see 
Barnes & Edge, 1982, Part Three).
Which side of the boundary to place Manufacture from
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Design on was an important issue for several reasons. BEB had 
commercia l interests in shaping the Manufacture from Design 
project into a Large Scale Demonstrator project and not into 
enabling technology. An important feature of the Large Scale 
Demonstrators from the point of view of the Alvey programme 
was that they should encourage technology transfer by bringing 
academics and industrial teams together on joint projects. And 
in terms of the programme as a whole it was intended that the 
demonstrator projects should provide the 'technological hooks' on 
which to hang the more research-based enabling technologies 
areas: IKBS, MMI, VLSI and Software Engineering. In this way it L 
was intended that the demonstrator projects provide direction to 
enabling technology. To do this it was intended that they have a 
more assured research path in order to act as a 'puli' on the 
enabling technologies. The demonstrators then were not being 
seen by the policy p lanners in terms of the trad it iona l 
hierarchical model which treats technology as applied science or 
the linear model of the development of a product as the 
application or extension of fundamental research. Rather the 
more assured paths of the dem onstra tor pro jects were to 
feedback into the cognitive resources for the enabling technology
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projects.
Apart from building necessary techno log ica l capability , 
according to the report of the Alvey Committee another reason it 
was important to have a workable distinction between the Large 
Scale Demonstrators and the enabling technologies was, it was 
said, because the demonstrators were in a privileged position in 
that the industrial collaborators would receive the profits from 
the eventual exploitation. An important consideration for the 
policy planners was therefore to make sure that anything which 
might be considered enabling technology would not be caught up 
w ithin dem onstra tor projects. The enabling technology was 
im portant to what Alvey referred to as the 'pre-competitive ' 
stage of research. Pre-competitive was geared toward the 
production of enabling technologies. These would not necessarily 
be commercially salable products but would allow companies to 
have the resou rces  for innova tion  to ensure  na tiona l 
competitiveness. The pre-competitive stage was to be followed 
by the competitive stage.
Alvey, according to BEB's project management, did not wish
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to lose control over IKBS and its transfer to Industry In general. 
This might happen if it stayed within a demonstrator project and 
In the hands of two companies. But IKBS was, of course, 
attractive to industry and BEB wanted to make sure it did not lose 
the potential commercial advantages it might offer them.
As far as BEB was concerned they had to make sure that the 
various parts, the likely contributions of each collaborator stayed 
together within the demonstrator. This system, they claimed, 
would consist almost entirely of existing hardware and software, 
and so could not be hived off into enabling technology. BEB could 
not, of course, be seen to be protecting IKBS for their own profit: 
'Alvey is trying to alter our perception and transfer Manufacture 
from Design to enabling technology. They think they tell us what 
is enabling technology and we think we tell them.'
So it was important in respect of the Alvey guidelines that 
the Manufacture from Design project was seen to be application 
work when it was brought under scrutiny by Alvey. When BEB 
made an application for more money they were told by Alvey that 
there were insufficient funds within the demonstrator coffers; if
they wanted more they would have to get it from enabling 
technology funds. That was seen by BEB management as Alvey's 
attempt to shift Cally's work on a designer system for the 
representation of design knowledge into the realm of enabling 
technology.
The task was therefore to be able to present the parts of the 
system  as in te rre la ted , that toge ther they constitu ted  an 
application of IKBS technology and that they only made sense if 
connected. Management played devil's advocate and ro le-p layed '- 
the possib le responses that Alvey might raise against the 
d e s igne r system . It was becoming apparent that presenting 
Manufacture from Design as a demonstrator project was not 
f oo l p r oo f ;  the role-playing going on made it evident that there 
was no clear-cut boundary. As far as the management, who 
represented the commercial interests of BEB, could see they 
could not provide a technical reason for the configuration: 
contributions/parts  could just as easily be seen as enabling 
technology as they could be argued for demonstrator. Their role- 
playing tactic got the response, ’whose side are you on?’ from 
some of the collaborators. To which management replied that it 
was not a question of taking sides, but of presenting a persuasive
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argument when they had to deal with the Alvey representative. 
According to management there was nothing to ensure that the 
system would not be hived off into enabling technology. The 
definition of the software was flexible according to where they 
wanted the funding to come from, but there was nothing that 
made it absolutely application technology in isolation from BEB's 
commercial considerations. Since they wanted all the work to be 
funded by Demonstrator funds they had to present the work as 
app lica t ion  techno logy. The ir reasoning had a ring of 
commonsense circularity about it: 'It is because it is. It’s all or
nothing. We just tell Alvey they can't have it'. There was no 
scale or spectrum on which to measure the IKBS as applied or 
enabling technology: 'the representation of design knowledge is 
not for anyone else, it's for this project.’ However, what they 
needed, management suggested, was an explanation 'more suited 
to Blunte's position than simply, "he can't have it".' Blunte was a 
member of the Alvey Directorate staff responsible for making 
sure that research aims were not mixed in with the goals of the 
dem onstra tor projects.
I don't how it was made to appear to Blunte as integrated
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through talk. It was, however, a g r e e d  that it was something 
that could not be settled, outside of practice: if when they did it 
it was proving to be research, fundamental and not yet ready for 
exploitation i.e not sure how turns out. But one rhetorical device 
was used to help sway the project on the side of demonstrator 
project: as a Cally member told me, 'Basically we lied to Blunte. 
We told him we'd make available for enabling technology anything 
that we considered research.' (What it means to make a 
'technology available' is an interesting issue. In the context of 
this discussion it meant revealing enough about the research for 
others to work on but not enough that they could easily exploit it: 
and that centered on what representations were revealing, 
diagrams, code etc. In a later and different issue we will see 
that just what it meant to 'reveal' the technology was the subject 
of much interpretation.)
We have seen that BEB had their particular commercial 
reasons for classifying Manufacture from Design as a Large Scale 
Demonstrator. But did Cally also stand to gain from such a 
status? Jim Watson supported the view that the system should 
be a Large Scale Demonstrator. So when I asked him about this I
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was surprised to hear him say that Cally had more to gain - in 
other words, it was to their 'real' advantage - to be classified as 
enabling technology. To have classified the work as enabling 
technology was, Jim Watson explained to me, in their interests as 
academics. They could have spoken to others at conferences and 
they would be able to write papers and been a member of the 
Alvey IKBS club where they could have exchanged ideas with other 
academics. And Jim Watson could get his name known in the 
academic community.
Just as with BEB, however, the basis of Cally's cognition 
was not 'nature', 'science' or even existing technology. Rather the 
determinants of cognition were quite clearly social. The basis of 
cognition were c a lc u la tio n s ,  made by Cally on the state of the 
current situation; did they stand to lose out by altering the co­
operation between themselves and BEB? In other words was it to 
their advantage to stick with the decision for a Large Scale 
Demonstrator project? This is what Jim Watson asked himself. 
Having agreed to go along with BEB, Cally decided to remain in the 
Large Scale Demonstrator collaboration. If Cally had backed out 
in favour of getting enabling technology funds, Jim Watson
argued, BEB may have withdrawn all support. In other words 
Cally may have been left without any project at all. There was
also the question of future funding both with BEB and with others
if Cally became known as an organization which retracted an 
initial collaboration. So what sort of 'choice' was it that Cally 
was faced with? Their calculations took into consideration their 
perceived ability to shape and mould the interests of BEB in line 
with their own. BEB, as Cally were aware, was the dominant 
industrial concern in the Alvey programme. And as had Peter
pointed out, 'some would say that BEB was Alvey.'
This seem s to say som eth ing about he te rogeneous 
eng ineering . Cally were not breaking the agreem ent or
rearranging existing relations to pursue what were their ideal 
academic interests. The question that this raises is what sort of 
model of human action do the network theorists work with? Do 
they take the view of rational action as pursuit of self-interest - 
the economists' definition of rational action? For the time being
however it appeared to Jim Watson that BEB's commercia l
interests represented an unmalleable object which they would
have to accept to have any funding at all.
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Within a matter of months then, the two-collaborator, 3- 
year long and non-commercial Design and Make project had grown 
with the help of some clever heterogeneous engineering and 
calculations into Manufacture from Design, an Alvey Large Scale 
Demonstrator project with some ten collaborators. This result 
was described by Crigbank as similar to ’making it with a wench. 
Both parties are concerned to find some mutual profit. Alvey got 
a good project and we got the money.'
Constructing a Project for Alvev
None of the Manufacture from Design collaborators ever 
advised me to read the Study Report to find out about the project. 
But since in the early days it was the only thing that adorned 
Cally's book shelves, which in turn was the only view from my 
desk, it made sense to give them a glance. In my early days on the 
project I not only thought that reading the Study Report would be 
useful for familiarising myself with what the collaborators were 
doing and the goals and aims of their work, but that it would also 
help me to be part of the team in some way. Instead it made me 
stick out like a sore thumb. Deen University's project manager, 
Joe Blair, was surprised to find me reading it: 'What are you
86
reading that for?', he asked. ’ It won’t tell you anything', he added 
and laughed in the way people do when they feel sorry for your 
naivety. Hadn't I noticed, he asked, that the way the work was 
now going, now that they were trying to do it, varied from the 
study report: 'We put it together to make it look integrated.' 'In 
actual fact', BEB Assembler's team manager, Nancy Thomas 
informed me 'we don’t know how it goes together.' And neither, 
they said, did they know what they were doing. I asked if they 
thought I should stop reading the Study Report and they seemed to 
think that was a good idea because: 'You don't put your personal 
reasons for doing a piece of research in a proposal because you 
won't get funding for it.' So the Study Report did not list these 
individual reasons but suggested a widespread commitment to 
C om puter Integrated M anufacture am ongst the team: 'The 
con tr ibu to rs  to th is report believe that there is no more 
im portan t app lica tion for advanced com puter science than 
computer integrated manufacture.'
So what were some of the 'personal' reasons collaborators 
had for being in Manufacture from Design? The BEB Assemblers 
saw the Alvey project, according to Nancy Thomas as a way to
prove the viability of their revolutionary robot. According to 
Thomas, when the research was done nobody else in the company 
(as a whole) was interested in this robot with the unusual 
structure. A place for it in a Large Scale Demonstrator project 
would represent a way to set it in context. It would provide an 
opportunity to do development work on the Bluebottle robot.
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The project was looked upon by Deen University's project 
manager, Joe Blair, as a way to get some Al experience to bring to 
their work on geometric modelling: 'we don't want to extend 
modelling in the present way.' He pondered on whether it would 
be possible for individual research interests to be met within the 
broader context of the project. That, according to Joe Blair, was 
a goal that might not fit the aims of BEB as a commercial firm: 
'BEB want a product and that could be a potential point of 
conflict. In modelling you might just make do with some 3-D 
straight surfaces in order to try out some vision work. But a 
commercial firm may step in and say they want curved surfaces 
because that is what will sell the system. That would hold back 
the original research goal to do something like vision work.' The 
result was what Blair called a bottom up project: each group
doing there own piece of work but not quite sure how it fits
together. But what is the broader context? Was there one? As 
far as Blair could see the project had no common theme; it had
been composed bottom-up instead of top-down, where the whole
is decomposed into its component parts. The issue whether 
Manufacture from Design was, technically and socially, a whole or 
a set of decomposable parts was, as we shall see a recurring one.
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It seems perfectly reasonable therefore to see the Study 
Report as a dressing up of their work to meet the policy 
objectives of the Alvey programme for a coherent project with 
goals that had potential for pulling enabling technology. This, of 
course, raises questions about the success the Alvey programme 
would have in managing the project - of having its policy 
objectives met in practice.
Getting Started
It was no surprise to the project management that there 
were d iffe ren t in terests in the project. It was perfectly 
reasonable, they thought, for collaborators in a joint project to 
fulfill some of these individual interests. But somehow they had 
to come together as a group to produce something. That would 
mean coming up with some sort of organization to combine both 
individual interests and the interests of the 'project' (see 
Olson, 1965). A speech by John F Kennedy was twisted into 
appropriate shape as a project motto: 'Think not what the project 
can do for you but what you can do for the project.' The 
collaborators would have to be organized, it was decided at an 
early workshop, in such a way that the work form ed an
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interlocking chain of inputs and outputs. Each collaborating site 
would have to know what it was passing on and what it was 
receiving: a flow of expected technology on the basis of which
each co llaborator could make plans to crystallize the various 
pieces into a functioning whole.3
But to do this they would have to understand each other's 
work. This is part of knowing what they were doing, essential to 
building a team. Although I had been put right about the Study 
Report I assumed that at least some of the key terms would be 
'familiar' to them: but it turned out that a 'technical' language 
which was totally incomprehensible to me was just as stupefying 
to some of the collaborators.
A recurrent phrase in the early days was: 'We have to 
understand one another.' They would have to understand what 
each other was talking about if they were going to build a system 
and if they were going to know who was doing what and how their 
work fitted in with that plan. Understanding the language was 
vital to having a dialogue: they had to know they understood each 
other. The unfamiliar language proved to be a way into the
4 Crystal growing is not my description but their's.
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project for me. I had expected to be the 'stranger* either in the 
sense of a curiosity or of being completely ignored. I had made an 
early attempt to make myself useful by sorting through and 
organising the files. If I could read them I would tidy them up a 
bit. I even offered to do some photocopying for them. Most of 
those attempts went by ignored. So I was taken by surprise when 
at last they had found some use for me. But I had not bargained on 
them seeing my technological ineptitude (as they saw it) as a 
useful attribute in their attempt to cohere as a group. This 
behaviour towards me was itself revealing about the project. It 
certainly gave a new meaning to 'acquiring native competence* - 
the importance of becoming part of the situation you observe. No 
one, I am sure, has said that participant observation is a static 
thing in the sense that it does not involve those you work with. 
But, at the same time, it was surprising to find out to just what 
extent my participant observation was a reflection of the state 
of the project, of the collaborators own native competences.
They saw my ignorance as an advantage in helping them 
s tandard ize  the ir technica l term inology. W hile they m ight 
assume they understood one another, that would not be good
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enough. They had to know  that they meant the same thing. They 
assumed that I would be clueless about the technology and that 
'competence' was exactly what they were looking for. I could help
them out, they said, by keeping a glossary of the terminology I did
(
not understand and the terms that others said they were having 
difficulty with. They pointed out that it was not especially for 
my benefit that they were suggesting this but for their own. 
When I had built up enough, they suggested the list could be 
discussed at meetings. My notebooks were full of promise. How 
will the words get their definitions? Who will attempt to take 
control over definitions? What will be the relationship of the 
language to practice? Alas, at least for my purposes as an 
analyst, the question of 'defin ition', like many of the other 
questions raised in the course of the project, was by-passed 
rather than resolved. I never became the important 'keeper of the 
concepts' they had suggested!
The Callv Team
The project manager, Jim Watson, came to Manufacture 
from Design from a Cambridge software firm. Jim was smartly 
dressed, always in neatly ironed shirt and tie and carried an
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attaché case. Though Jim's role was central - he, for example, 
had responsib ility for coordinating the work of Cally with the 
rest of the project - the group's inspiration was not him but an 
older member of the Cally Al Department, Peter Crigbank. Unlike 
Jim, Peter rarely wore his shirts ironed. It was a common joke 
on the team; 'Peter’s taken his shirt straight from the washing- 
machine again.' They were not just creased but practically three- 
dimensional designs themselves. Or when his shirt looked less 
crumpled: 'Peter's fiancé must be back from the States.' It was 
assumed that Peter was not really capable of doing very much 
other than programming or, indeed, that he wanted to do very 
much other than programming. But his ideas and his programming 
were seen as crucial to the group's success. Everything was to be 
done to make sure it was possible for him to get on and do that. 
Lunches were often brought to an unexpected end by Peter's 
imaginary pressing of a computer keyboard at the lunch table: 'I
must play twinkle fingers', he would announce before leaving.
Peter somehow needed taking care of and constantly 
reminded of where he was supposed to be at particular times. He 
never knew the time and would sometimes have to be phoned at
home to remind him to get out of his bed in the morning for an 
important meeting. It would often be Helen, our secretary, who 
would do this. She was concerned about Peter's lack of interest 
in money. She told me how he did not know what he had in his 
pockets. Did he have enough, she would want to know if he was 
going out? Helen was affected by his moods. If she was sad she 
would say it was because things were not going well for Peter. 
And Helen worried greatly over her decision to leave the team: 
was she creating more trouble for them by doing that? They 
would have to interview others. 'Was she wasting their time?' 
she would ask me. But she felt that things would be in safe hands 
with Jim. He was 'very capable.' She treated us all like an 
extension of her own family; baking cakes and tarts for us at 
Easter and at Christmas (see Barker and Downing, 1985). O u r  
secretaries were important to the functioning of the project and 
were always referred to as part of the team by Jim.
Often, however, it was not clear what precisely the 
secretaries were expected to do. Indeed sometimes Paula, Helen's 
replacement, got bored from having nothing to do since the team 
tended to do so much of their written work themselves on their 
own workstations. To relieve the boredom Paula would ask if she
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could type up my fieldnotes when there was nothing to do and she 
was bored. What she did like was when other collaborators came 
to Cally for meetings. Then she shopped for the buffet lunch and 
arranged the table. That kept her busy and kept boredom at bay. 
Another favourite was playing computer games at which she beat 
the researchers hands-down! Given that Helen treated the team 
like an extension of her family and that Peter was 'looked after' 
after by the secretaries, it does make one wonder about the role 
of the secretary in science and technology.4 Are secretaries in 
science and technology there to 'feminize' the work environment 
and co n tr ibu te  tow ards  the production  of sc ie n t if ic  and
te chno log ica l know ledge by supporting men in 'pecu lia r ly
"feminine" ways' as Barker and Downing suggest for the office? 
(Barker, et al., 1985) . An important aspect in employing Paula 
was, according to Peter, that 'she's pretty and doesn't wear too 
much make-up.' Other women interviewed for Helen's job had, I
was told, shown more interest in what the team were doing and
had asked questions about how a robot worked.
5 Delamont (1987) has commented on the role of the secretary in the production of 
scientific knowledge specifically in relation to getting papers out the door. This is 
part of her more general critique of social studies of science which have tended to 
ignore gender issues in the production of knowledge. This she has called a "blind 
spot".
The role of the secretary, however, was very important to 
my participant observation. In the beginning Peter and Jim would 
forget or just did not think to tell me about meetings. Helen 
would tell me if there was one in progress. To make it possible 
for me to join them she would take in a message or take the 
numbers for morning coffee. Paula was pleased to have me on the 
team, 'it's good having another girl around.'
Peter and Jim eventually shared a room in the new lab. 
Peter adorned his side of the room with a song by Winnie-the- 
Pooh. I had not expected to find, 'Isn't it Funny that Bears like 
Honey' on the wall of the chief investigator of an important 
dem onstra tor project or to hear him curse at his machine, 
'"Bother!" said Pooh', in the event of a programming error. On 
Peter's side there was also an abstract painting of a milk bottle 
and a photograph of a sailing boat. The team itself thought of 
Peter as a genuine eccentric. They told me how he had for a time 
driven a milk-float, believing it to be superior to the car in terms 
of pollution and safer with regard to speed. Safe that was, they 
told me, until Peter had crashed it into some railings! Jim, on 
the other hand, had one wall on his side of the room turned into a 
huge monthly wall-chart detailing his meetings with the other
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collaborators. His notes were stacked up on his desk and neatly 
kept in his brief case. Peter's were usually crumpled in his 
r u c k s a c k .  Their notes were d ifferent too. Jim 's were the 
minutes and agendas of meetings, Peter had lines of code and 
equations. Jim also kept in his drawer a tape recorder and tapes 
in preparation for his meetings with the other collaborators.
At a dinner party at Peter's home while everyone else sat 
around and spoke on such weighty subjects as Hofstader's book 
'Godel, Escher, Bach: the Eternal Golden Braid', Peter slept 
soundly in his chair: 'He's just like a little boy', his friend would 
remark. At social gatherings like this the number of topics that 
Jim would cover and give an opinion on was vast. I n d e e d  
whatever the subject raised he would have something to say 
about it. From art (Jim was especially keen on Escher) to music 
and politics, nothing escaped his interest or commentary.5
Sometimes Peter would roll down a mattress in the lab's
spare room for a nap to refresh him for more time at the
computer. Jim, on the other hand, never seemed to sleep. He
6Sherry Turkle has described Al researchers as "intellectual imperialists; with an 
encultured way of thinking on a global scale (Turkle, 1984 ).
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explained to me how as a student he had made himself extend his 
day so he could work longer and longer: he would rise in the 
morning earlier, an hour at a time, and stay at work late into the 
night. Getting his PhD finished meant late hours and working out 
meticulously the six month schedule he had planned to have it 
finished in. He could chart exactly where he was on the road to 
completion. It was finished on the day! It might not have been 
the best PhD in structural engineering, he confessed, but it was 
done. Keeping on top of the work and the other collaborators 
meant Jim was always the first one at his desk at the start of 
each day to get some reading in before the deluge of phone calls 
from other collaborators would start coming in. He got in earlier
than everyone else at first to play his tuba, but it turned out
there was always something else to do, and so he never got any 
practice in. He also wanted to read Al books before the phone 
calls from other collaborators. In the afternoon, he ate a Mars 
Bar to get him through that point in the afternoon when he felt 
himself get weary.
The project would require careful management and Crigbank
was not considered to be the best for that task. Helen, the
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project secretary, provided further proof that Crigbank was not 
to be entrusted with managing the project. She showed me where 
his files were interrupted with doodles of cats: Tha t's  when he 
gets bored.' And that was usually when he was at meetings which 
interrupted his programming.
Meetings like these were an opportunity to bring everyone 
together. But my period of observation was to be based largely at 
one site, Cally university. Part of having gone from being a small 
to being a large project was that it would involve many meetings 
with overall project management and the managers of each 
individual site. These people would meet regularly to discuss the 
d irec tion  of the p ro jec t at what were ca lled  'Techn ica l 
Committee Meetings'. The Technical Committee Meetings were 
composed of each site manager who gathered under one roof and 
around the one table at BEB's London offices to discuss 'technical' 
issues: hardware, languages, availability of resources. But for 
partic ipants there was often much debate at these meetings 
about what constitu ted both 'technical' issues and 'technical' 
argument. We can see this in the forthcoming chapters.
Jim was to attend these meetings, not Peter. Crigbank 
loved to travel around Britain on trains, but his place as Cally's 
principal chief investigator was to be with the team involved in 
programming. The meetings, despite their title, were 'social' in 
an im portant sense. Programmer Howard Jacobs saw an 
im portant part of Jim 's work as project manager to 'keep 
management off their backs.' It was how Jim saw his work too - 
'to make sure my guys don't get bothered.' However, both Jim and 
the programmers are, as Bruno Latour has argued (1987), 'doing 
technology', in the sense that the Cally team would not be free to 
p rogram  w ithou t J im 's  carefu l negotia ting  with the other 
collaborators at Technical Committee Meetings. The minutes and 
agendas of meetings were Jim's domain - something which Craig 
Ward need know nothing about as he sat down to program in the 
Cally lab while Jim Watson took his place at a table to discuss 
'the direction of the project'. (As we shall see in chapter 9 this 
division is more complicated than Latour suggests. Participants 
do not agree on what is the proper conduct of the site manager.)
It was a division of labour between them that turned out to suit
me. On the odd occasion Crigbank was required to travel to a
m eeting the experience, a lthough good fun, was usually
exhausting and nerve-racking. Crigbank was passionate about
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e ve ry th in g  to do with tra ins : s ta t ions , t im e ta b le s , the
interweaving of the lines, their speed and most importantly that 
they represented a safe and hygienic means of travel. To him 
travelling by train was almost as exciting as programming. We 
did not always take the easiest route of getting from our meeting 
back to home. We would sometimes take old trains that were 
more like milk-floats before connecting with 'the flying banana', 
the high-speed Intercity. In a sense travelling with him was like 
being inside the black box of British rail. Running up and running 
down the stairs that connected platforms is what I remember in 
our bid to make some train or other. Since I was usually the one 
carrying the food (our breakfast on the first train of the day), 
knowing that Peter would never remember, I found the whole 
thing tiring. It was at times like these that I knew participant 
observation was more than an academic methodology, it was also 
a real job with its attendant train fatigue and shortness of 
breath. Since I was usually on a train travelling as far as London 
at least once every fortnight, I was very glad to be travelling 
with Jim Watson whose skills as a manager were reflected in his 
approach to travelling: well planned and comfortable. Travelling 
with Jim we did not have to know how many other routes we were
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connected to, we were on this train and that was taking us from A 
to B. So long as everything was functioning as it should be we 
were using the train system as I was sure it was intended to be, a 
convenience that you did not have to think about too much in order 
to use it.
But it was not just Crigbank's lack of managerial skills that 
confined him principally to the project. He was needed to help 
train those new members of the team who in the beginning were 
not familiar with Al.
When I arrived at Cally for the start of the project I was 
not stepping into a well-established team in the sense of a group 
of people who had worked together for a long time. Indeed I was 
surprised to find that after Crigbank and Jim Watson I was the 
next to appear on the scene. As I surveyed the departmental 
members’ photographs, for a glimpse of whom I might be working 
with, I recognized only Peter's and Helen's picture amongst what 
were known as the 'mug-shots'.
Indeed at the beginning of the project we were still waiting
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on a place where the Cally team could work together. We awaited 
the refurbishment of the janitor's rooms in the attic of the Al 
department to become the workplace for the Cally team. Helen 
showed me around these rooms. With peeling wallpaper, rubble on 
the floor and the pictures of nude pin-ups it was hard to believe 
that this was to be the site of an important project.
But the hammers of the workmen were soon to transform 
these rooms into the clean white workspace for another set of 
'workmen', the Manufacture from Design researchers whose tools 
were to be computers. Our furniture was 'officey'; smart swivel 
chairs, functional desks, push button 'phones and carpets. It was 
customary in the first few weeks for staff from the rest of the 
department to visit these neat quarters and comment on how 
smart it looked in comparison with their old desks and chairs in 
much drabber surroundings. As the peeling wallpaper and the pin­
ups came down they were replaced by the block diagram of the 
possib le system and a map of Britain. With pins stuck through 
the various locations of the other collaborators it looked like a 
military strategy map.
In the beginning I was moved between rooms, wherever a 
desk could be found. When I shared with Jim Watson (who himself 
was feeling it difficult to believe he was in charge of a project, 
as he was sharing an office with another member of the
departmental staff until he was in the new lab with Peter) it was
surprising to find him - in between making phone calls and
writing letters to other collaborators - reading the same books 
about Artificial Intelligence as myself in an effort to learn about 
the subject!
When the rest of the team members started to arrive it was 
me who greeted them! Craig Ward was a newcomer who had been 
em ployed by the project for his background in mechanical 
engineering. One thing I certainly did not expect was to suggest 
which introductory books about Al he should read. However, Craig 
soon gave up after a few pages into Margaret Boden's classic, 
Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man (Boden, 1977) : Too  much 
psychology for me". In exchange he gave me some of his
university notes on mechanical engineering and some text book 
material on design which he was using for his part in the project.
I would find him alone in a room reading about the UNIX operating 
system and the Al language Prolog which would be used in the
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project. But he preferred 'hands on' experience and so together 
we would try first year undergraduate exerc ises in Prolog: 
nothing very complicated, just recognising the Prolog prompts 
and responding in the appropriate way.
This was not what I had expected: I was not 'observing', but 
acquiring some knowledge of Al at the same time as Craig and 
Jim. When it came time to learn programming, Craig was helped 
along by two more experienced team members, Tony Innes and 
Howard Jacobs. Just basic stuff, like how to write a program to 
find out on what days of the week Craig could expect to have 
dinner with the pop-singer Madonna: if it is Friday, Madonna is 
washing her hair and so the inference is that Madonna cannot have 
a dinner date with Craig.
There seemed to be a huge gulf between this sort of thing 
and the so ftw are  tha t would make in ferences about the 
dimensions, speed and other attributes of machined parts and 
then provide the instructions for their manufacture. Researcher 
Tony Innes seemed to have a similar idea. The project, he 
explained to Craig, was as fantastic as a Monty Python sketch
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about flying sheep. What did he mean? Keen on amateur
dramatics (the reason he said he had a great time at Cambridge 
but left with a poor degree) and proud of the fact and joking that 
he probably had the loudest voice in the department, Tony wasted 
no time in giving us a fu lly an imated and we ll-de livered 
explanation. He climbed onto his desk and began: There  are two 
farmers in a field both watching the sheep of one farmer fall out 
of a tree top and plummet to their death. "Why are you doing 
that?" the other farmer asks. "Just think of the commercial pay­
off if they ever fly," the other replied.'
For Tony Innes, then, the project was ambitious. He had 
little con fidence  in its chances of short-term  'com m erc ia l' 
success but, for That was what made it exciting for him: 'We
should have Manufacture from Design team T-Shirts displaying 
flying sheep.' The chances of turning the diagram of a p o s s ib le  
Manufacture from Design system that had graced the pages of the 
Study Report and which now hung on the wall of Craig's, Tony's 




The Interweaving of the 'Technical' and the 'Microsocial'
Creating the Manufacture from Design project was of course 
more than collecting people and props together. They needed 
'technology' with which to work. What happened, however, was not 
two separate series of 'social' and 'technical' decisions. As the 
'new socio logy of technology' suggests, the 'social' and the 
'technical' were interwoven in the decisions and choices made in 
the a ttem pt to create a working project (Law, 1984). Two 
examples - the choice of the computer and of its geometric 
software, show this most clearly.
The Computer Choice
A project like Manufacture from Design could go nowhere 
without hardware and software with which to program. BEB were 
pushing to have on the project a computer from their company, 
BEB computers. All the time they offered technical reasons for 
the advantages of the BEB computer over the DEC preferred by 
Cally. BEB computers were trying to get in on the lucrative civil 
computer market. They had been involved in defence computers
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and had failed to make any inroads in other markets for 
computers (C om puting . November, 1985). If it could be used on 
the Alvey programme and on a high profile demonstrator project 
it would be a good advert for it. Developing a UNIX operating 
system for their machine would help them to get in on the market.
The BEB computer, BEB 54, was agreed to have lower 
performance than the competing DEC VAX. BEB claimed the 54's 
performance would shortly be improved to the necessary level. 
Basing a decision on expected performance which might not 
happen in the end, was however a risky business1 . Cally could 
have reimplemented the software to run on the 54. As the project 
manager told me they could have, 'rewritten it in Prolog and Lisp'. 
But that was an inconvenience as far as they were concerned 
because it would take 'unnecessary' time.
But BEB were getting tired of discussing the computer in
terms of its present technical capabilities. 'The sooner everyone
1The Cally team took the advice of one worker in the department who had worked in 
industry. He advised them never to accept conditions based on promises of future 
success without setting down milestones of what would have to be achieved within a 
certain time. In other words there should be a time lim it on when to expect 
performance. This researcher had seen cases where a delivery date had been 
exceeded by more than a year. For Cally that could hold up their research plans.
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realises this project is political the better', said BEB Machines 
site manager, Gordon Collins. It was the first time that the 
commercial interests of BEB had come into the argument. And 
that had been deliberate on BEB's part. The overall manager, Bill 
Wilkie, had 'been told to keep out' of his letters any mention of 
commercial reasons for the choice of the 54 in the hope of 
winning the argument on 'technical' grounds, either existing or 
promised. While they were discussing floating-point arithmetic 
speed and so on, Cally said they had believed there was a choice 
in the computer. With hindsight they felt the discussions had 
taken place in such a way as 'to make us think we had a choice.'
But BEB were also up against the interests of Reams. They 
did not share BEB's interest in the future of the BEB 54 and did 
not want to use a computer that might take so long to develop as 
to jeopardize getting their fuel pump out onto the market; they 
were com m itted to using the best available hardware and 
software for the job. BEB however had sent a letter out to the 
collaborators stating that if the 54 was not used the company, 
'would have to reconsider its commercial reasons for being in the 
project.'
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A resolution was agreed that satisfied the interests of all 
parties. It was agreed that the BEB 54 would eventually be used, 
and the collaborators reserved grant money to purchase it when 
g iven proof tha t it fu lf i l led  certa in  requ irem ents . In the 
meantime BEB signed an OEM agreement with another computer 
company to supply computer workstations for the project2. In 
fact the improved BEB 54 never appeared, but at least BEB had 
avoided the humilation of seeing a competing machine publicly 
adopted for a high-prestige research project it was involved in.
The decision to stall the purchase of the 54 was welcomed
by Jim Watson: 'let's hope that's the political3 behind us now
and we can get on with the technical.' And he added for my
benefit: 'I suppose that won't be much interest to you though.' I
was becoming fond of the team and that comment made me feel
guilty since they obviously did not welcome any more commercial
concerns holding up the work or preventing them from using the
system software they preferred. I did not want them thinking
2An OEM agreement refers to an agreement between an equipment supplier and a 
buyer, in this case the buyer was BEB, whereby the buyer is able to sell the 
orig inal equipm ent on to a third party after they have combined it with other 
equipment or software, thereby having added value to the original product.
3This use of the term 'political' by participants, as a contrast to the 'technical' is 
discussed in (Mackenze, 1990).
that I enjoyed what so clearly infuriated them. But it was 
interesting that they saw me this way and drew their own 
assumptions about what my interests were. At the beginning of 
the debate when they themselves felt they had a technical choice 
Jim Watson assumed that I would not be interested in this. When 
the debate changed it was assumed that I would then be 
interested. It was a distinction with which I myself did not 
work. Nor was it a distinction with which Cally in practice 
worked as the case of the geometric modeller showed.
The geometric modeller.
1. Representing shape in mechanical engineering design.
An important element in the design task is to represent 
shape. One way in which a design can take physical shape is in 
the form of a drawing. Since mechanical engineering deals with 
forming metal into parts of three dimensions a designer has to 
have a way of representing the geometry of those parts. 
Mechanical engineering is concerned with the representation of 
3-D parts. Although drawing boards, paper and pencil are by no 
means outmoded, Computer Aided Design systems enables 
geometric modelling based upon the 'computer-compatible
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mathematical description of an object.' (Groover, & Zimmer, 
1984, p.58)
2. Representing shape in the Manufacture from Design Project.
One of the aims of the Manufacture from Design project was 
to 'by-pass the engineering drawing.' (F in a n c ia l  T im es. April 
1983) That meant representing shape or the geometry of parts, 
using a computerized geometrical modeller. There are different 
types of modellers but the one for the project was selected to do 
Constructive Solid Geometry. This means that it represents 
shape in terms of prim itives which are expressed in the 
m athem atics of Boolean algebra. Those prim itives, or basic 
simple shapes, can form a variety of more complex shapes 
depending on the Boolean relationship that is applied to them; 
AND, OR etc. This is illustrated in diagram 5. 1.
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FIG . 5.1
BOOLEAN OPERATION C(A+B) PERFORMED ON 
ELEMENTS IN B TO FORM SOLID IN A.
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Quite clearly then, a modeller is at one level an abstract 
mathematical entity. However, the modeller was more than a 
mathematical representation for those involved in Manufacture 
from Design. What it meant to represent shape in a working 
system could not be treated in isolation from 'political' concerns 
that ranged from the legal to the commercial.
A team from the University of Deen was the collaborator 
that had been chosen to work on the modeller to represent the 
geometry of parts for the fuel pump. Cally had chosen to work 
with Deen since they 'thought they were good at modelling' and 
being a university Cally felt sure they 'would get along better' 
than if they were working with an industrial collaborator.
The Mapelle modeller was the software for modelling. Deen
had worked on this in an industria l consortium  called the
'Modelling Group'. It was the belief of management that Deen was
bringing to the project not just their experience but the license
to the modeller which would enable them to have access to the
source code4. But Deen in fact did not have rights to the source
4'Source code' is the specific instructions which make up a program, in this case 
the modeller program. In order to incorporate existing programs with new ones, or
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code of the modeller.5 (That management could have slipped up 
on this was beyond the com prehension  of many of the 
collaborators). This meant that the project had to get the Mapelle 
modeller from somewhere for Deen to work on for Manufacture 
from Design. The idea was to get the modeller from one of the 
co llabora to rs  of the industria l consortium  with whom Deen 
university had worked to develop the modeller. But the conditions 
of such a license was that Manufacture from Design would not get 
access to the code of Mapelle. In other words the modeller was 
fixed. Work that the project wanted to do which could not be done 
by the modeller directly would have to be built around the 
modeller, treated as an unalterable black box, by constructing 
this as a 'shell'.
Any work that could not be done by Deen building a shell
would have to be sent to the supplier of the modeller to ask them
to develop their capabilities, as Deen were intending to develop the Mapelle modeller, 
it is necessary to have access to this source code.
5Another com plication was that the researchers at Deen were split into two 
groups: one on the Alvey Manufacture from Design project the other on the Modelling 
group which was working on enhancements to the modeller. The Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) was funding both groups, but was not prepared to fund both to do 
what might turn out to be similar work. The idea was that they should work out 
between them what they intended to do. The results of either which might be needed 
by the other should not unreasonably be witheld.
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to modify. BEB had wanted to purchase the Mapelle modeller from 
a BEB company BEB Computer Aided Engineering. This was 
believed by Cally to be because the company was in financial 
t r o u b le 6 . Being a commercial concern, this company was 
prepared to make only those changes requested by Cally or Deen 
which fitted in with their own plans for the modeller.
The fixed nature of the modeller was something which
concerned Jim Watson: 'If Mapelle is fixed then how does that
affect what we can ask Deen to do?' And if that work required
getting inside the modeller as opposed to building a shell around
it here was no guarantee that what BEB might plan for its
modeller or consider to be commercially viable would mesh with
Cally's goals. As Jim Watson put it: 'It isn't straightforward that
BEB would do everything that Deen asks them to do to Mapelle to
help us. If all it did was help us in our problem and did nothing
for BEB's present customers and made the package harder to
6There was another company which could have supplied the modeller. BEB believed 
they could control another BEB company more. However, it was the case that this 
BEB company which supplied computer aided engineering equipment, was in financial 
difficulties: '[BEB] slashes costs and cuts jobs...the company is sacking a tenth of its 
workforce... after a year of disastrous sales...the company had been hit by the slump 
in the electronics business and has had to cut operating costs... the computer aided 
engineering market is extremely cut-throat with a lot of aggressive US companies.' 
(C om puting . November, 1985). I make no judgement as to which explanation of the 
decision is correct.
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maintain then they wouldn't be interested because they get 
nothing out of it.' As far as Jim was concerned the situation was 
'next to hopeless. I wouldn't expect necessarily that we would be 
asking for Mapelle developments that have relevance to BEB's 
present or projected customers. We are doing something 
different to the modeller.'
For Cally that was a concern, in that their own plans might 
be constrained by the existing capabilities of the modeller7 and 
they would be unable to control the development of its future 
capabilities. Cally would have to build into the calculations for 
their future work the technical 'givens' of BEB. But these 'givens' 
might not be adequate. Jim Watson explained, 'We see how we 
want to use the modeller as distinct from how others want to use 
it. We are using Mapelle for questions of space occupancy, 
intersecting and calculating the minimum distance between two 
objects. In our designer system we don't want it for part 
programs.' 8
7 As yet it was not known what it was that Mapelle could do or not in relation to Cally 
requirements, so in order to force a decision to be taken on the modeller Cally had 
been making use of an internal modeller on which to base an argument for discussion; 
we can get our modeller to do this can you get Mapelle to do it, if not then we should 
consider what modeller to get.
8Geometry data in manufacturing is useful for generating the information on how 
to make a part. To machine a part you need to know its shape and the path the tool
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Using Mapelle for space occupancy, intersecting and the 
minimum distance between two objects was in essence closely 
related to the sort of requirements the Rapt assembly language 
would want to make of a modeller. An important element of 
Cally's work was, according to Jim Watson: 'to be able to send 
Rapt information to the modeller.' In current aids to design what 
was missing was knowledge about spatial relations.9
Why was the relationship between Rapt and the modeller so
important and why might it be competing with the capabilities of
a m odeller that might be more in line with generating part
programs? The Rapt work was the work of the robotics
department at Cally, and that group had been key to Crigbank and
to the formation of the project. As Crigbank once put it to me,'he
was interested in getting an application for RAPT.' Crigbank and
another key member of the robotics group were about to leave the
should go along to cut material. A part program automates the process by which the 
sequence of operations to be performed on a Numerically Controlled is planned and 
document
9 On a visit to Reams designers I was shown something that was common practice - 
cardboard mock-ups constructed by designers from their engineering drawings in 
order to get a feel for the way parts were related to one another and if they were able 
to perform the function they were supposed to. It was older designers within the 
company who worked this way and who had kept these huge bits of cardboard like 
something from a school project. Designers who used the CAD systems were 
comparitively young.
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department and Jim was keen that there should continue to be 
robotics research in the department.
IlL£ 'hole-in-th e-surface*
How then could Jim Watson circumvent the potentially 
constraining influence which a modeller from BEB could put on 
the Cally work? A scenario which Jim worked out revealed that 
in attempting to come up with a 'technical' argument for another 
modeller (and in turn change the meaning of the modeller for the 
project) he intermingled 'technical' and 'political' issues in the 
style of the heterogeneous engineer (Law, 1984).
The other type of modeller was a Boundary modeller which 
represents shape in terms of all the surfaces which make up an 
object. Something which a boundary model could do more easily 
than Mapelle was the ability to put a hole in a particular surface. 
Although that can be done in a solid modeller it is much harder to 
find in a constructive solid geometry description where that 
surface is because it is not explicit in the representation: 'what 
you have to say is take this cylinder primitive from the other 
primitives that make up the models. But working out how you
locate this cylinder such that it actually produces a hole in the 
surface is not trivial. It can be answered more easily in the 
boundary representation.' Such a technical argument was for Jim 
Watson a possible way of getting another modeller (which might 
be in technical terms more 'efficient') but which would, most 
importantly, let them out of a bind with BEB: 'BEB will consider 
modifications on a commercial basis and not on a research basis 
which is the basis of our work.'
But what about the supplier? Would another company not 
have the same commercial considerations as BEB in the light of 
asking for m odification? Jim had thought about this and 
considered getting the modeller from a company where he knew 
the people - people he knew to have come from 'research'. But he 
had to be careful to secure the agreement of his Departmental 
Head, Professor Smith, who might be cautious about offending 
BEB. Smith was aware of the 'real world' in which, he said, Al 
workers now found themselves. As he said at one meeting, 
researchers could not expect to have everything their own way. 
They would have to learn to compromise. Jim noted: 'I would use 
the point about the boundary modeller as leverage if Professor 
Smith supported our move to question the modeller. But if he
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doesn’t then we are faced with real problems.' If they had to go 
along with BEB and things didn't work out for Cally, 'I would let 
everyone know,' he threatened.
- 123 -
Chapter Six 
What is Computer Integrated Manufacture?
How technically revolutionary should one be?
The formal definition of Manufacture from Design as a 
demonstration project, rather than enabling technology, by no 
means constrained what Cally team members actually did. Within 
the project there were competing definitions of what they should 
be doing, 'in terpretative flexibility ' (Pinch and Bijker, 1984) 
surrounded the content of the designer system. The key issue was 
how technically revolutionary Manufacture from Design should 
be. It would be a failure if seen as just another CAD/CAM 
s y s te m ;1 but it needed to be tied to existing work in such a way 
as to offer a hope of success. That, at least, was the vision of 
th e  te a m 's  c e n t ra l  in s p i r a t io n ,  P e te r  C r ig b a n k .
Representing design knowledge
The M anufacture from Design concept, accord ing to
1 Computer Aided Design (CAD) produces a visual presentation of a design. It can 
be used to 'draw' and to modify drawings. Linking CAD with productive process, 
CAD/CAM (Computer Aided Manufacture) involves adding data about feeds and speeds 
of machining operations, for example, to the output of CAD terminals. The CAD 
systems are used to drive computer-numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools.
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Crigbank, was an extension of work that had been done by a much 
respected colleague of Crlgbank's, Ralph Slater. Slater had 
w r it ten  an A r t i f ic ia l ly  In te l l ig e n t p rogram  to prove the 
correctness of digital hardware design. This meant proving that 
the design of transistor circuitry would satisfy its specification; 
that it would behave as it was intended. Since Al is concerned 
with knowledge and intelligent behaviour it must use formalisms 
to represent knowledge (and intelligence) and use a formalism 
which is considered most appropriate to the knowledge being 
represented.
But what constitutes an adequate formalism for certain 
knowledge and its intelligent manipulation? 'Adequacy' could not 
be shown by pointing to a self-evident one-to-one, objective 
re la t io n sh ip  betw een the rep re se n ta tion  and w hat was 
represented. Most significantly, Slater's work represented a 
credib le  past achievement. That Slater's program 'worked' 
justified the use of its formalism, according to Crigbank, as a 
way to encode the design knowledge relevant to Reams fuel pump. 
It 'had successfully proved the correctness of a straightforward 
but very  de ta iled  design, invo lv ing many thousands  of
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transistors', Slater had written. As Slater had suggested, the 
design verification, apart from being of practical value, was also 
of great interest in terms of its Al research content. It involved 
representing the structure and function of complex systems, and 
knowledge about the problems the system was intended to deal 
w ith . An in ference mechanism  was needed to perform  
competently in a large search space. Techniques of guiding 
reasoning in search of a proof and general mathematical abilities 
like  a lg e b ra ic  m an ipu la t io n  w ere  needed, as we ll as 
understanding what the designs were intended to do.
A ccord ing  to S later, the design process could be 
represented as a taxonomic hierarchy: a tree structure that 
allows a design to evolve in terms of inherited 'properties'. 
Taxonom ies are a c lass ic  notion for the o rgan iza tion  of 
knowledge. For example, students of biology are familiar with 
taxonomies as a way of describing the relationships between 
different species and 'their' types. A simple taxonomy might be:
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V e rteb ra te
Mammal
Figure 6.1 
Source: (Shapiro, 1987, p.422)
This shows a hierarchy consisting of the class mammal, the 
superclass vertebrate, and the subclasses elephant, sheep and 
dog.
Of course, Slater's work was not concerned with the animal 
kingdom, but it did use these principles of organizing knowledge 
of the relationships between the different components that make 
up computer hardware; for example the relationships between
multiplexers, registers, adders and counters. Slater's work was
»
not im m ed ia te ly  com patib le  with the prob lem  which the 
Manufacture from Design project had set out to solve: bringing 
f lex ib ility  to the area of small-batch mechanical engineering.
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Slater had dealt with the design verification of 2-D shapes of 
transistor circuitry. Robots, however, assembled the complex 3- 
D shapes of mechanical engineering as opposed to the laminated 
surfaces of digital hardware. Nevertheless, Crigbank felt that 
Slater's approach to 2-D could be extended to 3-D2.
The Cally formalism was intended to support the evolution 
of a design. The evolution of a design is supported in terms of 
inheritance by a taxonomic hierarchy of engineering entities. 
These engineering entities are arranged in the hierarchy in what 
are called module classes. Modules are any engineering entity 
which has a concrete referent. This would then be used by 
designers to construct a design.
The idea behind the designer system was to represent, Peter
said, what a human designer did. That meant that when a designer
set about designing he proceeded from function. Hence the
2Of course how and why work on 2-D design verification was extended to 3-D 
mechanical engineering design is an interesting question for the sociology of 
technology. Barnes (1982) states that the process of extending a paradigm to fit 
another situation (problem) involves the creativity of the scientist. The scientist 
makes one situation like another. In this case mechanical engineering 3-D design 
was made analagous to the verification of 2-D designs for transitor circuitry. But 
just what sort of process is involved in extending a paradigm? Unfortunately the 
period of my participant observation pre-dates a detailed analysis of this process.
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taxonomy was a Functional Unit Module Taxonomy, becoming 


















FIG. 6.2 A BLOCK DIAGRAM OF THE 
FUNCTIONAL UNIT MODULE TAXONOMY
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For example, a transmission module would identify the function 
'transmission', which means something that will take an output 
from a motor in terms of one particular form of energy and 
converts it into something like a shaft going around slowly. 
Modules contain the information about functionality as facts in 
the form of equations expressed in the programming language 
Pro log.3
This m odu le  wou ld  hold know ledge  re levan t to
transmission, to turning this motion into that motion. But that
would not tell us anything about what sort of actual device was
needed for a particular component that will be required to work
along side other components. So we need to specify the design
even more, say, in terms of whether we want a hydraulic motor or
an electric motor. And so to end up with a particular design,
modules are arranged in the tree structure to progress from the
3 Prolog is a ’logic programming' language based on first order predicate calculus. 
For any logic you can design a variety of 'proof systems', that is ways in which you 
derive new statem ents, or equations, from existing ones. One particu lar proof 
procedure is 'unification', and as a programming language Prolog incorporates the 
ability to automatically carry out this procedure for statements which are written in 
a specified syntax. This means it is compatible taxonomic organization of knowledge 
which Crigbank proposed to use. In the simple mammal taxonomy, for example, 
given statements that sheep, elephants and dogs are mammals and that mammals are 
vertebrates, the statement that sheep, elephants and dogs are vertebrate could be 
automatically infered and outputted.
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most general at the 'top' -the root (it is an inverted tree!)- to the 
most specific at the bottom - the leaves - where enough 
information resides to make the design. The further down the 
h ierarchy, the more knowledge is gathered that turns the 
specification for a design (expressed in terms of what function it 
is intended to serve) into a fully instantiated design; that is, 
enough knowledge is gathered that allows the design to be 
machined and assembled. The modules have all their values for 
the particu lar equations associated with them fully specified. 
The purpose of the design then is to arrive at a characterisation 
of modules, to get values for parameters. What made the designer 
system a novel approach to design, according to Crigbank, was 
that it attempted to integrate previously existing but separate 
software, like PRESS for algebraic manipulation, Rapt to derive 
spa tia l re la t ion sh ip s  and the m ode lle r to derive  shape 
in form ation  around the design of m echanica lly  engineered 
components. The intended designer system was represented, by 
Jim Watson in the diagram shown in Figure 6.3 below. These 
d if fe ren t programs would be integrated using Poplog - a 
programming environment which supports (by providing editors 
and debugging facilities) the development and use of programs




Figure 6.3. Block Diagram of the Designer Sy-stem
134
To perform a function, objects have to be related to each other in 
space in order to fulfill that function. Since design, said Peter, 
was about objects going together, and RAPT was a language for 
talking about assembly - and assembly is about how things go 
together - then RAPT said Peter, represented a way of talking 
about design.
The combination of functionality and RAPT was, said Peter, 
what would distinguish a Designer System from existing CAD 
systems. Shape, claimed Peter, was related to functionality. 
CAD systems were concerned with geometry and representing 
shape, which they represent as dimensions, the position of points 
of lines in space. But CAD did not take into account, said Peter, 
the purpose that surface has, what it is intended to do. If you 
proceed from function, as the designer system does, then you 
identify that function - say, transmission The output from one 
module was the input to another, and you proceeded to a form to 
fulfill that function by using gears, belts, chains.
Proceeding to that form meant designing the belts, the 
gears and the chains that would fu lf i l l tha t function  of
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transmission. This is where the RAPT interpreter came in. RAPT 
derived the locations of modules from known relationships which 
existed between features of modules. Those features were 
represented in the modules in terms of shape information. The 
shape of modules in turn was represented by constructive solid 
geometry: that meant shapes were constructed out of primitive 
shapes (cubes, cylinders, etc) combined into the more complex 
shapes of engineering entities by Boolean algebra, as we saw in 
chapter five.
-
Features related to each other in order to fu lf i l l  a 
particular function. With a knowledge of how parts were related 
to one another, this representation was in Crigbank's opinion 
what made the system able to 'design' as opposed to merely 
'draw '. The designer system, according to Crigbank, then 'knew' 
about shape; it 'knew' what was meant by a design. That meant 
that shape was not just a sequence of lines on a page to be 
interpreted for its functionality by, say, a production engineer, 
which is what CAD systems did (in this way CAD systems were no 
different from engineering drawings), but that they bore some 
significance in terms of their spatial relationships. For example,
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a journal on a shaft was not just a drawing of some lines which 
'looked' like a relation between parts: it was a design of the 
functional relations between parts.
RAPT as a way to talk about design (to represent the task of 
designing) then was, said Peter, also a way integrating design and 
assembly processes. And crucially bringing together existing but 
previously separate software like Press, Rapt and modelling to 
work on design as represented by facts arranged in the functional 
unit module taxonomy was Computer-Integrated Manufacture, or 
CIM.
The Designer and the Machine
Another issue for the Cally team in designing the system 
concerned the relationship of the designer to the machine. This 
was to define the level of skill that a designer would require in 
order to use the system to design. A flow chart of a design 
process was drawn up, much of it from Craig Ward's university 
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In Crigbank and Watson's view the designer would go as far as the 
black line. Watson explained to his team: 'I think we have a 
reasonable idea of providing a lot of support to the left of the 
black line. The bottom level I don't think we know much about ... 
we're not trying to replace human expertise. We don't want to 
prevent the use of expertise by the human user.' The relationship 
that the designer would have to the system and the design 
process would be, wrote Watson, equivalent to a cyclist on a 
journey: the lie of the terrain was compared to the judgements 
that a designer would be expected to undertake in the course of 
designing. In Watson’s view, these capabilities made the designer 
system similar to a bicycle in terms of the facilities it offered
an engineer in design:
'The ac t iv ity  ca lled eng ineering design invo lves the 
exploration of a design space [the Functional Unit Module 
Taxonomy]. Up to now the human designer has had to explore 
this design space on foot, aided perhaps by some specialized 
pieces of equipment, like a mountain climber has for the 
difficult parts of a mountain. The Designer System then is a 
vehicle for travelling around the design space in. Actually it 
is more like a bicycle. With this vehicle a designer is able 
to explore more of the design space more easily and quickly, 
having a better view of the surroundings as he does so. The 
direction of travel will be under the complete control of the 
human designer, although the vehicle will be able to advise 
him of relevant information and facts about the current 
position and direction of travel, and also will tell him about 
the shape of the local terrain. During the development of the
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Designer System there will probably be parts of the design 
space where it will not be able to go; places where the
terrain is too rugged to drive over. At these places the
human designer will have to get out (or off) and walk. This
is why the Designer System is a bicycle and not a car, so
that it can be carried over the fences, or pushed up the hills.'
It was this aspect of the designer system which in Watson's view
made it a 'designer's apprentice'. He explained what this meant:
'This term emphasises the fact that we are not aiming to 
replace the expertise of the human designer, but rather to 
improve and extend the tools he uses to design with. Put 
another way the Designer System should increase the 
productivity of a good designer but not turn a bad designer 
into a good one. It will therefore be able to carry out the
tedious and repetitive tasks quickly.'
The Virtues of Flying Sheep
In a team brought together for the first time, with a range
of backgrounds and views about what Artif ic ia l Intelligence
should be, these aims - extending a 2-D formulation to 3-D, and
assisting rather than replacing the human designer - were by no
means immediately acceptable to all members.
Tony Innes' tale of the 'flying sheep' had been accompanied 
by a flightless jump from his desk. Tony was enthusiastic about 
the latest work going on in Al and was the only one to circulate 
the very latest offerings from the journals to the rest of the
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group. These included everything from the latest in design, a hot 
sub jec t in Al, to how to establish re la tionsh ips between 
industrialists and university researchers. He read widely on up- 
to-date  th ings; the latest books on expert systems to the 
businessperson's bible on how to succeed in business, 'In Search 
of Excellence'. Tony liked being part of the Al scene. He was 
always preparing papers for some conference or other and never 
seemed to be off the phone discussing amendments to papers he 
was co-writing. He was certain ly the team's most dynamic 
member. An idea for a paper could turn up at the most unexpected 
moments and places, he said. His latest paper had been the result 
of coffee-time chats with colleagues. I spent much time making 
myself useful by taking messages for Tony or photocopying some 
article he wanted to circulate to the team.
Tony Innes's scenario of 'flying sheep' presented the picture 
of a potentially unattainable technological goal and artefact. But 
that was what made it interesting for him. It was, in his opinion, 
'beyond the state-of-the-art' research. And the Manufacture from 
Design project he saw as an opportunity to use the resources of 
Alvey, both in terms of time and money, to do some 'beyond the
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state-of-the-art' research. The little confidence he had in its
chances of success, as exemplified by the 'Flying Sheep' scenario, 
was what made it a project worth taking on. He looked forward 
to the team's first meeting to discuss the designer system to air 
his plans, where he said, 'We should be tackling hard problems we 
don't know how to solve.' 'We should be looking beyond the next 
five years.'
But the work that Tony had planned for the designer system 
to advance the state-of-the-art in computer aided design and 
manufacture did not sit easily with what Crigbank and Watson had 
in mind. The work that Tony had planned was almost immediately 
seen as something which might jeopardize the viability of the 
Manufacture from Design concept. The goal of the first, pilot,
stage of the Manufacture from Design project, was to prove the
viability of the Manufacture from Design concept, and that could 
be threatened by an over-ambitious version of what that concept 
was. Some of the dialogue between Watson and Innes was as 
fo l lo w s :
Innes: 'What will the Pilot project consist in?'
Watson: 'Building in knowledge.'
Innes: 'Then it is an expert system.'
Watson: 'No its not! It is a designer system.'
Innes: 'Then it is not worth its salt!'
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Watson: 'Are you saying we won't be demonstrating an 
in te ll igent system?'
Innes: 'Yes!'
Innes did not disagree that Crigbank's work was extending 
Slater's formalism. What he did feel, however, was that this was 
not the best way to proceed. That the designer system was to 
in teg ra te  p rev ious ly  d is t inc t p ieces of so ftware  was not, 
according to Tony Innes, going to be sufficient to distinguish it 
from existing CAD systems on the market. Indeed, using these 
resources would limit the designer system in assisting skilled 
designers, Innes felt. There was nothing new about inheritance 
hierarchies, he said. They had been around a long time. The system 
would not be a design aid to already good designers, but should be 
trying to turn average or below average designers into good ones, 
not by teaching them buy by building a system capable of 
qua lita t ive  reasoning and reasoning with uncertainty. Tony 
explained that,
'Jim is wanting to do things that have already been done. I 
mean Peter's work - people have been working on that for 
ten years. Functional hierarchy in Prolog in not new. I 
really don't think there is much IKBS in getting the various 
engines like Press to talk to one another in Poplog in a UNIX 
operating system. Jim has a short-term view of the system.
We should be tackling hard problems that we don't know how
to solve. We should be looking ahead five years and not
reinventing the wheel.' 4
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What they could be doing in the project, Tony argued, was 
building a system that included a number of analysis packages and 
knowledge bases which would 'know when to come in to deal with 
design.' The packages, argued Innes, would 'know' when their
expertise was need to help solve a problem. It was, he said, 
s im ilar to a board meeting, 'with everybody sitting around a 
table, if the issue of finance is raised the accountant says, "I 
know about this," and comes into the discussion. He is turn might 
mention sales and so the marketing person comes in'.
As it was there was nothing in the description of the
designer system in the Study Report which would make Tony
himself, 'want to go out and buy it.' And as for the idea of the
designer system providing capabilities analogous to the bicycle:
'shouldn't we be trying to take chunks out of heads and put it into
the machine'5 , said Howard Jacobs in support of Tony. Watson
replied 'I don't like that... we don't know how to do that.' But
4 lt is interesting to note that one associate of Innes' claimed that concerning work 
on qualitative reasoning: 'we do not expect to see many application papers presented 
at Expert System conferences in the near future which are built from qualitative 
models - we do hope, however, to see more papers on theoretical work in this area.' 
Expert System 85 (ed.) M. Herns.
5Forsythe (, 1987) discusses the way Al workers treat knowledge: 'For knowledge 
engineers, knowledge is apparently a 'thing' that can be extracted like a mineral or a 
diseased tooth.' (p.9)
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Jacobs claimed: 'We are attempting to codify expertise and take
decision making for the designer.' Watson disagreed: 'We are
codifying knowledge not expertise. Expertise is how you do
something.' They were providing a tool to the user, said Watson, 
and advice which the designer could choose to use.
Watson also felt that attempting to make the project too 
ambitious, could lead to over-inflated expectations which might 
lead to accusations of failure: 'If people think we are attempting 
this they will expect us to do it'. Al was, after all, on the verge 
of regaining some credibility. What they did know, said Crigbank, 
was that Slater's formalism was a tried and tested method.
Crigbank had faith that the wall diagram would come off the
w a l l .6 They had, Crigbank explained while looking at a diagram
of the contributions, more or less, all the various elements for
what was necessary to turn this layout of a possible Manufacture
6Crigbank’s confidence was not shared by other researchers within the department 
who were not involved in the project. One worker told me that he doubted the 
possiblity of buiding such a system: 'It's way beyond the state-of-the-art. It would 
be like giving your car to a garage and it came out fixed at the other end and you didn't 
know what tools had been used on it. It seems like it is only those who have been 
involved in its construction, in the idea of the system who believe in it. All I think 
they can do is prove the feas ib ility  of the concept. At the end of the pilot or 
demonstrator phase they will say, "it's possible to do this or it's not possible to do 
th is . '"
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from Design system into a working one. To Jim Watson, as 
project manager, this was an important consideration. He was 
very conscious of the limited time they had to prove the project's 
viability: 'How do we provide verification for what we've done? 
We want to say that what we've said we'd do, we have done.'
In answer to this it was Tony's view, that instead of 
providing verification they should be aiming at a hard e x p e r im e n t. 
At the end of the five years, he explained, that experiment could 
be shown to have either failed or succeeded. And Innes believed 
that it was the technologists who should decide what research 
should and could be tackled and what could be expected.
Getting allies behind him would not be easy for Tony. Could 
he get pressure put on Crigbank to change his mind about what 
they should be trying to do? Craig Ward was new and unfamiliar 
to Al: he could, he said, see both sides. In the room he shared 
with Craig, Howard and myself, Tony would air his views. Peter's 
position he felt had been strengthened by what he saw as Jim's 
sycophancy: 'Everytime Peter opens his mouth, Jim nods his head. 
He agrees with everything he says. It's so annoying.' Tony
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corrected me when I asked him about the system's knowledge 
base: 'Let's jus t call it a database', he answered and then 
continued to Craig, 'The fundamental problem is if we are working 
on electronic catalogue. What are we proving by punching in 
three pages of a bearing catalogue. Pretty intelligent stuff, eh?' 
he said sarcastically. 'Are we having the user type in this bloody 
stuff? Where is the IKBS in that?'
As for the term 'apprentice' which Jim had used to describe 
the designer system, that was another point of contention with 
Innes. The term 'apprentice', Tony told Jim, suggested a system 
that would learn form a master, in this case the engineer. The 
idea being that the master would transmit the relevant knowledge 
to the apprentice. Since the designer system was for Tony 
regrettably more conservative in its aims in not permitting the 
machine to take on more of the qualitative aspects of design, it 
was not an 'apprentice' but an 'assistant'. On this point Tony 
added to Craig, 'We should be telling designers what pages of that 
catalogue to go to, not giving it to them to flick through.'
Both Innes and Watson spoke of how they fell into Radical
and Conservative camps. Watson explained: 'There is some 
conflict on the group. Some think that it is too conservative. I 
think they are aiming too high.' It was a division about which 
Peter had made his own assessment. On one of our train journeys 
together he told me how Innes’ outlook could partly be put down 
to the enthusiasm of youth7.
One of Innes ideas was accepted by the rest of the team.
The FUMT, described above, represented what Cally referred to
as, the space of possible designs which could be inferred from the
encoded design knowledge it contained. Design, said Peter, was
all about exploration in a large space of possible designs. In this
process log ica l cons is tency  of d if fe ren t s ta tem ents  about
different aspects of the design is very important. The most usual
form of maintaining logically consistent statements in Al, or
what is known as 'truth maintenance', is done by a method called
backward changing. It was Tony Innes who introduced to the
project another form of maintaining truth: it was based on the
'Assumption Based Truth Maintenance System' (ABTMS) of de
7After project meetings, when the direction of the designer system was discussed, 
however, Jim Watson could not be entirely sure that there were different points of 
view within the team: 'Perhaps different language makes one assume that different 
concepts are being discussed'. This could also be seen perhaps, as an instance of the 




Kleer and was called 'Choices without Backtracking'. Jim Watson 
did not immediately accept Tony's suggestion. But Crigbank saw it 
as a way of letting the designer create a design in an infinitely 
large search space. And most importantly what it enabled, said 
Peter was a way of 'getting some 1985 Al into the project'. What 
the ABTMS did was to allow the designer to 'play about' and 
change his mind about design decisions, for example, when a 
different value for a gear speed was chosen all the work based on 
that decision was not wiped out as it would have been when back 
tracking truth maintenance was used, and this meant that a 
designer who wished to revert to the old design decision could do 
so without having to redo the work. The ABTMS was said to be
like a record-keeping system, and all the inconsistencies are
collected together in a 'no good assumption set'. It would keep 
track of all the dependencies that a designer would normally have 
to remember. In a final design, however, the set would have to be 
'good'. This meant that a designer who changed his mind from one 
gear speed to another would eventually have to chose which was 
to be the one for the design in hand. The ABTMS would allow the
d e s ig n e r,  W atson  e ve n tu a l ly  co n ce d e d , 'c o n s tra in t - f re e -  
exp lora tion ' of the design space; or what Crigbank called,
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creativity, by not enforcing 'truth' consistency on the design until 
the des igner had tried various poss ib ilit ies. And that was 
something, said Jim Watson, 'We just think designers would like 
to have. It's what I would like to have if I was a designer'.
However, despite this achievement, the Manufacture from 
Design project was not, Tony Innes claimed, going to do his career 
any good especially in terms of getting papers out. As his radical 
vision for it faded, he seemed to pursue his outside contacts even 
more; arranging more meetings and conference papers. He began 
to arrive for work later in the morning and started leaving earlier 
at night: Tve got work to do at home', he would say. He had not, 
he told Craig and myself, come to Cally 'to do a hacker's job', 
which is what he believed getting the various programs like 
Press, Rapt, modeller to talk to one another in Poplog to be. He 
certainly did not want to stay beyond his contract and eventually 
left for Hewlett-Packard.
How socially revolutionary should one be?
The different meanings which Innes and Crigbank attached 
to the content of the designer system were not informed in their
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conversation, within the Cally lab, by a macro-problem. It was 
Jim Watson as project manager who associated the work that was 
to be done on the workstations within the Cally lab to a problem 
in manufacturing industry. Crigbank did not do that sort of thing. 
It was the same with the Design and Make proposal. David Curtis 
had written the piece on computer-integrated manufacture that 
served as that proposal's wider rationale. Jim sought to locate 
the project in terms of the inadequacy of the engineering drawing 
as a means for 'com m unica ting  the design in tention  to 
m anufactu ring, inspection, too lroom , construction  and other 
departments. Drawings indicate what has to be done to produce 
the product and make it work' (Cooley, 1981,p.51). The sequential 
organization - that is the design stage followed by draughting, 
fo llowed by machining information, followed by assembly and 
then maintenance data - depends on people to interpret drawings 
and to pass that information onto others down the line.
According to Jim, that system worked, 'but only because 
people are very good at handling knowledge in informal ways ... 
But there comes a point where you really cannot really improve 
the flexibility of this system because we are using people in this
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way as well as we can.'8 According to Jim, as this knowledge 
got passed on some vital elements got lost or redistributed 
throughout the organisation. A production engineer not sure about 
some information will have to talk to someone further back in the 
chain: 'Such conversations do happen, of course, but the way most 
manufacturing companies are organised does nothing to encourage 
them .'
It was, said Jim, endemic to a process where people used 
different conventions that they would make mistakes. They could 
not be expected to handle the inconsistencies in knowledge 
forever. The world of engineering drawings, machine tools and 
the programs to run them, swarf, production plans, break downs, 
queues of parts-in-progress and the effort of people to handle 
that complicated world was, according to Cally, at the same time 
a world where knowledge was created and then lost again. It was 
said Jim a bit like Chinese whispers. The original information 
could end up distorted, what started out as the command: 'Going 
to advance, send reinforcements' could wind up as 'Going to a 
dance, send three and fourpence'. It was a scenario which Jim 
Watson illustrated for the world of manufacturing with what he
8Jim W atson's interview with Com puting. 1986
called the 'Saw-Tooth' diagram, which is shown in figure
below.
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The saw -too th  d iagram  i l lus tra ted  w hat happened when 
knowledge was being mishandled. The 'jagged-edge' highlighted 
the point at which people and machines, notations and diagrams, 
software and hardware failed to converge. A popular story within 
the group was used to illustrate the point. It was told to them by 
David Curtis and it concerned the case of a designer who passed 
his engineering drawing annotated with 'N/B' onto the production 
engineer. But 'N/B' did not mean the same thing to the two 
engineers. The designer had put it in as an instruction to the 
engineer, shorthand for 'Nota Bene' and in this case meant 'Take 
note of this equation, it is important.' The engineer however had 
taken 'N/B' to mean 'Make this component up in Naval Brass.' 
Naval Brass is an extremely expensive material, and the result of 
course was a serious and costly error.
An engineering drawing of something like a fuel pump 
leaves much unsaid, Jim claimed. An engineer must infer what it 
does not explicitly communicate - including how the pump works, 
and the roles played by it various parts:
'Take an engineering drawing, which comes out of the 
detailed draughting office, and is passed onto engineers, who 
then have to look at this drawing and decide how the
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components on it are to be made. That engineering drawing, 
which may meet all the standards of engineering drawings, 
does not exp lic it ly  represent the functiona lity  of that 
component...someone looking at the drawing has to work out 
what each part is and what it is meant to do. Now skilled 
engineers are perfectly capable of doing this. But there may 
come points where, because it is not explicitly represented, 
you cannot guarantee that you are understanding completely 
what this component is for.'
But, said Jim, the designer system's representation of functional 
knowledge was what w o u ld  enable design information to be 
created and handled explicitly and hence consistently. The key 
obstacle to flexibility in manufacture, said Jim, was a problem, 
which o thers  had fa iled  to tack le , assoc ia ted  w ith the 
distribution of knowledge in the factory. Achieving consistency 
on the knowledge that was generated in the manufacturing 
process was essential.
The system as planned by Jim and Peter was viewed, as we 
have seen, by Tony Innes to be technically conservative. But how 
did this view of the technology meet with the goals of the other 
co llabora to rs?  Was this also the route to f lex ib il ity  and 
Computer Integrated Manufacture as envisaged by the industrial 
co llaborators? BEB's manager Alan Rogers did consider the 
creation of knowledge to be a problem facing manufacturing.
155
Indeed, he had written an article for the BEB company journal 
explaining that flexibility in manufacturing depended on all parts 
of an organization knowing what was going on so that the 
manufacturing process as a whole could respond quickly to 
changes in the market: for example, a cancelled order or the quick 
re-routing of a batch due to break-downs in machinery. But for 
Jim W atson the concept behind the designer system was 
'heretical'. For the Manufacture from Design system to work 
outside the lab it would require, Jim claimed, changes in the 
social world. Creating consistent knowledge was not just about 
writing lines of computer code - it would also involve 'social 
engineering', as we shall see in chapter seven.
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Chapter Seven 
How centralized should you be?
M acrosoc ia l c.e.atEatteaiiflD
Project manager, Jim Watson associated the problem of 
know ledge  gain and loss w ith  ano ther issue a ffec ting  
manufacturing industry - the 'accountancy lag'.
It was becoming widely recognised that existing methods of 
a cco un ting  were  lagg ing behind the needs of modern 
manufacturing. In the United States, the National Academy of 
Sciences Committee on Computer Aided Manufacturing Annual 
Report, 1979 noted that: 'The application of existing evaluation 
techniques to new manufacturing technologies results in an 
underestimate of the benefits. No method currently accounts for 
the benefits  resulting from in tegration and reorgan isa tion ' 
(quoted in Senker, 1986, pp. 17-18). 'Old fashioned analyses' 
were said to 'scupper modern manufacturing' (Financial T im es . 
1986). New technologies were being evaluated according to the 
payback method which it was claimed ignored new standards of 
measuring manufacturing performance suited to new technology.
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Using the payback method of investm ent appra isa l each 
departm ent in a company calculates the cost of a particular 
investment in terms of financial payback, that is return on 
capital. The appraisals are then sent to top management for 
approval. According to this method management approves those 
investm ents which will repay the ir costs w ithin a specified 
period, usually two to three years. The payback method has a built 
in safeguard against risk. However, these methods were said to be 
a 'Barrier to Strategic Investment' in automation technology' 
(Senker, 1986, p .17). 'The accountant ignores them which leads to 
an "accountancy lag". As a result, companies needlessly delay or 
cancel decisions on reinvestment.' (Financial T im es. 1986). The 
Technology Policy Board's document (1980,1985) on the 'Way 
Ahead' for the management of manufacturing technology agreed 
tha t conventiona l accounting did not properly evaluate the 
benefits of new flexible manufacturing systems. But any changes 
were said to depend on having a dynamic Board of Directors at the 
head of a company. Others, for example Senker (1986) suggested 
that top management personnel to be trained in computer aided 
m anufactu ring  techno log ies in order to be tte r assess the 
advantages.
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Jim Watson spoke about accounting to eminent visitors to 
Cally like Eugene Merchant, research d irector of C incinnati 
Milacron - the largest machine tool builder in the US. Merchant 
agreed tha t ex is ting  methods were not su itab le  to new 
technologies. Jim spoke of how 'outmoded' practices could affect 
the decision to invest in new technology like the Manufacturing 
from Design system. I thought that accounting was just another 
subject for Jim like art, music, politics or films about which he 
spoke with us (the Cally team) in the pub or at a meal. But on 
accountancy he spoke with almost messianic zeal. In Jim's 
scenario there would be no waiting around for accounting methods 
to catch up with the 'needs' of manufacturing, for top management 
to be trained in new technology or for a dynamic Board of 
Directors to appear on the scene, in order for a valid assessment 
of the designer system to be made.
Rather, Jim's scenario for designer system reversed how 
the 'problem' should be seen. The designer system was, he 
claimed, a new technology which was at the same time the 
so lu t ion  to the problems engendered by traditional accountancy. 
In this scenario, accountancy problems were solved by the way
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knowledge was created and handled in the designer system. For
the designer system to work changes were required in the social
world. The knowledge for assessing new technology had to be
handled by a new set of practitioners.1
The knowledge which the designer system made available to
designers would, said Watson, put them  in the position of being
able to make decisions about what projects to take on board.
They would have the information at their finger-tips, as a result
of having created consistent knowledge, and, on that basis be
equipped to assess the profitability of a project. Because they
would have complete knowledge they would reduce the safety-
factors used currently by accountants to compensate for having
incomplete knowledge in assessing contracts. As a result of
accurate knowledge it would be possible for a company to take on
more contracts and in turn, Jim argued, increase overall profits.
But all that was a process which called for some social
engineering: a reversal of the previous status held between
accountants and designers within manufacturing industry. The
1Jim Watson took a sim ilar stance with politicians. It should be Al programs that 
take decisions about government. Amongst a group of socially concerned computer 
scientists: concerned about Ai and jobs and skills and to get the opinions of people 
about these systems Jim said it was up to the Al community to educate people about 
Al. The others considered this to be an arrogant attitude and approach.
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central role of the designer system as Cally saw their work in the 
project would lead to and be reflected by a change in the status 
of des igners  w ith in the enterprise. The p rac tit ioners  of 
'accounting ' were to be the designers. In this scenario new 
manufacturing technology was not a passive object awaiting 
changes in the 'outside' world (the social context of accounting). 
The solution to the 'accountancy lag' was built into the knowledge 
representation schema of the designer system2.
A cco rd in g  to W atson the 'sa v in g s  and e ff ic ie n cy
improvements sought by the Procrustean domination of financial
control' (the accountants) was a situation that was 'forced on
m anufac tu r ing  by the inherent d if f icu lt ies  of the existing
organizations in handling the knowledge generation process.' In
other words it was the pass-oriented nature of knowledge that
was responsible for the problems in evaluating the expected
2Senker (1986) suggests that engineers should play a more im portant role in 
strategic decision making than they do at present in the UK. He also acknowledges that 
this would 'pose a threat to other managment functions - in particular finance, 
accountancy and marketing, which tend to be more strongly entrenched in top
management This present several problems. Most obviously, other groups are not
going to step aside willingly and allow engineers to take a more prominent role in 
decision-m aking' (1986, p.118). but he recommends first that they be trained in 
'marketing, economic and social considerations'. However, it is not the same as the 
view put forward by Jim Watson - that is, that the technology of the designer system 
makes redundant the need for such training and reinforces that it is the designer 
systems itself which allows designers to make appropriate decisions on investments.
161
return on investm ents  or the lucra tiveness of con trac ts . 
According to Jim, 'the current theory about the organization of 
m anufacturing industry is that the various activ it ies should 
revolve around the financial control and management activity.' 
That was, said Jim, the 'accepted wisdom' of manufacturing that 
Manufacture from Design would challenge. But Jim claimed that 
'the heretical theory behind Manufacture from Design is that it is 
the activity of design which should be at the centre, with the 
financial activity to serve that central activity, not dominate and 
control it.' A view of manufacturing whereby the designer was 
'restored to his true position', that is at the centre of the 
enterprise, was only possible with the techniques of Al research, 
according to Watson. Jim Watson called this a centrist view of 
manufacturing.
W hat Jim had mapped out was a scenario of various 
elements knitted together: the problems of evaluating contracts
and new technology for their profitability, problems in flexibility 
of manufacture - the capacity to switch production lines quickly 
and, at the root of the problem, knowledge gain and loss. That 
last could only be solved, said Watson, by Al techniques .which in
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this case was the Cally formalism for talking about design.
’Tech n ica l’ Centralization
The centralization of designers within firms was mirrored 
by centralization in the 'technical'. RAPT code, the Functional 
Unit Module Taxonomy, and the balance of power between 
designers and accountants in making decisions were all the 
e lem en ts  wh ich  Jim W atson linked tog e the r  to en fo rce  
consistency on the creation and handling of knowledge. Most 
c ruc ia l to en fo rc ing  cons is tency  m eant not trans fo rm ing  
knowledge out of the Cally formalism into another in order to 
accumulate the knowledge necessary to the eventual manufacture 
of the design. That, said Jim, would only recast the same problem 
of knowledge gain and loss. The implication of that was that 
M anu fac tu re  from Design was not in Ca lly 's  schem a a 
'decomposable' system. For designer system to be accepted as 
'working', changes to the social world would be necessary. 
Ultimately it would be necessary for any company, said Jim, to 
either abandon its existing software or 'move to the field next 
door' in pursuit of the truly flexible and integrated manufacturing 
organization. The implication was to start afresh with the
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Manufacture from Design system as envisaged by Cally. To ensure 
consistency of knowledge generated it had to stay in the Cally's 
formalism, according to Jim. Inconsistency in formalisms would 
go against the need for flexibility. It created, said Jim, more of 
the knowledge gain and loss.
The Cally formalism used to express knowledge throughout 
its generation was the solution to this problem and the answer to 
real f lexibility in industry. It was a case of being more like 
Russian dolls than Chinese whispers.
Jim's argument had taken the route of a complete circle: in
his scenario he had, in Latour's sense, brought the laboratory to 
bear on macroproblems. In so doing he was dissolving 'the 
ins ide/outs ide boundary', the boundary between the lab and 
'society' (Latour, 1983, p .163). The problems of flexibility were 
to be understood as problems of knowledge handling which in turn 
were to be seen in terms of Cally's formalism. And in the hands 
of designers the knowledge made available by using Cally's 
formalism could operate like a balance sheet on which to assess 
the profitability of contracts or new investments and provide the
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consistency of information necessary to increase flexibility.
BEB management stated that they had an obligation 'to get 
something out of this project' in the time available. (That was 
interpreted by Cally's team manager as a product.) Crucially, BEB 
believed that they could not expect companies to give up the 
software they already had in order to take on a Manufacture from 
Design system en masse.
Reams, like BEB, would benefit from the eventual 
exploitation of a system which would reduce the time between 
design and manufacturing of a product by integrating the design 
function with planning, machining and assembly. The product 
which was to be the focus for the collaborators expertise was an 
electro-mechanical diesel injector pump produced by Reams. But 
the pump was not simply a focus or just one aspect of Reams 
attempt "to ensure total realism" in the project.
The product itself was key to Reams. The pump was a 
revolutionary design available in prototype and for which there 
were, according to Reams, "excellent market prospects." The 
Reams fuel injection company therefore saw itself as being a
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major focus for the project in its commitment to "introducing 
this fuel pump to the market as quickly as possible." The tight 
time-scales meant that the commercial considerations related to 
market needs for the new injector pump products might enforce a 
particular short-term course of action: 'a modular development of 
a h ighly com petit ive  manufacturing system appeared to be 
compatible with the anticipated market growth of the fuel pump.' 
(Study Report). Reams also made it clear in the Study Report 
that they reserved the right to specify the order of priorities so 
as not to prejudice their market position. One particular short­
term course of action would involve using currently available 
international hardware and software that would be "best for the 
job." That was said to be an important consideration in terms of 
leapfrogging experience gained in software development rather 
than starting from scratch in the effort to turn the prototype fuel 
pump into a marketable product. Another factor which Reams had 
to take into consideration was the major investments they had 
made in certain commercial hardware and software, CAD/CAM 
systems. The effort that had also been put into the training of 
staff in the use and maintenance of these systems meant in 
Reams view that it was "logical to try to interface with such
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elem ents rather than try to replace them with a lternatives" 
(Study Report). That, claimed Jim Watson, was one of the reasons 
why Reams had not objected to using the modeller that would 
come from BEB's computer-aided engineering company. That 
m odeller would interface with the ir existing investments in
technology, their computer vision CAD systems. In other words,
for the industrial collaborators there were constraints in terms 
of previous investments.
This constra in t translated into the technical form of a
modular system decomposable into its separable parts, not the 
integral, centralized one Cally dreamed of.
Cally rejected the idea that the designer system to go into a 
design office and be expected to work a longside existing 
software. For Cally, however, that might mean using hardware or 
software which would interfere with the goal of achieving a
'centrist' system. For BEB, however, the system had to be 
decomposable to fit in with 'our obligation to get products out.' 
The world was not as malleable. There was, said Alan Rogers, 'no 
other way' than to have a modular - decomposable - system.
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Cally a ttr ibu ted  BEB's a ttachm ent to m odu la rity , as 
overin terpre ta tion  of the block d iagram: that is that blocks 
should be seen as discrete packages. Something more profound 
was at stake, however. The modular and integrated approaches 
were connected to different views about the 'hardness' of the 
social world. From BEB's point of view this meant that the social 
world was not quite as malleable as Cally wished to portray it.
These were potential sources of conflict for the Cally team. 
The keenness to use the software and hardware that would get 
the pump onto the market or to use software or hardware that 
would get 'products' onto the market for BEB could be obstacles to 
Ca lly 's  goal of ach ieving a system that would mainta in 
consistency of formalism throughout the product life cycle. In 
other words, it was Cally's aim not to be driven by software or 
hardware that might make it necessary to transform; to go from 
one formalism to another. As far as Cally was concerned the 
project was not about 'products' but proving the viability of the 
concept of integration - and integration as they defined it.
That meant centralized, uniform integration. That approach
went wider at Cally than just the Designer system. It pervaded 
Peter's views on transport. I already knew from travelling with 
him how much he liked trains. But it was more than that. It was a 
consum ing passion because railways embodied what Peter 
considered to be good technology. Train travel was a good and 
safe technology because it displayed principles of uniformity: a 
trained driver was devoted to the movement of passengers along 
rails especially designed and committed to trains. Trains were 
less likely than cars to lead to conflic ting and sometimes 
harmful situations because they occupied space that was quite 
separate from pedestrians. Car travel was illogical. Cars 
created chaos because they represented an inconsistent mode of 
transport: individual vehicles driven by individual drivers with a 
variety of temperaments, travelling at different speeds was not a 
coherent form of transport. Indeed it was a situation that made 
cars 'dangerous weapons.' The car system represented an 
incons is ten t and con flic t ing  s ituation because unpro tected 
pedestrians were often competing for the same road space as 
cars. Cars, people and public buildings were too close too each 
other. A chaotic situation ensued from this contradiction.
I found out - almost at considerable personal cost - just
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how far Peter was prepared to take his convictions: not being as
quick to cross roads or as contemptuous of cars as he, I would 
find myself stuck in the middle of traffic as I tried to follow him 
across a busy road. He on the other hand would stroll out onto the 
road in defiance, making cars avoid him. This was not a side 
issue for Peter; indeed sometimes it occupied so central place in 
his thoughts that it annoyed the other researchers: 'He's spending 
more time writing his paper on a new form of transport than on 
the designer system.'
Because Peter refused to travel in cars he would sometimes 
leave meetings earlier than his team-mates in order to make his 
way to the railway station. Once he chose to eat alone in a bar 
while the rest of the team and Reams' designers and management 
sat outside for lunch to enjoy a rare hot day in September. But 
Peter found the cars near the pub oppressive, so the rest of us 
ended up going inside to join him and talk about the designer 
system .
Peter laid the poor state of the population's health and its 
inability to create wealth at the feet of transport policy. This
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was because of the inconsistency between transport policy and 
domestic policy. Cars were unhygenic in the sense that they were 
responsible for road accidents and deaths. That, according to 
Peter, reduced the capacity of the population to create wealth.
So a better transport system was an approach to public health 
policy and that in turn was related to domestic policy. In Peter's 
views on transport even terrorist attacks were facilitated by the 
use of volatile fuel and the nearness of roads to public buildings. 
Public buildings and 'peopleways' were too close to cars and 
lorries. Here, again, was said to be an inconsistency between 
’transport policy which encourages the use of machines burning 
such fuels, and the policy of HMG with respect to other explosive 
substances.' Uniformity and consistency were the name of the 
game.
Such an explanation would not of course be universally, or 
even widely accepted. Perhaps smoking, absenteeism, strikes, or 
in ternationa l com petition are more likely candidates for the 
state of the GNP. For many people, indeed most on the Cally team, 
cars were a convenience. Car rides could take them on a short cut 
to a central line station!
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Similarly, Jim Watson's view of the way decisions were 
taken in companies did not go unchallenged. The overall project 
manager from the BEB team managing the project disagreed with 
Cally's 'simplified' view of the way decisions were taken in a 
company. He asked Jim Watson to remove reference to this from 
his paper for an im portant conference to be attended by 
industrialists and academics. What BEB objected to was that this 
was not a fair assessment of what went on in companies, it did 
not happen that way.
Ultimately this could perhaps be seen as a challenge to the 
centra liza tion  of Cally's formalism, but that issue of formal 
centra lization was also tied to an immediate issue of social 
centralization: how the project should be organized.
O rg a n iz in g  s ite s  in to  a p ro je c t
A first very important task for management in the project 
was to organize the contributions of the individual sites into a 
p ro jec t. One task of project management was to make the work 
of the individual collaborators visible and accountable not only to 
itself but to the hierarchy of committees that, at least in theory,
controlled the Manufacture from Design project. They included 
the Steering Committee, which was one level above the Technical 
Committee in that it was composed of a member from each site 
who was not the site manager, perhaps head of department in the 
case of the universities and the director in the case of the 
indus tr ia l team s. U lt im a te ly , of cause, the p ro jec t was 
responsible to the Alvey Directorate. In the first few months of 
the project I was surprised at the amount of time we spent at 
meetings discussing the details of what were called the Term s 
of Reference' of the various committees that were responsible 
for the running of the project: who was entitled to make technical 
suggestions, when something should be overruled. Far removed 
from romantic flashes of inspiration in disorganized settings, 
technological work was inseparable from establishing the means 
whereby those managing the project could 'know' that technical 
work was indeed taking place on sites. In other words records 
would have to be generated that could be used to eventually 
convince the Steering Committee and Alvey that the group was 
making 'technological progress'.
The relationship between the project's Alvey monitor, the 
S tee r ing  C om m ittee , M anufac tu re  from  D es ign 's  p ro jec t
- 172 -
173
management (itself a hierarchy of an overall project manager 
above the systems and software managers) and an individual site 
manager involved planning and collecting progress data (which 
was in turn broken down into man-hours of effort for activities 
completed in the previous three months, those planned for the 
next three months and the team members committed to such 
work). That way it was possible to have 'milestones' of work 
which could be monitored as either meeting or failing to meet 
targets. These categories would then form the basis of the 
progress reports for site managers, to be discussed at progress 
meetings with management, who then generated another round of 
reports for the overall project manager of 'Manufacture from 
Design' who in turn was responsible for what he called the 
'synchronising' of site reports into a project progress report for 
the Steering Committee and eventually the Alvey directorate. 
That was the theory; to have the work of the indiv idual 
co llaborators eventually come together. But how? For what 
purpose?
To report progress collaborators would need something to 
be progressing towards. From the beginning it was made clear by
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project management that they would have to find a way of 
organizing the work both to meet the individual interests of
collaborators (see chapter four) and to satisfy an overall project 
plan. And out of this common goal it was envisaged that the 
work of each site would have to form a chain of expected
technological inputs and outputs. This chain was to be set in 
m otion  by m anagem ents  p roduction  of 'ac t iv ity  ne twork 
diagrams'. With a software package using an IBM PC to plan the 
activ ity  networks, it was a case of techno logy monitoring 
technology.
The project was as a cluster of artefacts - these were the 
contributions of the various teams: design, planning, modelling, 
machining, assembly and maintenance - that were intended to 
come together to form a system. A system that was being
referred to as a factory of the future. This is how management
saw it; each should be able to work or make calculations for their 
own work on the basis of what others are going to do in the future 
(i.e not going along willy-nilly not knowing that what you are 
doing is of any use: 'We need to know we are being useful' said
one participant) An individual site should be able to get on with
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its contribution to the system knowing that 'what was coming 
down' was what they expected to have.
All elements - design, machining, assembly - were going 
to be parts which mutually affected each other in a system but 
just how needed to be defined.
That was the theory . The p rac tice  was d if fe ren t. 
C o llabo ra to rs  would  leave m eetings saying, 'I still don 't 
understand what we're supposed to be doing'. How those 
con tr ibu t ions  were supposed to come together, who was 
expecting who to do what and how much were not known: 'What do 
we need to be able to do', 'What do we want from a planning 
system', 'What should the assembly cell be doing', 'when does 
maintenance come in'. For some it proved difficult to even think 
about a key aspect of the project, what it meant to represent 
design knowledge within a computer programming language: 'I
can't visualise that task.'
In pa rt th is  unce rta in ty  was, acco rd ing  to some 
collaborators, because the project did not have a goal. As one
researcher explained, work could only make progress if there was 
a goal: 'I see the project being run as a series of experiments, the 
results of which can be used or not. But you can't have an 
experiment without a goal or a concept towards which you can 
work.'
Jim Watson agreed that there was no goal coming from 
management. Since a plan of where they were going had not been 
worked out it was, in Jim Watson's view, the job of site managers 
to work it out between them.
As far as Jim could see, managements attempts to organize 
the project and collaborators was derived from how they saw the 
'technical' contributions: as distinct packages. That was seen by 
Jim Watson to be the modular view which Cally said BEB had 
obtained of the project by misinterpreting the block diagram. The 
block diagram of the designer system was being reified, with the 
mistaken implication that all that had to be done to coordinate 
the project was to define the interfaces between separate blocks. 
But said, Watson, how could they do that when they did not know 
what was going into each box? Managements attempt to prepare 
spread sheets of 'technical' activity across sites was, claimed
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Jim, a further indication that they were being expected to come 
up with a modular system and to develop products. Resisting a 
modular system in favour of a 'centrist' approach involved Cally 
in a process of placing itself at the centre of the project.
M ic ro s o c ia l C e n tra liz a t io n
As far as Jim was concerned the diagram of a possible 
Manufacture from Design system was not truly representative of 
the place of the Cally's work - the designer system - in the 
overall project. In this diagram Cally was positioned on the far 
left, proceeded by the other contributions which were connected 
by arrows going from left to right. That, said Jim, represented a 
pass-oriented system; the knowledge from the designer system 
was portrayed as being passed through the different stages and 
that, according to Jim was what they were trying to get away 
from. Cally rather should be in the centre of activities with the 
other contributions around it.
But the project could only be centralized satisfactorily if 
those involved shared a common language for talking about the 
system. They were from a variety of backgrounds - engineering,
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computer science, psychology, physics and artificial intelligence 
- and from a varie ty of establishments - un ivers ities, big 
business, industrial research labs, and consultancies attached to 
universities. They needed to speak the same language and to know 
they understood each other. That as we saw in chapter 4 was one 
of the first requests from collaborators. But they should talk 
Cally's way. At some moments it seemed as if Cally was telling 
the others that they must not presume to understand texts, they 
must get texts from Cally and get them to explain what they 
mean. Jim Watson explained to me how it would be up to Cally to 
say that they had been understood, that the others were 
understand ing3.
Another attempt to enforce centralization was to try to
limit the access of 'management' (as d istinct from 'technical'
people) to the meetings where the system was discussed. To do
this Jim Watson tried to have Technical Committee meetings
composed of what he called Participants and Observers; only
participants could contribute to the discussion. Observers had to
3 a  question of general sociological interest concerns the role of language in 
maintaining order. It would involve a longer period of participant observation to look 
at how Cally attempt to get others to talk their language for discussing the designer 
system and how in turn order is kept in a process of mutual sanctioning on the 
’correct' use of language.
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be called on to make suggestions. Under this arrangement
management were invariably observers. Needless to say it did not 
find much sympathy amongst management.
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Chapter Eight 
The Man-Machine Interface in Rhetoric and Reality
Central to the rhetoric surrounding the establishment of the 
Alvey programme was the area of Man-Machine Interface (MMI), 
defined as the 'methods, media and mechanisms for enhancing 
cooperation between people and machines in an interactive 
environment' (Alvey Directorate, 1984, p.3). In this chapter I 
trace what happened as attempts were made to translate this 
rhetoric into the reality of project work. The Alvey programme 
generally laid much store by MMI for the success of the whole 
programme: 'MMI design quality is already a matter of concern to 
overseas manufacturers - w itness IBM's policy of applying 
"usability plans" to its product development. UK manufacturers 
will need to take similar steps to maintain competitiveness, 
relying increasingly on the MMI R&D community in developing the 
necessary design capability' (ibid.). It was stated that unless 
some understanding of MMI was developed the full potential of 
present or future information systems would not be realised. 
Within the Alvey IKBS programme in particular MMI was thought
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to be crucial to the commercial success of a technology that was 
considered by many. The commercial success of IKBS - and of the 
Alvey programme as a whole - was said to depend on 'making 
sophisticated products truly acceptable to their users' (DOI, 
1982, p.29). MMI was to be central to the Alvey programme. 
There were, for example, to be research centres to administer 
advice on MMI, and to make state-of-the-art research available to 
small firms that have no in-house MMI.
Systems had to fit with the humans who were to use them. 
One task, said the Report of the Alvey Committee, was to: 
'Analyse human problem solving behaviour in complex tasks. Use 
this information ... to create systems which are compatible with 
human reasoning' (ibid., p.30).
By way of acting as a show-case for MMI, the proposed MMI 
strategy document stated that 'Particular emphasis is placed on 
the role of exemplar and demonstrator projects as a means of 
consolidating the technology and confirm ing its utility' (Alvey 
Directorate, 1984, p. 2). MMI was to occupy 'a special position in 
relation to the Alvey programme as a whole, where it has the
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essential role of representing the needs of the user in advanced 
IT projects.' And that relationship was said to be particularly 
strong in the area of the Large Scale Demonstrator projects.
To bring together the work of researchers, designers and 
users and link their work to the needs of industry was an 
important aspect of the MMI strategy. That was the Alvey line. 
However, MMI did not simply slide into the Manufacture from 
Design large scale demonstrator: its place on the project was to 
involve much negotiation and engineering amongst the various 
c o l la b o ra to rs .
M a n -M a c h in e  In te r fa c e  and  th e  M a n u fa c tu re  fro m  D es ign  p ro je c t:  
Erac.tic.e
The original Manufacture from Design proposal did not 
include an MMI collaborator, and in that shape was unacceptable 
to the Alvey directorate until an MMI group had been included.
Eventually the Manufacture from Design project included as a 
collaborator such a group: the Human Factors and Technology 
Interface centre, HATI.
But tha t a 's lot' now ex is ted for MMI was, some 
collaborators claimed, because it had been m a d e  for HATI. 
HATI's place, it was cla imed, had arisen not out of any 
'technological' need, as had that of the other collaborators, but 
because, as one participant put it, the director of HATI was a 
'buddy' of Alvey's MMI director. The presence of MMI within the 
pro ject provoked a varie ty of com m ents from the other
collaborators: 'What is MMI?’, 'It's just flavour of the month with 
Alvey', to 'MMI's got nothing to do with technology.'
So MMI and HATI entered the project as something of an 
afterthought. There was often a feeling of 'what to do with MMI?' 
on the project. Indeed management were often concerned that 
HATI was being left out of the project. Eric Cater of Reams came 
up with an idea to give MMI 'something to do'. He chose an 
engineering metaphor to describe the relationship of HATI to the 
other collaborators. It was a metaphor which made a distinction 
between who was actively contributing to the project and who 
was not. The other collaborators he said were the 'real cogs' in 
the project. MMI was like oil. It could help the project to go 
smoothly. MMI researchers could talk to the other collaborators 
about how they saw their roles in the project and how they saw
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each o th e r.1 But that was an essential role, and since Cater 
was an 'industrialist' (as manager for Reams), it is interesting to 
note that at this very early stage in the life of the Manufacture 
from Design project 'industry' did not see themselves as having 
MMI needs as the Alvey MMI strategy saw it.
Different groups were unsure of MMI's place in the project
and were assigning different meanings to the role of HATI in it.
No matter what the other collaborators might have thought about
MMI or about its place in the project, however, MMI people did not
doubt that they had a very important role to play. On yet another
train journey - this time with a member of the HATI team - I was
told how they were hoping to be involved on a creative basis not
just on consultancy terms with the project. Frank Jackson of
HATI spoke excitedly and was enthusiastic about MMI's role on the
project, discussing lots of creative ideas that I did not follow
like the possibilities of a system which would allow a designer
to simulate his hands on the screen so as to allow manual
positioning of mechanical components. And for an advanced
information technology it was something of a surprise for me to
1 Eric Cater was usually the one saying that the project was about 'getting on with 
each other1 and MMI could be used in that way.
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hear him say, 'I'm not convinced that there isn't still a place for 
pencil and paper in design, you know'. I sometimes wondered if 
the different people I met were on the 'same' project. In other 
words, 'interpretative flexibility' surrounded HATI's position as a 
co llaborator on the project. But as we shall see, that same
'interpretative flexibility' did not surround only who was entitled 
to contribute to the design of the designer system, but also 
surrounded the nature of that design. At the opposite pole from 
HATI and MMI were Cally, and it is to their position that I now 
turn.
C a l l y . an d . .r e p r e s e nting d esign Kn o w le d g e
Three  th ings  were  en tw ined  in C a lly 's  task : the 
r e p re s e n ta t io n  of design knowledge, where design knowledge
was lo ca ted  and how it was obtained.  As we have already seen, 
the Functional Unit Module Taxonomy was Cally's formalism for 
re p re se n t in g  des ign . And so an initial attempt at building a
designer system began with codifying the knowledge needed to
design a gearbox.
Encoding design knowledge meant in practice that Craig
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Ward and Peter began 'loading up' the taxonomy from books and 
Craig 's university notes. Craig copied artic les from books 
showing the relationship between the types of gears as in a 
h ie ra rchy . One popular book was an 1960s text on engineering 
design. Also to hand was Craig's knowledge of mechanical 
engineering as recent graduate. However, it could not be said that 
Craig had a great deal of design experience: when he attempted a 
design on our drawing board he had to have pointed out to him by 
another team member that his combination of components would 
not work.2
In what sense was the functional unit module taxonomy a 
representation of design knowledge? The taxonomy was a 
representation of design for the computer but Craig Ward 
pondered on how it was he was now thinking of design knowledge 
as a functional unit module taxonomy. The taxonom y was 
represented highly schematically in the diagram of the designer 
system, this was shown in figure 6. 2.
Craig reflected on how this shape influenced his way of
2Jim also claimed that Cally had practical experience of design: 'Peter Is building 
his own concrete boat. He's a very practical guy. Certainly the oil on Peter's fingers 
were proof of a hard weekend's work. In other words it was not all theoretical.
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seeing the design process as hierarchical. He wondered if he 
thought about design as a process which could be represented by a 
taxonomy within the machine because of its rectangular shape on 
paper. With the shorter sides at top and bottom his eyes 
progressed from the top downwards. Was it simply the way we 
looked at images, he asked me, that influenced his idea of the 
design process? Had the design knowledge been represented as a 
circle would that, he wondered, have changed the way he 
conceived of the design process and how it should be represented 
in the machine? As I was cast as the 'psychologist', he suggested 
it was something I might be able to comment on. Jim, however, 
told Craig not to read too much into his diagram. He had chosen 
the rectangle simply because it was a convenient shape for A4 
graph paper and could eventually be turned into a clear overhead 
projector slide.
For Cally, representing functionality was fundamental to 
the designer system. Design, it was claimed, was a matter of 
satis fy ing the function that an engineering com ponent was 
intended to have in the process of designing. Even buying Peter's 
wedding gift was a lesson in functionality. Going shopping on
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this occasion with Craig, Jim and Howard was an experience for 
me. As consumers they wanted a gift that was mechanical. So 
they chose an old fashioned coffee-grinder. Howard thought I was 
some sort of philistine. When they suggested coffee-grinder, I 
immediately came up with electric. No, my shopping companions 
told me, mechanical was much more interesting for someone like 
Peter. When the shop-keeper asked us if we wanted it 'made up' 
or 'as it is', I immediately said 'made up'. But I was soon put 
right. Peter, they said, would enjoy thinking in terms of spatial 
relations and how the parts should go together to function. Peter 
obviously appreciated his present: he wrote his thank you note to 
us in Prolog clauses to express the functionality of the grinder's 
related components: input beans, turn crank, output ground coffee; 
'Yum, yum'.
HAT! and the  d e s ign e r sys tem
HATI, by comparison, did not begin with functionality, but 
with systems: systems composed of machines and humans. HATI's 
view of developing technology meant paying attention to what 
they called the social and the technological 'sub-systems' that 
composed 'production systems'. The design of a system was both
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organizational and cognitive. 'The normal procedure of designing 
systems does not make explicit mention of the socio-technical 
elements. What tends to happen is that the technical systems are 
defined first and a social system is put together afterwards to 
try to cope with the technical system' (HATI document). This sort 
of approach had, according to HATI, led to disasters like Three 
Mile Island. That technological failure happened in part because 
the control room had been inappropriately designed for the human 
operators. So it was, in HATI's view, important to adopt an 
approach that involved human factors in the design of the 
technology to avoid other 'sub-optimal' (failure) situations like 
low productivity, job dissatisfaction, reduction of efficiency and 
high labour turnover.
Translated into the context of the Manufacture from Design 
project, this HATI perspective implied finding out how designers 
thought before designing a system to assist them. This might 
have seemed as innocuous conclusion, but it was to spark fierce 
opposition from Cally.
After one meeting with HATI's site manager Peter said what 
he did not like was groups like HATI coming along with 'fixed 
ideas' for the project; this, he said, was the way with MM I. Early 
on in the life of the project Jim wrote to BEB management for the 
project to point out that HATI's concern with 'how designers 
think' was 'going over the top.'
HATI's  'f ixed idea ’ was to see as p rob lem atic  the 
representation of the design process as a functional taxonomy on 
the grounds that it might not in fact adequately represent the 
design process. Perhaps designers did not th ink  in terms of a 
taxonomy. More explicitly they suggested that Cally's basic 
assumption might be wrong. It might not be the case that the 
designer designed according to functionality. It might be that 
designers designed according to shape. The designer might th ink  
according to shape or not think in terms of a taxonomy.
This meant, for the MMI team at HATI, that they should have 
input to the heart of the designer system, into how knowledge 
was represented - at least in the sense of wishing to have it 
recognised that the knowledge base was still a flexible issue and
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that MMI had some input to it.
As far as Cally was concerned the MMI influence had to be 
'on top o f  the designer system, not at its heart. Design w as  a 
functional process. Crigbank drew the analogy with air travel: 
'MMI is important, but it is not more important than understanding 
the basic aerodynamics. You have to design wings, control 
surfaces and an engine to provide the necessary energy. You 
define com ponents to perform function and then you start 
worrying about how it is a person comes to control those 
components. So with the designer system, we don't progress by 
designing cockpit. We progress by designing for function. If we 
don't know anything about physics or aerodynamics and design for 
a human requirement we end up with Doctor Who's Teleportation 
machine - you dial Washington and you materialise in Washington. 
That's an aeroplane or a device conceived of for performing the 
function of transport w ithout any reference to the physical 
principles whereby transport can be accomplished. So if you are 
doing a Designer System you have got to think what the basic 
engines are, the basic structure to support design and then you 
think how to present to the human.'
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An MMI-led project would not work according to Crigbank. 
If you are "dominated by MMI you end up with Doctor Who's Tardis 
and not an aeroplane. Some people might argue that the plane 
analogy is not a fair one because they'll say that design is a more 
cognitive activity than flying. I would say that Al is about the 
automation of cognitive capabilities and MMI is not. It is about 
matching the human to the machine. MMI is concerned with the 
capacity of people and how that can be matched to the capacity of 
machines. In the designer system that has to do with things like 
what the memory is like since you don't want to force the human 
to remember too much and how good they are at typing. And how 
good they are at looking and seeing things on the screen. So you 
want to bring things together. You make sure the plane has wings 
and then you start worrying about MMI."
What made the designer system powerful as a design tool, 
according to Cally, was that it was based on the language of 
mathematics. Mathematics was, Peter claimed, unambiguous, 
therefore the consistency that they claimed as being important to 
flexibility was also taken care of by the Functional Unit Module 
Taxonomy's mathematical representation. The system would have
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to represent what was implicitly understood by designers and it 
would have to make this explicit for the system to work. But it 
would be not a bad thing, said Jim Watson, for designers to be 
more rigorous. And most importantly designers would adapt  to 
the designer system. It was the view of Cally's colleagues within 
the Al department also, that 'designers might not like it at first 
but they'll get used to it when they start seeing results.' Or, as 
Craig Ward put it, 'You can get a left-handed pygymy to drive a 
left-handed Russian tank.'
In the case of the designer system, HATIs socio-technical 
approach suggested that it would be 'important to understand the 
psychologica l aspects of the user in order to construct the 
knowledge base, the representation of that knowledge' (HATI 
docum en t) .  HATI's  s ta tem ent expressed the ir  in te res t in 
'expertise gleaning' since what they wanted to avoid was what 
they called a case of Rambo in Wonderland; the designer being hit 
with information that bounced off him like bullets. This, they 
claimed, was what would happen if a MMI was treated, as Cally 
wanted, as an interface to built on to the system once the Al 
researchers had designed it. MMI should not be used just to try to
make the designer system palatable to the user, if the way a 
designer 'actually' designed was not represented in the knowledge 
base.
Cally, however, saw themselves as designing a methodology 
for taxonomy building which, according to Craig Ward, would 
e l im ina te  the need for a knowledge engineer task, for 'expertise 
gleaning'. The methodology would enable designers to encode the 
necessary knowledge straight into the designer system. He 
showed me an article about the knowledge engineering 'problem': 
how it could lead to information being misinterpreted in the 
process of gathering it. Cally were therefore addressing and 
solving an important problem by getting the designer to encode 
the know ledge h imself, accord ing to set gu ide lines , and 
e lim inating the need for a separate knowledge engineering 
fu n c tion .
This difference of approach between HATI and Cally is 
perhaps of more general significance. Diana Forsythe is an 
anthropologist who has studied in an Al laboratory and looked at 
the ways in which Al workers perceive knowledge and how it 
should be gathered. She undertook her study (1987) as a result of
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being struck by the ways in which two sets of workers, social 
scientists and Al researchers, both concerned with the gathering 
of and interpretation of knowledge, neverthe less took very 
different approaches to the task of knowledge gathering. The 
social scientist considers the gathering of knowledge to be 
prob lem atic , requiring carefu l methods to obtain; extended 
periods of observation or interviews which are prepared in 
advance. The style of the interview is carefully considered and 
there are plenty of methodological texts to advise on matters 
such as the benefits and disadvantages of structured or non­
structured interviews to suit the interviewee in question. By 
comparison, the Al worker, she claims, does not see knowledge 
gathering to be problematic. Because knowledge is thought of 
within Al as residing in heads or in books it can be 'extracted'. 
Humans are only a problem to the extent that they get in the way 
of more efficient means of gathering knowledge. Getting the 
'human out of the loop' in knowledge gathering is, she claims, a 
goal of Al workers. Al Workers, she claims, only see themselves 
as making do with talking to experts (without consulting texts on 
interviewing, considering it to be a matter of commonsense to 
talk to an expert) until they can develop techniques to gather
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MMI and the  'd e lo c a lis a tio n ' o f the  d e s ig n e r sys tem
Jim Watson described the building of the designer system at 
Cally as experim entation between Peter and the machine. 
Representing functionality was, said Jim, worked out everyday 
between Peter and his workstation. Peter's creativity was held 
to be responsible for the designer system. "That's what he is 
doing all the time, working out". Finding out how designers th ink  
when they design was not an issue. Why not? Because said Jim 
designers did not know how they thought.
HATI's approach, according to Jim W atson, was all 
'psychology' and 'opinions'. Jim greeted HATI's request for a colour 
workstation with some scepticism: 'They perceive  they need 
colour, they don't k n o w  they need it.' HATI's work was all ideas, 
and it was not situated in a body of practice. HATI, said Jim, did 
not always reference their work therefore you had to think it was 
based on opinions. That was the difference, said Jim, that Cally's 
system was based on the fundamental and unambiguous nature of 
mathematics. Jim disliked what he saw as the ambiguity of the
knowledge automatical ly .
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English language: words like tale and tail. The language of 
mathematics was preferable because of what he saw as its 
indomitable and unambiguous nature. The designer system should 
therefore be based on the fundamentals of mathematics in order 
to ensure that knowledge was consistent. It was essential to 
making implic it knowledge explicit. Implic it knowledge was 
what designers worked with; implicit knowledge was not always 
co m m u n ica te d . Again it cou ld  lead to the  so rt of 
m isin terpretations which lead to Naval Brass type situations, 
described in chapter seven.3 It was that, claimed Watson, 
which would give the designer system its universality.4
Jim Watson's view was that since MMI was concerned with
how designers think then a system led by MMI principles would be
'a disaster'. Implicitly, he was disagreeing with the centrality
awarded MMI by the Alvey programme. The designer system, he
3 I found it amusing that language was not treated in quite the same way when it 
came to issues of gender like the use of male pronouns. Then it was a case of not 
changing the language but our perception of it. That is think about men and women 
when the male form is used. The language could be left as it was if we thought about 
two genders.
4He is not alone in ascribing to mathematics a trancendental nature. However, see 
Bloors's 'Polyhedra and the Abominations of Leviticus' (, 1978) and Lakatos's(, 
1976) study of the history of Euler's theorem. These show that mathematics, which 
confronts us the most objective of discipline,s can also be studied from a sociological 
perspective.
claimed, would not spread if it was based on MMI. Jim envisaged 
expanding the circle of users. This he described in terms of 
expanding concentric circles, moving out from the lab and the 
users/researchers at Cally: "It would go out from here to more 
and more users." The more it reached, the greater the proof of the 
system's generality; that they had in other words designed 'the 
designer system'. Designers, he claimed, would a d a p t  to the 
designer system since it was based on mathematics.
But, according to Jim Watson, MMI could, if given a place in 
the construction of the knowledge representation affect the 
ability of the system to spread: 'I'd be worried about the designer 
system depending on MMI for it to work.' Why? It would, said 
Jim, limit the system's use to those designers who happened to 
think in the way that MMI had worked it out for. As far as Jim 
was concerned, then, the sub ject of MMI was i t s e l f  as 
id iosyncratic as gold-plating, equivalent to the experiment that 
worked because it was 3am or because it happened at Warwick 
university under the direction of Professor Jones (MacKenzie, 
1987). What Jim would have liked was a designer system that 
was as successful as the pocket calculator: "What's so great 
about the calculator is that it works independently of how it
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looks or how it is presented to the user. It works because the
technological principles have been worked out." What Jim Watson
then suggested was that it might be a good test of the system if
it can work with any MMI. 'Any MMI on top' was equivalent to using
d ifferent ways of interacting with the machine for the design
task. That it should work with any MMI was the equivalent to
saying that an experiment can only be considered to work, to
produce facts, if it can work at any time of the day, in Rio de
Janeiro or Clacton-on-sea, and does not depend on the skills of
one scientist to conduct it. This was a suggestion for how to
make HATI 'useful' within the project: to get them to test
whether the failure of the system to increase its concentric
circles is the result of poor MMI or the fundamental nature of the
s y s te m .5 A Designer System could not be accepted as working
if it was 'MMI-led' since MMI was, in Jim's view, by its very
nature an idiosyncratic and hence a local achievement. Like the
experim ent which remains a private d iscovery, the Designer
System would not leave Cally's laboratory or at least get beyond
5What would obviously be of interest here would be the way in which a test as Jim 
Watson proposed might be set up to evaluate the designer system. How it would be 
determined that the problems associated with using the system lay with the taxonomy 
or the MMI. In other words there is always the possiblity that interpretative 
flexibility would surround the results of such a test.
200
the particular idyiosyncracies of a few designers.
At meetings, HATI wanted to establish the reversibility of 
the Functional Unit Module Taxonomy as a way of representing 
design knowledge and to contest the idea that MMI was an 
afterthought for system designers. HATI stated, 'As long as you 
don't think you are coming so far and we are going to build on top. 
At the meeting Jim Watson seemed to deny that this was Cally's 
scheme: 'Oh no ... like you would have to take what we give you.'
But away from the meeting and on our way home Jim Watson told 
me that the FUMT was fundamental. That was not brought into the 
public arena.
This was not uncommon. Often different points of view 
were not brought into public confrontation. An observer of 
meetings only, or other such formal settings, would thus gain 
only a partia l p icture of the social shaping of technology. 
Therefore it is necessary to follow scientists and technologists 
around to appreciate that agreement might be context dependent. 
As we follow them away from meetings we can see the different 
strategies that technologists use to maintain their own position.
'I'm keen to have some independence from MMI', said Jim 
Watson. An initial attempt was to tackle this at the level of the 
t e c h n ic a l  c o m m i t t e e  meetings by d iv id ing  part ic ipa t ion  in 
meetings between 'partic ipants' and 'observers'. Participants 
active ly  took part in the d iscussions of which they were 
co n s id e re d  to be ce n tra l ly  invo lved . O bse rve rs  were 
collaborators who could be present but who would be expected to 
sit on the side lines, who would be asked by a participant to offer 
an opinion. Invariably, HATI was an 'observer' - a situation with 
which management, attuned to MMI's centrality to Alvey, was 
uncom fortab le.
Within the Cally team HATI were referred to as 'a bunch of 
furniture removers.' It was a deliberately derogatory term which 
was intended to get a good laugh at talks within the department 
and was used to refer to what Cally thought should be the concern 
of HATI within the project. It referred to MMI work in the 
'narrow ' sense of ergonom ics as defined in terms of the 
comfortable chairs on which a designer should sit, the resolution 
of screens and what sort of computer they might use. That should
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be HATI's concern.
For Jim Watson the place of HATI was 'off our backs.' To 
that end a team meeting was called. And so Crigbank came up 
with a 'technological' response to HATI, an MMI for the designer 
system which he called 'table-topping.' I asked Peter why he was 
doing this? - so 'HATI can fuck-off he replied. I asked Craig, who
had been at the meeting, to explain it to me but he did not
understand it: 'Peter has some good ideas but I don't always
follow what he’s on about.'6 But Peter did develop a pictorial 
representation of the designer system which would make it 
easier to use the taxonomy. It was a pictorial representation of 
the taxonomy; when you clicked with a 'mouse' a box labelled with 
the name of a module the relevant information about that module 
was available to the designer.
A partic ipant observer?
The different approaches were not confined to just HATI and 
Cally. The subject of MMI raised concern from a variety of 
co llabora tors . Reg Scott, site manager of BEB Machines,
announced to a meeting he held with Cally that HATI were
6A s it transpired table-topping was not used.
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attempting a take-over-bid. Scott took the view that MMI was
about 'marketing the system, making it look good.' When I asked
him what he meant he replied 'why do you always ask me?' When I
tried to explain that he was the one that always spoke about
HATI, he said 'you're always defending them'. I, after all, was a
sociologist. What was the connection: 'They are doing stuff on
s o c io -technical systems and you're a socio person. You're like
them . I bet you're a spy working for them. You're always talking
to them. You're always nodding when they say something. The
socio has nothing to do with technology. It comes in after you've
designed the technology.' As a good relativist I did not nod my
head! But what was interesting is that he saw me in this light:
my 'questions' were taken as a defence of HATI. And any attempts
I made to 'protest my innocence' were only taken as further
defending HATI. (Was I to join in some of the fun poked at HATI?)
Sometimes it made me uncomfortable, because he would say he
had seen talking to 'them' yet again. He would sometimes even
wink at me across the room as if to say, 'caught you!'. If I was a
native member then I was being seen as a member of the 'wrong'
side and that made me feel nervous.7 It probably was not all in
7There was almost something macho in Reg Scott's views towards MMI. He told me 
stories about the back streets in Birmingham where engineers kept lathes in their
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Reg Scott's 'head' however. HATI's Clive Mint did seem to see me 
as some sort of ally in his struggle to get recognised. After 
meetings he would sometimes ask me 'what did you think of that 
then' and he would say he couldn't wait to see what I was going to 
write about 'all these guys' in the sense of some sort of exposé of 
the truth.
A particular question Mint asked me was how had I gone 
about learning the language of Al? The HATI team had to do this 
in order to influence the Cally team: 'we have to understand the 
way they talk in order to convince them of the credibility of what 
we have to say before its too late', Clive Mint explained to me.8 
He seemed to see there being a point at which it would be 'too 
late' to change the system. Although he didn't specify when that 
would be or what that time would 'look' like, there was a 
recognition that the system was not infinitely malleable. Why it 
was not too late yet, why they felt they could still make an 
impact was not spelt out, however. An interesting general issue
back gardens and where they did cheap but good engineering jobs, repair work and 
the like. The way he spoke of it was to conjure up images of rolled-up sleeves and 
hard graft.
8For Craig Ward, it was HATI's lack of programming experience which excluded 
them from making a serious contribution: 'how can they make praticai suggestions. 
The don't write code, they can't know if what they suggest is implementable. If 
someone had programming experience you might say "well okay'".
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lurks here: at what point the technology becomes immovable for 
those involved? As I have said, for Clive Mint of HATI it was 
important to understand the language of Artificial Intelligence as 
used at Cally in order to make some impact and get accepted by 
Cally as making an impact. But that was not as clear a task as it 
sounds. As Jim so frequently said to me 'It will be up to us to say 
whether they understand the way we talk here.'9
Part of HATI seeing me as an ally was Clive Mint's remark
to me that Craig Ward was sounding just like Jim Watson. Clive
wanted to know if he was always like that. Since within the
group at Cally there was not a coherent point of view as regards
MMI, I felt I could have said that within the team there was not
always unity on MMI issues: some members did feel that MMI did
have a part to play in how the system was designed.10 I found
this an awkward situation to be in. There was the methodological
9There is an interesting comparison to be made here with the work by Ashmore, 
Pinch and Mulkay (, 1987) on how health economists attempt to get medical doctors 
to apply to their practice of medicine the principles of economics. The authors are 
interested in the way that the health economists 'translate' (Latour, 1983) medical 
practice. In the case of the MMI workers we can see that they to wished to be able to 
influence Cally but they needed to learn their language and they also took the position 
that there was a point beyond which translation would be impossible.
10MMI, said Jacobs, did influence what you did to the knowledge base. They should 
listen to what designers want.
206
problem of maintaining some neutrality. There was a loyalty I 
felt towards Cally and the fact that perhaps on some occasions 
they wanted to present a united front. I evaded his question.
A r t if ic ia l In te llig e n c e , d e s ig n e rs  and the  d e s ig n e r sys te m
HATI was not alone in its concern over the construction of 
the designer system. Reams, the end-user, was also concerned. 
How 'real', Reams site manager Eric Cater wondered, was a 
system that was encoding the knowledge of engineering from text 
books and not from brains. Where was 'real' knowledge located? 
Eric would remark: 'We want brains in there (pointing to a 
computer) with a curly wig around it.' The system was intended 
to use the knowledge of the Reams designers, and in particular 
their knowledge about pump design in order to demonstrate the 
validity of the system, 'to the watching world.' The validity was 
to be demonstrated by the use of a 'real' product, the knowledge 
of 'real' designers and in a 'real' factory.
Reams was a company in transition. What was evident was 
the move from older designers to younger, multi-skilled workers. 
There was quite visibly two groups of older and of younger
workers. On arriving Eric Cater introduced us to Michael Gray, 
designer at Reams and a key figure in the design of Reams' 
'revolutionary' fuel injection pump. Michael was about to retire 
and what Eric Cater wanted was, he said, 'to get Michael's brain in 
the designer system'. Otherwise he was going to leave the 
company taking with him all the knowledge and experience he had 
gained over the years of working for the company and on the 
design of the fuel pump. Eric's goal was to get that in a form that 
could be used by the new breed of engineers; 'lesser skilled' 
engineers, he called them. This was considered to be a pressing 
need. People learned things and took it away with them because 
they never wrote it down. Therefore, according to Cater, the 
designer system should be a way of retaining knowledge.
The Cally team had come down at Cater's request to talk to 
designers and find out how they designed. I had overhead him tell 
another site manager that Peter was "still not concerned with the 
way designers think." Here in the Reams factory, Cater felt Cally 
would get to talk to 'real' designers and find out how it was they 
did things. After talking to the designers, Watson felt that they 
used something akin to a taxonomy. However, designers were not 
totally convinced by the system, as they explained to Howard and
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Craig. Why was it, they asked, if the system was not intending to 
replace skilled engineers was it making knowledge explicit in the 
form of prompts - knowledge that a skilled designer would not 
need to have represented explicitly? And that very question 
caught Howard off balance. About this question Howard told me: 
"That was a good question. I hadn't thought about that before. I 
think I said something about the designer system holding the 
information that was in text books." 11
It was part of Eric Cater's job to sell the designer system
within his company and to do that successfully he had to convince
management and designers that the designer system was relevant.
The rationale for a designer system was clear to Eric Cater: "we
need a designer system for the same reasons that British Leyland
had to rationalise: the economic climate dictates. It takes years
to train designers. That's a large financial investment and if we
can use cheaper designers, that's designers who don't require the
same amount of training then so much the better." Since part of
11 When Clive Mint saw Howard Jacobs talking to designers he asked Craig Ward: 'Is 
he tra ined? ' Craig replied ,'lts just commonsense'. D. Forsythe (1987) notes 
something sim ilar, which is that Al workers do not see the need for any special 
methodology: that knowledge gathering is just about talking and knowledge can be 
transferred by talking.
Ream's organizational experiment (see Chapter 9) was to rotate 
engineers, doing jobs they did not always have a great deal of 
experience in, the system would have to have a way of retaining 
knowledge and passing that knowledge on. To be relevant it 
should represent the way designers think. According to Cater, 
ninety percent of design knowledge came from experience and 
history: what you were trained to do and what you found out by 
having done it for so long. It did not come from books, which was 
where Cater claimed Cally were getting most of their knowledge 
from.
Cater was still concerned that Crigbank was not looking 
at how designers were thinking: "Dare I say it", Cater asked the 
Cally team, "I know its heresy, but designers do think in graphical 
form, maybe they do design in terms of shape." In Cater's view 
the taxonomy itself had a structure which might not represent 
what went on inside the heads of designers; the structure of the 
taxonomy did not represent associative memory. The taxonomy 
required that those modules further down the tree inherit the 
characteristics of their parent, that is the module above. It did 
not allow null inheritance or multiple inheritance of functions. In 
a debate that took us to discuss in a more light-hearted vein
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whether a three-legged Indian elephant was indeed a child module 
of the parent elephant, Peter replied that non-inheritance was not 
possible. A module must inherit all characteristics for it to work 
"and that's it."12
That w a s  just it as far as Eric Cater was concerned:
Peter's concern was getting the FUMT to work. According to
Cater, "Peter had a technique before he had the problem. He's
looked for a problem to test it out." But he was not, said Cater,
addressing the problem of how it was designers happened to think
and on the basis of that design a system able to retain knowledge.
Although Eric Cater was impressed by Peter's interface to the
designer system - the graphical display which when clicked
12Within the Cally team itself there was some concern that inheriting a single 
function, not allowing null inheritance or multiple inheritance was 'Because Jim 
says so. It's dogma really.' Slater's work was the basis for the designer system and 
the success of Slater's program taken as setting a precedent for extending module 
hiearchies into mechanical engineering. 'We know that FUMT works', Jim Watson 
was to say to any who doubted the taxonomy. But for researchers like Craig Ward 
using Slater's work was, in his opinion, easier said than done. To arrange according 
to functionality was not obvious: 'what functionality?' for there was more than one 
function according to which bearings could be arranged. And if the function of shafts 
was to rotate then Craig could think of an instance, a spindle shaft, for example, 
which did not rotate. At one point Jim Watson even suggested they might benefit from 
talking to a zoologist to find out about classify knowledge. Perhaps Harry Collins 
would suggest that the difficulty the team experience in creating the taxonomy is 
simply the problems that are encountered when Al workers attempt to encode tacit 
skills.
would give design information - he was not sure that the 
Functional Unit Module Taxonomy was the best representation for 
the system.
Cally, it is worth noting, did not share Cater's social agenda 
of making it possible to use less skilled designers. They insisted: 
'This is a system for use by expert designers.' 'We are not in this 
to see the demise of human designers. The system will not be of 
use to novices.' The system, according to Jim, was more than 
about retaining knowledge: it was a mathematically consistent 
way of representing design.13
Finding Cally's position inadequate to their perceived needs,
Reams recruited HATI. To find out how designers went about
designing, Reams decided to invite the HATI team by getting them
down to the business park to watch and ask questions of and
watch designers for six weeks. The move was not well received
by Jim Watson: "MMI should go on top or else I'd be worried about
what we were doing here." He objected that HATI would not know
which "technical" questions to ask the designers or how to
13lt was Cally's concern however to explore the building of a general designer 
system, not one specific to fuel pump design. In chapter 9, I will explore further the 
problems the project as a whole faced in defining and demonstrating a convincing 
demonstration of a factory of the future.
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interpret their answers. It was, said Jim, the technical people at 
Cally who were capable of asking designers questions. The 
implication was that design is about the equations designers use. 
Ream's Eric Cater was, however, not particularly concerned about 
this proposed 'incapacity' in HATI. He wanted them to watch 
designers, talk to them about what influenced their decision when 
they thought, and to see when and where they thought about shape. 
As it turned out that designers at Reams had not been dismissive 
of HATI. Indeed they had greatly enjoyed their visit - t h e y  
thought Clive very sociable and 'a great laugh'.
Reams was not alone in wishing to involve MMI on the 
project. At the same time BEB was submitting to the Alvey 
directorate a proposal for an enabling technology on MMI. Along 
with British Aerospace and HATI, BEB had put together a proposal, 
eventually accepted, for MMI in computer aided design technology. 
Around this time Jim Watson was to change his approach to MMI 
and its relation to the designer system. It was no longer the case 
that MMI should be a test of the system's universality. Rather, 
what he now felt was needed was an MMI to bring out the full 
potential of the designer system, an MMI linked closely to the
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work at Cally. However it was an MMI to be driven by the 'power 
of the designer system'. In this changed approach, which gave 
importance to MMI as a way of getting to the 'full potential of the 
taxonomy', the direction of influence was still to come from 
Cally.
More heterogeneous engineering was on the cards, however. 
In a phone call to me Jim Watson spoke about HATI's attempt to 
form a design team to broaden design responsibility beyond Cally: 
'HATI are feeling left out but I want to resist the formation of a 
design team. Things should be driven by need, and it is up to us to 
determine that need.' The task that faced Cally was not just to 
convince others that groups in general, and a design group in 
particular, should be driven by need. Rather that task required an 
extra bit of heterogeneous engineering and that was to convince 
the other collaborators that it was the Cally team i t s e l f  which 
should determine need.
These manoeuvres might seem to be of local significance 
only. But ultimately they represented attempts to define the 
relationship between two different technologies, MMI and IKBS.
How the relationship between MMI and IKBS has been worked out 
subsequently is beyond the scope of this study. One thing, 
however, is amply clear: that the dictum of a policy-making body 
such as the Alvey Committee Directorate was not sufficient to 




Obviously, it was important for those involved that the 
project be a success. But what 'success' meant differed radically 
from group to group and context to context. In this chapter, I 
review some of these different meanings of success, and how the 
partic ipants sought to achieve it. I begin with the most 
ambitious version of what success meant - that the project 
would lead to a demonstrating the possibility of a significant, 
m aybe re v o lu t io n a ry ,  change , both o rg a n iz a t io n a l and 
technological, in factories. As the chapter proceeds, however, we 
shall also find more modest versions of what it was to succeed, 
versions which nonetheless occupying a great deal of the time and 
effort of participants.
A 'g ra n d io s e ’ v e rs io n  of demonstrating su ccess ,
The site for the final demonstration was to be a new plant 
set up for the Demonstrator project by the Reams company. Most 
importantly this site was to be the location for an organizational
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experim en t in sm all-batch eng ineering . The aim of the 
experiment was 'to determine whether professional engineers can 
s a t is fa c to r i ly  o p e ra te  a p la n t w ith o u t  s p e c ia l is a t io n ,  
d e m a rca t io n  or su p e rv is io n ' (Ream s docu m e n t) .  The 
'experimental steps' were - no hierarchical structure, introducing 
g roup  w ork ing  rota inc lud ing  w eekends , au tom a tion  of 
unrewarding jobs or the use of sub-contract labour - what Eric 
Cater like to call 'R e n t-a -Y ob '.1 Sub-contract work had 
'advantages' according to Eric, 'Even if we tell a sub-contractor 
we're happy with their work and we'll use them forever they know 
that you can still turn round and dispense with their services.' In 
addition, the experiment called for a wide range of training, wide 
range of skills and experience, no personnel function, se lf­
supervision and team building exercises and importantly no union 
recogn it ion .2 The organizational approach meant changes to the
1Eric Cater liked the deferential and the cultured worker. The Germans were 
appealing because even the 'ordinary' worker took an interest in music and politics, 
unlike their British equivalent. He also enjoyed a visit to the Burrell collection 
because the museum servitors were polite and opened doors for him and his family.
2Deen's site manager literally had his tongue in his cheek when he suggested to a 
technical committee meeting that unions should be consulted to discuss the design of 
the system: 'we should have union people here to ask them what they think of what 
we're doing.' He knew he was saying something contentious. The remark was talked 
over as if it hadn't been said and participant's addressed themselves to the next item 
on the agenda. This tends to support the criticism that Russell (, 1986 ) makes of 
Pinch and Bijker's (1984) Social Contruction of Technology approach (SCOT) and 
their Relevant Social Groups. Russell objects to the SCOT approach because it treats
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workforce: no operators, setters, works engineers, foremen or 
personnel, minimal machine manning and paperwork. And finally 
all employees were to be staff and skilled and the plant to be in 
operation 7 days, 24 hours a day. These were to be flexible 
(ro tate jobs) and skilled, graduate level eng ineers whose 
qualifications it was believed would motivate them to loyalty to 
the company. That, said Eric Cater, was in contrast to the bored 
minder of some machine who, he claimed, was 'like a time-bomb 
waiting to go off.' Although particular details about the Reams 
experim ent were not released within the project Eric Cater 
explained how Reams were attempting to undertake a new type of 
organization along the lines of General Electric's experiment in 
se lf-m anagem ent: teams/group work, rotating jobs, incentive 
schemes. Eric also told me that 'The Bible on how to make large 
organisations work' was the book 'In Search of Excellence' by 
Peters and Waterman. He was impressed to read about the
as relevant to the production of technological knowledge only those groups actively 
involved, in other words those who have access to the site of the production of 
knowledge and ignores those who may be actively excluded. However, the inclusion of 
other groups might not increase the range of 'interpretative flexibility' surrounding 
a technology in any way that subverts the likely route to 'c losure '. Marxist 
approaches within the sociology of work have suggested that getting workers onto 
directors' boards as part of industrial democracy schemes does not lead to their 
participation in the decision-making process in any way that upsets the current 
agenda. Rather, they find their 'interests' repressed by the profit constraint (See 
MacFarlane, 1981).
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success of companies like MacDonalds which had managed to 
secure commitment from workers by getting them to wear caps 
when they served up 'burgers, 'put a white coat on a worker and 
they think they belong.'
There were more tangible signs that the Reams factory was 
an experiment. The place seemed impermanent in appearance and 
the kind of port-a-cabin office smelt new like it had just come 
out of a plastic bag. Situated on a Business Park, it was 
accessible only to 'authorised personnel.' Like an experimental 
control variable it was intended to be kept 'secret' in order to 
avoid, as one engineer put it, 'an adverse reaction' from other 
sites and in particular from the unions. When I went with the 
Cally team to visit the site, our taxi-driver had some difficulty 
in finding it! At this time the machine-tools were being
installed. The shop-floor was clean and tidy and the machines 
shiny-new. Only the odd bit of swarf gave the slightest hint of 
activity. It was also extremely quiet apart from a demonstration 
we were given of fuel injection. The Reams experiment, 
however, was intended to act as 'catalyst' to spread to other 
parts of Reams sites. On seeing a rotating globe on a Cally
workstation one of Reams engineer/managers exclaimed: 'That's 
where we're aiming at: the world'. And they were going to get 
there, they wrote boldly across a whiteboard by 'Ruling the World 
with Artif ic ia l In te ll igence '.3
The organizational changes desired by Reams required what 
they called 'Methods of Achievement'. This included the intention 
to use minimal manned machines, to train staff in all production 
engineering, machine maintenance, electronics and computing, to 
link computer aided design and computer aided manufacturing 
(linking production control computer and the NC machine tools), 
and maximise integration by computerizing tasks. In other words, 
the Reams experiment made it clear that it was not technology 
which would lead to, or require changes in, work-roles in the 
sense of technological determinism. Rather the desired 'effects' 
of the o rgan iza tiona l experim ent were to be taken into 
consideration in the construction of the technology itself.
The Reams Experiment: A neo-Fordist model of the future factory
This re la tionsh ip  between the organ iza tion  and the 
technology changes draws noticeable parallels with much current
3 I was told this by one young Reams' engineer sponsored to do a PhD at Cally 
working on the Cally designer system.
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writing on the the production process. The Reams factory was a 
neo-Ford is t model. This writing has focussed on the changes 
from Fordist princip les to neo-Fordist ones (Aglietta, 1979; 
Blackburn, Coombs, et al., 1985). Capital accumulation based on 
Fordism is claimed to be in crisis. The Fordist techniques of 
mass production technology, dedicated machinery such as 
assembly lines and the organization of the workforce cannot be 
extended into small-batch engineering. But it is changes to 
small-batch engineering which are said to be important for an 
economic upswing. Blackburn et al explain that small-batch 
engineering is important because of its position in the production 
of capital goods: 'transformations in technology and organisation 
in this sector which result in cheapening its products are likely 
to have widespread effects throughout many other sectors which 
use these capital goods' (Blackburn, et al., 1985, p .108). Neo- 
Fordist technological elements include control mechanization, 
flexible production of a bigger range of products, the integration 
of design, production and distribution. And planning stages in 
advance as a total system and so subjecting them to scientific 
and mathematical representation.
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Within the Reams experimental plant there was a vision of 
the future: a plastic model! However, demonstrating the
Manufacture from Design project on this site was for some time
in the future and goes beyond the time of my fieldwork. T h e
demonstrator projects, as I have already discussed in this thesis 
were an im portant part of the A lvey program m e's social 
engineering. They were intended to be precursors to market 
products, with industry playing a vital role in their shaping. They 
were also to be instrumental in rendering IKBS available for
decision-making by senior management in industry. Reams was 
the user company where the 'realism' of the project was to be 
demonstrated. This early phase in the life of one demonstrator 
however shows that there were competing versions of 'reality', 
confusions about what could be achieved, and different versions 
of success. These all involved heterogeneous engineering, but 
mostly of a much more mundane kind than in Ream's new-Fordist 
fa c to ry .
A 'mundane' version of a demonstration: constructing a demo
Bringing the work of the Cally researchers together for the 
f irs t dem onstra tion of the ir software involved the sort of
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preparations usually associated with the staging of a theatrical 
production. Indeed, Cally used similar techniques: selection and 
preparation to the best of effects. They arranged what they 
called 'dress rehearsals' in front of selected members of the Al 
department who in turn saw themselves as role-playing the part 
of the other collaborators. Cally's MMI was deliberately called 
System Design Interface so that HATI would not think 'we are 
stepping on their toes' and trying to displace them from the 
designer system. 'Honest bugs' were removed and parts of the 
demonstration were saved as images, said Howard Jacobs, so that 
the system did not look too slow. What should go into the system 
was prepared in advance: values were put into equations which in 
turn were worked out longhand on the whiteboard. The 
'correctness' of the designer system was checked against the 
longhand versions. At the advice of the role-playing audience 
Cally wrote what they called 'scripts ' to guide the viewers 
through what was appearing on the screen. There were separate 
scrip ts for the dem onstra tors  themselves, with prompts to 
remind them what to say at certain stages of the demonstration. 
And according to programmer Craig Ward these were sometimes 
rem inders to 'ta lk  over' particu lar ly  creaky points in the
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demonstration to divert the viewers attention. There were also 
times designated for the audience to ask questions which was not 
during but before and after a demonstration. Last but not least 
time was spent, as in all 'performances', on the backstage work of 
making sure the screen was visible by playing around with lights 
in the demo room and altering the font size. Even the chairs were 
arranged to make viewing comfortable.4
When it came to demonstrating, however, not all the 
audiences were as attentive as some of the collaborators; 'too 
c lever by three-quarters' was what Craig Ward called one site 
manager who spotted a Cally error. For it was a demonstration at 
Cally attended by Alvey's MMI director and the director of the 
Large Scale Demonstrator projects that had to be the most 
bizzare I had witnessed. One director fell asleep almost as soon 
as the demonstration began and the other, suffering from back­
ache, lay on the floor lifting his head only occasionally to catch a 
g lim pse of the screen. How could Cally be said to be
4 Researchers did not share knowledge of the system ’s various parts. Its 
production was fragmented and designated to different workers. This was usually 
ev iden t at dem onstra tions. Once the phone in terrupted one researcher's  
demonstration. As he left to take the call, the audience expected another researcher to 
take over, but the latter replied, 'I don't know anything about this.' I was told that if
I wanted to understand the RAPT work on the system I should go to the other 
dem onstration (the same demonstrations were run sim ultaneously in different 
room s) where the researcher with RAPT knowledge would be present.
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dem onstra ting  an in te ll igen t system? And perhaps jus t as 
important how can those policy-makers be said to direct or 
manage technology? On what do they base their decisions about 
technology? This was not only an odd demonstration but it was 
amongst the most annoying for Howard Jacobs who would turn 
round to see a d irector nodding-off in his chair. Later he 
remarked to me 'They asked nothing! Not even the kind of 
questions you ask us about what we are doing. What do they think 
they are doing? Do they know anything? What have they come for 
and what are they going to say they have seen?' Certainly a scene 
such as this made it hard to accept, without a touch of irony, the 
com m en t from the one 'o rd ina ry ' v iew er of the Cally
demonstration: 'We'll expect Peter to change if we find him going 
in a different direction from the rest of the world.'
According to Mark Robbins constructing the demonstrations 
was s im u lta n e o u s ly  co n s truc t ing  ' in te l l ig e n ce '.  Th is is 
interesting in an area that is about building intelligent systems.
It was Mark Robbins' view that intelligence did not simply
e m a n a te  from  the p rog ra m s . Rather the ascr ip t ion  of
'intelligence' depended on an unequal distribution of knowledge
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surrounding the designer system - knowledge that was relative to 
the time spent on programming. Mark Robbins said he knew what 
went into the system: he was closely involved in the programming 
and hours spent debugging gave him familiarity with the system.
Once you knew what went into it, suggested Mark Robbins, it was 
not in te ll igen t5 . But it was not a familiarity shared by the the 
other collaborators 'Intelligence' was a social re la tion6. In a 
light-hearted vein Craig Ward suggested that they select a 
version of the demonstrations (the 'internal' version of a module 
class as opposed to the 'external' version) that would show lots 
of 'flashy equations to blind them with science so they think it is 
really clever.'
The designer system, however, was to be used eventually by
designers and not just demonstrated to collaborators. Craig Ward
saw what he did - encoding knowledge into the taxonomy - as
attempting to get the designer system to the point it could be, as
he put it, t rus ted  by a designer. This trust meant for Craig Ward
5The term 'intelligence' did not figure prominently in the department of Artificial 
Intelligence. For example, Jim Watson was informed by Professor Smith that he had
made history by putting 'intelligent' in the title of a departmental talk: 'What makes
a robot intelligent?'. Jim Watson noted, in turn, that no-one at the talk asked him to 
attempt a definition of intelligence.
6See (W oolgar, 1985) on how the boundary betwen humans and machines is 
socially mediated.
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that a designer would not keep turning to pencil and paper to 
check the output from the designer system but would accredit the 
output of the designer system itself as knowledge or information 
about design. This is, however, an interesting notion of what it 
means to have successfully built an intelligent system in a 
subject like Al that has warned against what one practitioner 
discusses as success based upon what might appear to be 
'intuitively sound' (Doyle, 1984, p4).7
But for Jim Watson how Cally would evaluate the success of
the designer system sometimes provoked the anxious thought:
'Suppose there is only one designer system in the world, how and
when will we know we have the right one?' There was, he said 'no
7Doyie, 1984 writes about expert systems in particular: "But if we place trust in 
an expert system because its information appears sound and reasonable, and because 
it has succeeded on a few dozen test cases, we are derelict in re sp o n s ib ly  and 
prudence, for the uncommon sense of current systems offers small warrant for 
success in many other cases." (1984: pp4-5) What is trust? What is the basis of 
believing a machine's output or accrediting it with knowlege? The reliability of a 
technology's output is an area to be explored: what makes a technology reliable? For 
example, imagine a supermarket situation where a shopper who has used a pocket 
calculator to tote up the cost of the shopping is faced by a different total at the bar-' 
coded check-out till. Which technology is believed, which is the more reliable and 
why? What factors influence which output is believed? Is the brain brought in to 
arbitrate? Or is the brain redundant? In the case of a 'dispute' between the output 
from the designer system and the pencil and paper, which result is relied on? Does 
it depend on the user? How does a user accredit the output of a technology like the 
designer system with the status of knowledge?
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benchmark' by which to evaluate the designer system8.
A concern for collaborators Reams and BEB was that the 
project must be made to appear viable to the Steering Committee 
and to the Alvey directorate in order to secure funding for the 
dem onstra tor phase9. That involved making the collaborations 
look like a project and the technical contributions part of a 
system that would demonstrate factory automation to Alvey.
C onstructing  Feasib ility
How were they to construct their work in order to continue
to get the funding? How were they to present their work to Alvey
and the Steering Committee? There was much mundane work to
be done. How were they to make it appear as though they had a
8 Did users provide an independent judgement? Designers, said Mark Robbins, 
would have to be told in advance what to expect so that they would not judge the 
system according to the assessment criteria of CAD; that is a system that will do a lot 
of drawing with some reasoning tagged on. The designer system did not do lots of 
sophisticated drawings and so according to this reseacher designers had to be 
prepared for a tool that did constraint satisfaction. Interestingly, according to this 
researcher, HATI, who had conducted 'usability' studies on the designer system, did 
not explain the system 'properly' to the designers with the result that designers 
expecting a CAD system criticised its 'usability': they were he said looking for a CAD 
system and did not get it. The complaints came back to Cally. It was this 
researcher's view that HATI had chosen not to 'explain' the systems' capabilities to 
the designers in order to boost their own views of the system: this is not what 
designers want in other words.
9 During the first two and a half years of the project it was described as a 'pilot' 
p ro ject, in the follow ing two and a half years the pro ject would enter the 
'demonstrator phase'.
plan and a way of going forward. They had only paper at their 
d isposal. They must show the contribu tions 'going from 
divergence to convergence': 'We must not look fragmented, that is 
like nine separate contributions.' They considered how to best to 
draw diagrams to give an impression of a plan and of a direction; 
one suggestion was that convergence might be shown by diagrams 
which showed a con tinuous reduction in the number of 
contributions from nine to six and then to four. It would 
hopefully show that individual contributions gradually converged 
as individual sites came together to solve mutual problems. Will 
the dem onstra tor look 'noddy', Eric Cater asked the other 
collaborators? Should they concentrate on feedback asked Joe 
Blair, since they said they would do it and because it might 'zap' 
Alvey. But on the other hand said one of the BEB project managers 
they did not want to 'zap too much' or else the funding could stop, 
'they might say "that's it you've done it” .' So preparing the 
demonstrations was to be a delicate act in making several 
impressions upon the viewing audience: to convince them that
they were on course to demonstrate a valid/commercial system 
a n d  they still had work to do.10
10lt was also at this time that the Enabling Technology/Large Scale Demonstrator 
distinction resurfaced (see chapter 4). It was announced to the collaborators at a 
project workshop that there were enabling technologies that would appreciate a 
'real-life' application like the demonstrator project. The Large Scale Demonstrators
The project, however had eventually to put on a 'realistic' 
show for the Alvey directorate at the final demonstration. It was 
also intended that work within the project was in keeping with 
world developments in factory automation. This was especially 
im portant for the Demonstrator Definition Co-ord inator, Phil 
Mann (a physicist from BEB Assemblers). It is interesting in 
itself that such a managerial position exists. As the title 
suggests, his job on the project was to define the direction the 
project should take for the second part of the project, the 
demonstrator phase and then to co-ordinate the activities of the 
nine collaborators in line with that direction. It was during the 
pilot project phase that Reams were to raise concern over what 
they saw as the incongruity of individual site work. How could 
they convince Alvey of having come up with a system that would
were intended to act as drag on Enabling Technologies, said Deen's project manager, 
Joe Blair. It was therefore unfair, he objected, that they might now have to take 
enabling technologies on board just because those projects had gone ahead without the 
'puli' of Manufacture from Design. What faced the project now, said Demonstrator 
Definition Coordinator Phil Mann, was how to minimize the effect on their work of 
having to fu lfill the ir contractual obligation to take on board the enabling 
technologies; in other words, it looked as if possibly more heterogeneous engineering 
might be required in the future regarding this relationship. No necessary or 
hierarchical relationship existed between these areas of technology said to be on 
different ends of the research/application continuum. This is interesting in the light 
of the Alvey Evaluation interim report which states that passing enabling technology 
results onto the Large Scale Demonstrator projects had been unsuccessful because no 
clear framework existed for this purpose (Georghiou, 1987).
meet the stated goals as they appeared in the Study Report when 
some of the collaborators were focussing on problems that 
excluded others from making their contributions to meet their 
individual goals/requirements and prevented the project as a 
whole from meeting its stated aims. With Cally working on 
gearbox design, HATI claimed they had only limited material to 
interface to. That, in HATI's view, would not be enough to 
adequately demonstrate the usefulness of MMI. It was not just 
Ca lly  how ever. A ccord ing  to Reams, Deen un ive rs ity 's  
concentration on modelling milled parts only would mean that BEB 
machines were not going to be able to demonstrate anything but 
the most elementary of machining operations. Another Reams 
concern was over BEB machines who were to provide a control 
system able to schedule and marshal materials, tools and data to 
both the manufacturing cell and the assembly cell. But how was 
the control system to obtain information regarding materials, 
jigs, fixtures, given that the process planner would not be 
considering assembly, or jigs and fixtures?
A vital issue for Reams was the scope of the project. If the 
demonstrator was only able to put together simple, meccano-type 
parts, its wider implications for industry were close to nil: 'if it
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can only deal with a very restricted set of different parts of 
particular configurations and manufacturing methods then again 
its relevance will not be seen to be great (particularly if those 
parts are not fuel pump parts.) It is important that at the end of 
the project the Demonstrator must work with parts of a known 
product and, it must be such that it could fit into a real factory - 
i.e. capable of ongoing operation. The whole demonstrator must 
be such that manufacturers will quickly recognise its validity. If 
all that is provided is the ability to design one or two simple 
parts with IKBS help, restricted only to parts that can be milled, 
with cons ide rab le  human ass is tance between design and 
manufacture, then the watching world is unlikely to be impressed' 
( project document).
Perhaps they should have a system design team, one 
participant suggested. That was all right, said another, if you 
knew what system you wanted to design. One other issue that 
was raised that would have to be dealt with in the course of the 
p ro ject was how the designer system was going to be 
'd ifferentiated' from CAD/CAM systems that had huge design 
teams: they should be looking for a way to distinguish the system
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from CAD/CAM systems that would appear more viable: they did 
not to have th e ir  success  m easured  th is  way.
A large Scale Demonstrator: collaboration and precursors to market 
p ro d u c ts?
Cally, said Jim Watson were concerned with a general
methodology of design not just a system specific to the fuel
pump: in particular, they were not building an expert system11.
They were concerned with a methodology for encoding design
knowledge: not just fuel pumps (It was Craig Ward's view that
Reams saw the fuel pump being neglected)12. Management
claimed they had an obligation to the Alvey directorate and to the
BEB company to 'get products out' within the lifetime of the
project The concern with getting products out was, said Jim
Watson, misplaced and came from management holding a mistaken
view of the system: 'I don't know why Alan Rogers keeps going on
11 The name 'designer system' had been chosen by Peter. It was, said Jim, the 
'official' name of the system, not IKBS. One industrial participant assumed it was 
because Cally wished to avoid another 'Lighthill' and resist being accused of failure. 
However, a lthough not referring to the Manufacture from Design project Jim 
Watson told me that something which 'does go on' is universities making their work 
attractive to industry by calling it expert systems.
12According to Craig, Reams' site manager was concerned about the team's apparent 
neglect of the fuel injection pump. To satisfy the Reams site manager, said Craig 
Ward, the Cally team took the drawings of the fuel pump down to Reams and referred 
to it to ease their mind about working on it.
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about getting products out. It's too soon.'
BEB were reifying the block diagram of the designer system 
in seeing products, said Jim Watson. A particular problem was 
the 'specialists' programs which were designed to aid a designer 
in making design decisions for cost considerations, reliability 
and maintenance. It was Jim's view that BEB's concern with 
getting products out of the project came from seeing these as 
expert systems. BEB in turn wanted to know why they could not
be called expert systems.13
13Neither was Cally researcher Tony Innes convinced that the 'specialists' should 
not be called 'expert systems'. Jim Watson's definition of specialists as systems 
which would give advice but not take decisions for the designer was what 
distinguished the specialists from expert systems. Tony Innes did not agree - 'what 
are they then?' he commented. Expert systems, he claimed, were  used in an 
advisory role. But it was the future expectations of expert systems with powers of 
judgement that Jim was protecting the system against.
It is worth noting that many comments like these passed between members in the 
form of team - or what were called 'internal' - papers rather than conversationally. 
Attached to a paper would be a list of those in the group who should read it.
Comments were then written down and given to Jim, often with no discussion 
between team members. But the com m ents them selves were som etim es 
'conversational' in style. Tony Innes' remarks in particular,'Ugh .... what does this 
mean?!! This is horrible!!' Before you passed it on, you ticked off your name from 
the list. 'Observation', or just knowing what was going on, therefore depended on my' 
name being on the list and making sure I got hold of any papers that were returned to 
Jim. Indeed much of the work in the Al lab was not 'observable' to me in the way that 
is most commonly represented in the science studies literature as participant 
observation. And the idea of objects being constituted through 'talk' (Knorr-Cetina, 
1981; Lynch, 1984) also seemed a million miles away from my experience. Work 
is often silent; the researcher at his machine is often not aware who else is in his 
room with him.
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Controlling the criteria of success
The specia lists, said Jim, were being seen as expert 
systems that could be developed as products: cost, maintenance 
and reliability expert systems. How could expectations of such a 
system be contro lled? Cally called their advisory programs 
specialists so as not to 'confuse' them with expert systems. Why 
were they not expert systems, said the BEB managers? As 
specialists it was intended that they have specialized knowledge 
about costing, etc., but that the control of these programs would 
be in the hands of the user, the user would have to invoke and 
could always overrule. Their name was eventually changed again 
from 'specialist' to 'toolbox'. A toolbox is something a user has 
control over, it indicates an aid to design. Said one new Cally 
researcher about the change: 'It's political more than anything'.
'Specialists' had connotations of inferencing and expert systems. 
'Toolboxes' is to move management's expectations further away.' 
It was the future expectations (i.e. rising expectations) of expert 
systems which Jim Watson said he was up against. That was why 
Cally had always made it clear that the system was not intended 
to be used by a novice: hence the bicycle analogy. Restricting or 
what one worker called 'managing' expectations also involved, he
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said, adopting an air of 'we know, you don't'. 'Jim likes to present 
a sort of 'we are the university, we know". In other words it was 
a case of who was entitled to confer success on the work: by 
w h o se  criteria.14
It was indeed often Jim Watson's view that, 'it's up to us to 
say what can be done, what is possible.' And as the newly- 
appointed intelligent robotics lecturer one thing that bothered
Jim was, ironically, recent interest in robotics. This interest 
was not entirely comforting for him; it did not signal robotics 
arrival to a position of credibility. Robotics had entered into the 
public imagination in a way that might not reflect what went on 
ins ide Al laboratories. What were these in terested parties
expecting? And what would happen to their work if they did not
meet these expectations? What Jim spoke of needing was to
avoid was another Lighthill-type crit ic ism .15
14However, one researcher told me that expectations had to be managed carefully. 
You could not give the Impression that your collaborators were getting nothing.
15 Why do they need to control expectations? I am not sa tis fied  that this is a 
sufficient explanation. Does controlling expectations suggest some awareness of what 
is involved in making a system 'work'? Harry Collins enculturational model 
(Collins, 1985) of knowledge suggests that Al systems work because the user fills in 
the gaps: i.e compensates for the knowledge (everyday understandings which we have 
as a result of belonging to a culture, to participating in a form of life) which cannot 
be encoded in a machine in an algorithmic form. But just how much is a user being 
expected to fill in when it is an expert system and what kind of user is expected to 
use it? Expectations of expert systems were rising all the time said Jim Watson.
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The 'simple and well-contained' problem of encoding the 
design knowledge for simple gear parts that appeared 'unrealistic' 
to Reams was, said Jim Watson, suitable for Cally's software. 
Fewer collaborators; that after all was what DAM, the original 
project was all about. There was even one suggestion to 
m in im ise  co llabora tion  w ith in the p ro jec t to ju s t a few 
collaborators: to those who supported Cally's technical project. 
Demonstrating the principles that would design and use that 
knowledge to assemble a part. One Cally researcher saw 
Manufacture from Design 'as one big detour to get back to the 
original project, design and make.' One researcher from Talcot 
suggested, 'we can allay their fears, tell them we're doing this 
modular stuff and get on with doing integrated work.' Another 
site manager, Nancy Thomas of BEB Assemblers, described herself 
as half-researcher and half-industrial worker because of her role 
as a researcher in an industrial research centre. She could see 
both approaches, she claimed. It was as though she embodied both 
approaches to the design of the system. (Barnes, 1971).
Although this minimal version of the project was not
Was this equivalent to saying that users are expecting to use less skill and companies 
like Reams were hoping to use m ulti-skilled workers, that is less specialized 
w o rke rs?
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adopted, it was 'too soon for products' claimed Jim and in his 
defence he was going to show BEB a N e w  Scientist article 
claiming that it was 'Too Early for the Factory of the Future'. 
This was r e s e a rc h ,  Jim pointed out to some visitors to Cally. 
One v is ito r from Cally un ivers ity 's  mechanical eng ineering 
department who saw the demonstration doubted the economic 
viability of the method for encoding knowledge into the taxonomy. 
That, he said, would be a major obstacle to its commercial 
success. A company, he claimed, would have to put their best 
designers onto the job of loading up the taxonomy. And that, he
said, would take many man-months. That amount of time was too
costly for a company. It was doubtful that companies would want 
to do this. Craig Ward having worked in industry agreed with this. 
But Jim Watson responded, 'We're not concerned with that, this is 
research.' So how was Jim Watson going to define this work as
research and to keep control over (and define?) the criteria of
success?16
»
The 'nature of the problem', for Jim, involved exploring the
technology for what he called a 'truly' flexible manufacturing
16l have no evidence, however, that the industrial collaborators on the project saw 
this as a 'problem'.
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system. This was, according to Jim, a vital stage that BEB and 
Reams were leaving out. According to Jim they considered the 
work as moving from research to development. The industrial
collaborators, claimed Jim, ignored the 'nature' of the problem: 
but that in Jim's view was to miss out a vital stage.17 After a 
sess ion  of M aste rc lasses  in tended to bring the o the r 
collaborators up to date with Cally work, the team went to the 
pub afte rwards to discuss the session. In part icu la r we 
d iscussed why the co llaborators seemed pleased with the
Masterclasses at the end of the day. This concerned the team: 
why were they pleased, what did they expect? One researcher who 
had worked in industry suggested that they might be pleased 
because Cally had represented their work as sets of tasks 
progressing serially and numbered 1.1., 1.2 etc. This he said
probably gave the industrial co llaborators in part icu la r the 
impression of stages completed that could go onto be developed. 
And so fuzzying the boundaries between versions was one
suggestion.
Jim 's future position within the Cally Al department was
17But was it not a demonstrator project; the idea being that it was to get out 
products driven by industry.
239
not just as manager of an Alvey large scale demonstrator project 
but as lecturer in intelligent robotics. He wanted to stay in 
Cally and in academia; he had no intention, he said, of going back 
into industry. There were noticeable changes in his personal 
style as time went by: the smart shirt and tie, jacket and attaché 
case were replaced by leather jacket and backpack. The former 
'props' were now reserved for technical committee meetings.
The lecturership was a post in which Jim Watson needed to
publish papers to establish his academic career. With Peter's
eventual departure to the United States, Jim was keen that there
should be continuing research in robotics using the designer
system work. Robotics at Cally should not be thought of as going
with Peter18. Not everyone on the project was convinced that
the designer system had a future without Peter. His departure
was a source of some concern; one programmer explained how
Peter had been responsible for all the implementation and that
w ithout him, he was not convinced that there was enough
'momentum to keep going'.19 Many on the Cally team wished to
18When Peter left he gave a lecture in the department about his last twenty years 
working there. After the talk Jim told me that retrospectives were all very well but 
that he was looking to the future: and that robotics work at Cally couldnot be seen to 
have gone just because Peter and another colleague had left the department.
19 lt was Peter who was responsible for such fine-tuning as sim plifying the
publish.
Professor Smith of the Al department said they were now in 
the 'real' world. They had to make some compromises. That was 
absurd, according to Howard Jacobs. He had come to a university 
to be able to publish - his career, he claimed, depended on it. If 
he had wanted to work in industry he would have gone there. He 
wrote down these comments which he called his 'flame' but in the 
end he did not show to Professor Smith.
The Politics of Publication
Cally's work appeared as papers not just demos. For Cally
algebraic manipulation engine Press , to suit the designer system. The designer 
system did not need all the capability of Press, so Peter came up with the idea of 
simplifying it into what he called mini-Press. It was hoped that mini-Press would 
speed up algebraic manipulation for the needs of the designer system. The method of 
testing the capacity of Press against mini-Press was also typical of Peter's style. 
The test was actually a race to see which program was quicker. And so with the 
screen divided down the middle, Press and mini-Press were put in the starting 
blocks. They were each set an equation and then to the sound of Peter and me shouting 
'Ready, Steady, Go' they were off. It was then like watching rain drops racing down a 
window, but we were egging-on the same competitor. When mini-Press won, Peter 
cheered with delight. He then asked me to choose an equation in the way an 
entertainer might ask an audience to think of a number. I chose tan x =y+1, but this 
time mini-Press stumbled at the first hurdle. 'It's crashed', said Peter and turning 
to me said, 'I thought you didn't know any maths'. It seemed that choosing the 
equation had given me some credibility and I was very proud to have tan x=y+1 
called after me. At talks, 'Anne's equation' was referred to as the sticking point for 
mini-Press.
presenting the work as papers was important - especially for Jim 
Watson - to get to academic peers. For the industrial groups and 
for the Demonstrator Definition Coordinator papers needed to be 
protected from the potential scrutiny of competitors; in economic 
terms that meant knowledge which represented a possible return 
on investment.
But how might papers be used, who would they help? The 
industrial teams depended on the Cally team to answer these 
questions. How were they enlightening competitors who would 
read Cally's papers? What clues were they giving away? If Cally 
were to 'gaze into their crystal ball', Eric Cater of Reams asked, 
'what could they see in the future?' There was nothing you could 
actually 'kick or see or feel' as yet said Cater, but were their 
ideas in this area going to help someone working on similar 
problems to get a marketable solution first. What could be done 
to stop them? Could they see others picking up on their work?
It was generally agreed that flow diagrams and algorithms would 
make technology available to others but in the papers what else 
could be revealing the designer system to potential competitors? 
An increase in length of time that BEB wished to take to assess 
the papers and take precautions to protect from com petitor
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scrutiny was in Cally's view too long for Cally to be able to 
present papers at conferences or to submit to journals.
Indeed, Cally's desire to publish affected the definition they 
gave to the designer system. The Functional Unit Module 
Taxonomy was changed to 'Encyclopedia' and the designer system, 
was renamed 'Cally designer system'. The idea was, said Peter, to 
turn Cally's work into 'a hypothetical system', independent from 
the Alvey funded project: one which they could talk about in 
principle. In other words, Cally's designer system as opposed to 
Manufacture from Design's designer system. Cally, Jim Watson 
claimed, needed a way to talk about the designer system. They 
needed, said Peter, to 'decoup le '  the designer system from the 
project as a whole. As part of a demonstrator project they did 
not have access to the IKBS 'club' where they could discuss their 
work with other researchers in the IKBS field. And Jim needed a 
way of getting known in academic circles (in hindsight he told me 
that he regretted going along with the negotiations that had led 
to the project being classified as a demonstrator project and not 
as enabling technology). They were, said Jim, shut off from a 
forum in which they could talk to other academics. But instead
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of, as Jim Watson put it, 'setting a precedent' for the publication 
of papers, which was Cally's intention behind changing the names, 
the terminology had the unintended consequence of making the 
concept of the 'taxonomy' clearer to the industrialists. According 
to the project managers from the industrial teams, 'Encyclopedia' 
had an everyday usage. If, by analogy, it made things clearer to 
them it was likely, they suggested, to make it clearer to those 
who might wish to do something with it.
One suggestion from Jim Watson was for BEB to make
applications for patents. That way, Cally suggested, they could
write papers and BEB could protect 'results'. But what was it,
asked BEB, that was patentable? What was it, in other words,
that was to constitute 'new' knowledge? And how were they to
accord something the status of new knowledge?20 In BEB's view
since Cally was amongst the world's leading Al universities the
rest of the world would probably be looking to them. It was, said
BEB and Reams, a pecking order that included the collaboration of
un ivers it ies  with industry. It was BEB's v iew  that the
universities constituted a league table: 'where do you put yourself
20An interesting analysis would be a study of the social processes which lead to the 
acceptance or rejection of a patent application thereby assigning it the status of 'new' 
or not 'new' knowledge.
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on that pecking order and where do others see you?'. (Indeed
according to the demonstrator definition coord ina tor part of
BEB's reason for being on the project was the reputation of Cally
university.) For the industrialists then 'knowledge' was not
independent from a network of Al researchers collaborating with
industry. A network with which they were not familiar, but
which they suspected existed. The academic groups which Cally
wished to address were, said Eric Cater, most likely to be
working with the industrial groups: 'The Hewlett-Packard and
IBM's must be looking to see what comes out of here.' What were
they giving away? Where would Cally place itself on that league
table? Who was going to be taking notice of the references Cally
cited? What about the interpolation of tables? Cally tried to
persuade BEB and Ream's that anybody working in field of Al
design systems would be addressing similar problems. But,
asked BEB, were they using the work that Cally was citing in the
same way? Were Cally giving them the vital piece of information
they needed? Were Cally doing themselves a disservice, BEB.
asked, by assuming that others working in this area would not
necessarily  be looking to C a lly?21 It was the removal of
21 It was a tricky situation for BEB and Reams. As BEB's pro ject m anager 
explained, they also needed Cally to publish in order that they be seen to be associated
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references to bodies of work which the industrial collaborators 
wanted: references which in the industrialists view could direct 
competitors to a body of knowledge that might lead them to solve 
an existing problem. Removing those references, said Cally, 
would knock them off any top position they might hold in the 
academic league table.
References were essential to Cally. They needed them as 
Jim pointed out to the industrial collaborators to show 'that our 
work is based on good stuff' (See Latour 1987 and, Gilbert 1977). 
Since it seemed to Cally that only references roused BEB's 
concern, Cally constructed an elaborate scenario intended to 
provide BEB and Reams with a definition of the situation at 
meetings, which they hoped, would ensure important citations 
stayed in the text. The idea was to load future papers with two 
sets of references: the ones they wanted to keep in the text and 
'decoys’ with which they planned to catch BEB and Reams 
attention. It was not yet worked out how they were to appear in. 
the text but when BEB asked for their removal they would 
initially put up a fight which having learnt from previous dealings
with a reputable and highly regarded university - that is one that had papers 
published.
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would 'alert' the industrialists to the potential 'importance' of 
these references. BEB would pursue the removal and Cally would 
gradually submit22. BEB, it was hoped, would feel like they had 
won and allow the publication to go ahead with the 'real' 
references Cally wished to keep in the text.23
Different views within the Cally team
Not all members of the Cally team gave publications as high
a priority as Jim. Although the names of the other workers would
sometimes appear on the papers, Mark Robbins was one who did
not understand why his name should appear as a contributor or
co-author. According to Mark, he could not write with any
certainty what Jim had to say about the designer system. The
designer system, as he worked on it, was not experienced with
the same degree of certainty as it appeared in the papers that Jim
22This type of communicative behaviour has been studied by Goffman (1970). He 
writes: 'The subject appreciates that his environment will create an impression on 
the observer, and so attempts to set the stage beforehand. Aware that his actions, 
expressions, and words will provide inform ation to the observer, the subject 
incorporates into the initial phases of this activity a consideration of its later phases 
so that the definition of the situation he eventually provides for the observer 
hopefully will be one he feels from the beginning would be profitable to evoke' 
(Goffman, 1970, p .12)
23lf references are left out of papers to protect commercially-sensitive knowledge 
then how accurate are co-citation studies at describing an intellectual field for the 
purposes of making policy decisions? Similarly, strategies such as changing the 
nomenclature of a system might affect the accuracy of keyword analysis.
wrote 'I would always have to add some qualification; it can do
that sometimes, doesn't do it quite like that. I'm never that
certain. Jim would make claims for what it would do in the
fu tu re . '24 He said he would be no good at conferences where he
would be expected to talk to others about the system. As a result
he did not go to them. Indeed, at one meeting this worker
de libera te ly  chose to present h a n d w r i t t e n  slides of his talk
about his work, which, he explained, was because he was not
certain about what he was doing. He could not say anything with
any certainty in the manner of a paper, and interpreted how he
differed from Jim as the result of their d ifferent roles in the
production of knowledge, 'I suppose Jim has to sell it.' When it
came to selling the system Jim had the ability to take what Mark
considered to be risks, claiming it could do things Mark felt it
could not. And most importantly he had the knack of getting
himself out of tight spots. When asked if the designer system
could recognise as a contradiction a hole so big it would
obliterate the side of a cube, Jim said it could. Mark, who was
demonstrating, knew it could not. Luckily he did not have to
demonstrate. Jim was able to use what Mark called 'human'
t e r m s 25 to get himself out of a tight spot: 'he'd say, "oh, you
24See Collins (1985, p145) on certainty and social d istance from the site of
knowledge production.
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misunderstand me, I meant it could do it, one  day'".
Mark continued, 'It's never that certain to me. Integration 
dissolves when you get close up.' Along with 'modularity' he 
suggested integration was an abstract notion. As a result papers 
were not accorded a very high status by Mark Robbins; they were, 
as he put it 'waffle that anyone could write.'
This worker referred to Jim Watson as someone who saw
himself 'as a bit of swashbuckler, a bit like Errol Flynn.' He went
on, 'He thinks the designer system is revolutionary but it isn't. It
won't stand up to much prodding.' However, it seemed that the
ability to make jokes26 about the system (and laugh at them!)
and to criticise its shortcomings was related to the degrees of
25Such terms were anathema to a mathematician like Mark Robbins. It was his 
view that it was a feature of Al that terminology was so indefinite. Discussions with 
Jim were likely trying to hit a 'moving target'. There was no commonly agreed 
terminology as, he claimed, there was in physics.
260nce over tea Craig Ward and a colleague were laughing about the inability of the 
designer system to design a gearbox let alone the vastly more complicated fuel pump. 
When I asked him if he had no confidence in the designer system, he answered me in a 
surprised tone; "Oh come on Anne, we don't have to bullshit you. You're one of us. 
We give others the gloss." Craig Ward's comment is also interesting in terms of what 
it says about the access a participant observer can have to the world of the 
technologist: private thoughts on the technology might be quite different to what is 
presented to the 'outside' world, even when the participant does not always appear to 
be a member of her group!
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closeness to the designer system; those closest to it would joke 
about it. However, 'Jim gets very defensive about the designer 
system', said Mark. Even within the team itself Jim, said Mark 
Robbins, would not take a light-hearted joke against it. Mark felt 
this defensiveness was not justified, especially since Jim, as 
manager, was not as close to the technical development of the 
system .
Indeed not everyone was that bothered about publishing
either. 'I can see BEB's point' Craig Ward told me, 'but if the
whole team left over publications I could hardly work all these
workstations on my own.' And so he went along with the rest of
the team. Craig wanted to see something get out that he could
say he had been apart of. Craig liked achievements. His
successful weekend mountaineering trips were marked on a wall-
chart he had on our office wall. Each triangle filled-in with red
crayon marked another munroe conquered. He was proud of the
large number he had c lim bed.27 Craig looked on Peter's
eventual departure to the States28 as possibly a way of speeding
27He was also very proud of his British Telecom shares. Each morning Craig 
scoured the paper to see how they were doing. None of us were able to advise him, 
however, on when he should sell to make the quick return he dreamed ofl
28After Peter left the project for work in the States one researcher feard that 
without him there would be insufficient momentum to keep the thing going. It was all
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BEB up to get something out. As he argued: 'They'll be afraid he 
speaks to others.' BEB, according to Craig, had paid Peter vast 
amounts of money not to talk about his work. But, Craig added, 
'that would be like rape.'29 He looked forward to what he called 
the 'End of the Revolution.' Instead of the flying-sheep he said 
they should have a project T-Shirt which would contrast the 
designer system to the dark satanic mills of the first industrial 
revolution: 'The designer system will show happy people picnicing 
on green grass.' 'But software is like a soap-bubble' said Craig 
'unless you do something with it bursts.' He left the project, he 
said, with the belief that 'the designer system has kind of gone 
as far as it can. It sort of went when Howard and Peter left.'
Peter's ideas said another. 'When we get stuck we'd just ask Peter'. After each stage 
of demonstration of their software Craig said there was a sense of 'Now what do we 
do?' 'We didn't know where we were going. Peter did everything. And Jim hadn't 
really been involved in the programming.' The work itself was distributed at Cally 
team meetings by Peter and Jim to the other team members. For most of the time I 
was on the project it was really just Craig and Howard were given work to do: putting 
modules into the taxonomy. It was called 'homework' which was indicative of its 
status as something to be completed before the next meeting and the next assignment.
29l squirmed visibly at the use of rape in this context. Craig then commented, 'well 
you know what I mean.' I didn’t. It seems that quite a bit of sexual/power language 
surrounds men and their contact with science and technology. The Noble prize- 
w inning physicist Richard Feynman described science when first encountered, as 
being like an exciting lover. Over time science was like a wife. Nature here is 
portrayed as the feminine over which men exert control. It seems that for Craig 
Ward the technologist who is held back from talking about or publishing the results 
of his encounter with technology experiences the violation of his rights and his 
freedom: an experience akin to rape. In other words, when the technologist cannot 





This thesis began by reviewing some important theoretical 
approaches which have attempted to explain technological change. 
It is now time to draw together the empirical material of my 
case-study in order to see how these approaches bear up in the 
light of such a study.
The Marxist approaches
Hirsch's state theory sees state funding of technology as 
part of restructuring of capital in periods of cris is (Hirsch,
1978). There is however in this approach an implicit acceptance 
of the capita list nature of the technology which leaves the 
creative process unexplored. Just how the nature of that society 
impinges on or shapes technology is neglected. The result is that 
technology remains firmly within the black box.
Noble (1986) on the other hand is a Marxist who has looked 
at the process of technical change. He has explored social choice
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in the design of machine tools and has argued that neither 
'technica l' or 'economic' factors are the decis ive factors in 
technical design. They are mere rhetoric, justifications behind 
which the real impulse is to control labour. The goals of 
techno log is ts  (engineers) and m anagem ent are inextricably 
linked; the ideology of capitalist domination, the 'queer quest for 
power and omnipotence' all lead to the choice of technologies 
which deskill and control labour.1
Noble suggests that this quest for power and control over 
labour continues with the factory of the future and the use of 
Artific ia l Intelligence in manufacturing. Cooley (1981), in a 
sim ilar vein 'predicts' the continuing trend to deskill mental 
labour - specifically, design work - that began with CAD systems. 
He has argued that expert systems will continue this process.
In this thesis I have shown that for the Cally technologists
there were indeed different views on how to design the designer
system; this focussed on how much the system should do and how
1 There is however a contradiction in Noble's argument. If the engineers design 
what they know will find favour with the managers and the capita list ideology 
dominates then how can there also be social choice in technical design? The 
existence of choice does not appear to be consistent with his approach.
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much the designer. The more 'conservative' appoach in this regard 
was chosen over the more 'radical'. The criteria which influenced 
Cally's choice was existing work which was familiar to Peter and 
which in the area of VLSI design had been successful. In part the 
particu lar h istorical circumstances of the Al community also 
seem to have been influential in that choice. Accusations of 
failure as damaging as the Lighthill report for example was not 
an experience to be repeated. In other words, these factors 
seemed more crucial to the choice than an 'impulse' to attempt to 
encode within the machine powers of judgement that would allow 
the system to use as Innes put it 'average' as opposed to 'good' 
designers.
But what about the industrial collaborators and the shaping 
of the designer system and the manufacture from design project? 
The Marxist literature sees the process of technological change 
as informed by clear goals - capitalist goals. But this is not 
what I found. They are not a homogeneous group. BEB were 
interested in getting out products. But what were products? The 
industria l co llaborators experienced much chaos in how to 
organize the various collaborators and the language of Al was
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unfamiliar. What work going on at Cally could be identified as 
'new' IKBS knowledge was not se lf-evident to the industrial 
collaborators. They had to rely on the academics to show them. 
Reams' Eric Cater does appear to have expressed a concern that 
the designer system 'put brains inside the designer system' and 
use less highly trained designers; he suggested that perhaps 
Cally's taxonomy was not the way to represent how designers
think. He enrolled the help of the MMI team but as we saw their
place in the project was to be negotiated with Cally.
This study, however, cannot offer a knock-down to a
possible riposte from a Marxist approach. The Marxist critique is
levelled at the inappropriateness of participant observation to an
understanding of the shaping of technology. It argues that
'technology ' happens elsewhere; 'behind the backs' of the
researchers in any one laboratory and that technology is not
shaped by the activities of individual capita l.2 Rather, capital
is conducting a series of experiments in technologica l and
managerial innovations in order to overcome the current crisis in
2 From the sociology of knowledge approach Trevor Pinch (, 1986) critic ises 
laboratory studies in technology where the key actors (the core group) are spread 
over several sites. This means that a partial picture emerges since activities 
pertinent to the site being studied may be taking place elsewhere.
the established pattern of relations between capital and labour 
and create a new basis on which to accumulate capital (Aglietta,
1979). Social shaping in this context means that new technology 
is shaped by the struggle to establish a new pattern of capitalist 
exploitation which does not mean that control over the labour 
process is an overr id ing  im pera tive  for cap ita l in th is 
r e s t r u c t u r i n g . 3 It is also claimed that there is no logic 
determining which experiment is going to be successful in terms 
of its relation to the profitability of the innovating company or 
its c o m p a t ib i l i ty  w ith em ergen t pa tte rns  of e xp lo ita t ion . 
Perhaps, then, the Alvey programme as a whole or some of its 
pro jects will turn out be unsuccessful experim ents in the 
attempt to establish a new basis for exploitation. However, 
questions remain: how does that notion of success enter into the 
everyday practice of technology? Do technologists work towards 
conformity, making explicit choices and selecting what they work 
on or are they working in the dark on pot-luck projects which at 
some level are deemed successful? We are still left with the 
problem of how to study technical change.
3Control as the principle reason for has been criticised by Wajcman (, 1986). 
Capitalism is based on the need to accumulate capital. It is based on valorization 
(increasing surplus value). So the question that comes to mind when Noble posits 
the drive to control labour as the reason for choosing one technology over another is 
why control: how can it be control for control's sake in a society that is driven by the 
need to make profit?
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But perhaps any reference to capitalism or to a pre-existing
society which shapes the technology is misplaced. Perhaps
Latour, Callon and Law are right and the technologists were
shaping both technology and the social world according to their
own goals and interests. Certa in ly we have seen them
in te rw ea v in g  the ' te ch n ica l '  and the 'so c ia l ' ;  w ith the
m o d e l l e r 4 . Even the rhetoric of Alvey's MMI policy was
negotiated at the level of the project as Cally sought to protect
the 'cognitive capabilities' of the system (the representation of
knowledge) as the i r  area of work. Jim Watson also held strong
views about the changes that were required in the social world in
order to take on the designer system. But he did not seek to
engineer those changes. He did not go out into industry to upset
the status of designers and accountants within companies in
order to take on board the designer system. Nor did he persuade
companies to get ready to take on board an integrated system.
Perhaps, thought this does not mean that Latour and his
colleagues are wrong. Perhaps my participants are just poor
heterogeneous engineers. But what and whose 'reality' are we
4Here however we saw that heterogeneous engineering had its lim its as far as Jim 
Watson was concerned: a modeller from another supplier depended on getting the go- 
ahead from the head of the department Professor Smith.
talking about? 'Realistic ' r e s e a r c h  as opposed to products 
required the publication of papers. We saw how they wrote papers 
- employing 'textual' s tra teg ies in an attempt to get them 
published while at the same time trying to establish the 
independence of the designer system from the rest of the project. 
Jim Watson's career at Cally, where he planned a future around 
his post as lecturer in intelligent robotics, depended on being 
able to publish and extend the work of the designer system. 
Activ ities then might be said to be geared towards f u t u r e  
in ves tm e n ts . In the meantime they sought to control the criteria 
of success of their work and simultaneously who  was entitled to 
confer success upon the designer system. It was too soon for 
products in other words.
So before dismissing the Latourian perspective (at least as 
inapplicable to this case), it is important to take into account the 
possibility that the goals of the heterogeneous engineering of the 
academic participants were actually modest: they wanted to be 
successful academics, rather than to produce a product, much 
less to revolutionize British industry. That may be so; although it 
also seems the case that the more modest goal grew in salience 
as the grander ones seemed less feasible, and perhaps b e ca u se
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they seemed less feasible. More generally however, any Latourian 
perspective needs to take account, it seems to me, actors 
propensity to take large chunks of their technical and social 
world as 'given'. Most of us, most of the time are heterogeneous 
engineers in only a very limited sense. To put it another way, 
while the Marxist approach has a tendency to reify the social, the 
Latourian approach underestimates the th ing-like character of 
the social world as it is perceived and acted w ith in by 
participants.
Partic ipant Observation: A Technique of Control?
What happens to ethnographic work and who sees a use for 
it? Who might you be bringing your knowledge back to and what 
for? The classical sociological answer has of course been that 
ethnographies are produced to help understanding of the social 
world. But a response to my work suggested that there might be 
circumstances where 'understanding' could shade into 'control'.
I was approached by one evaluator who was interested in 
how my knowledge might help them to understand how academics 
and indus tr ia l partners  can be made to co lla b o ra te  in
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techno log ica l deve lopm ent.5 He felt that my amount of contact
w ith this pa rt icu la r group of techno log is ts  and industria l
collaborators could help evaluators make recommendations for
how to improve participation. He referred to what he claimed
were Jim's inconsistent account of expert systems which this
evaluator said presented conflicting views about how he saw
these systems. I, however, was assumed to have got c lo se r  to
these technologists than the evaluators, and as a result was
assumed to be privy to a more consistent view: what did they
really th ink about things? What was it that m ight inhibit
collaboration and what could I suggest as a way of resolving it?
How could this schism be resolved between industry and
academia? The evaluators were not the only ones. Manufacture
from Design's monitor, responsible for monitoring progress also
took an interest in my presence on the project. The Alvey
Directorate, he said, wanted as much information about what was
going on; it was possible, he suggested, that I could supplement
the work of the evaluators. We cannot, therefore, neglect the
5The evaluators in turn have been criticised by the Cabinet Office's chief scientific 
officer, John Fairclough, for not being able to recommend the path that technological 
developments should take in the future to enhance Britain's technological capability. 
The evaluators have explained that was not their task. This seems to suggest that the 
evaluators were expected to identify technological trajectories which the managers of 
technical change could then use to direct funds. However, see Mackenzie (1987) for 
a critique of the notion of technological trajectories.
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possibility that under some circumstances the ethnographer of 
science and technology might be engaged in similar work to the 
scientist of technologist. Latour has described the work that 
scientists do as a process of turning messy reality into traces, 
inscriptions on paper, making implicit knowledge explicit and 
turning beliefs into knowledge. The acquisition of knowledge is 
like building a trap: it allows those in possession of such 
knowledge to control at a distance, to take decisions based on 
s im plif ied information: production curves and equations are 
s im plif ications that enable such contro l: All these objects
occupy the beginning and the end of a similar accumulation cycle; 
no matter if they are far or near, infinitely big or small...they all 
end up at such scale that a few men or women can dominate them 
by sight; at one point or another, they all take the shape of a flat 
surface of paper that can be archived, pinned on a wall, and 
combined with others; they all help to reverse the balance of 
forces between those who master and those who are mastered. 
(Latour, 1987)
Is the process Latour describes for science and for the 
exp lo ita tion  of one country by ano ther app licab le  to the 
microstudy of science? Perhaps ethnographers are guilty (or
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potentially so) of the same imperialism which Latour describes. 
We may be part of what Latour calls the cycle of accumulation. Is 
partic ipant observation a 'neutral' methodology? Or is what 
Latour describes as the behaviour of his technoscientists also 
applicable to the social scientist doing participant observation, 
he will gain an edge only if the other navigators have gotten a 
way to bring the lands back with them in such a manner that he 
will see Sakhalin island, for the first time, at leisure, in his own 
home, or in the Admirality office, while smoking his pipe, (ibid)
Does the study of sc ience  and technology, c losed worlds 
to most of us, vindicate the rights of the sociologist? This 
question stems from more than the enquiries of the evaluators 
and the monitors of the Alvey programme about my work. It is 
not just about one case-study but about the general process of 
accumulating knowledge. I base it on my experience of a meeting 
of the Science Policy Support Group in Nottingham April 1988. 
The point of this meeting was to present project proposals to the 
Economic and Science Research Council with reference to the 
ways in which science studies could be useful to science policy.
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Ethnographic work it was suggested, could be justified to 
the funders if they knew that a company like Xerox Parc 
employed an ethnographer. Another sociologist suggested that his 
videos of workers were liked by the management team of the 
company in which he was doing his research; he did not have to 
justify them. And from this experience he felt that the language 
used by sociologists to describe their work was quite familiar to 
others. But no-one at this meeting asked w h y  e thnographers  
were employed by big organizations. What use did these 
companies have for their work; what do they believe they are 
getting to make it worthwhile?
Are social scientists privileging the sociologist when they 
do not ask how it is that sociology can make itself accountable to 
funders? Or why it is that managers are quite familiar with the 
language of the sociologist; why it makes sense? Where does 
reflexivity stop and why? What are the politics surrounding 
reflexivity? Pursuing a strategy of special relativism (Collins, 
1983) - denying that reflexivity poses a problem - is too glib an 
answer to these questions.
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Methodology: Gender Issues
So far this thesis has seen me described as a spy, a
psychologist and an ally of the human factors approach. Up until
this point there has been nothing to distinguish this thesis from
any other partic ipant observation theses in the socio logy of
technology that might potentially be written. But there is in fact
one vitally important feature; this thesis has been written by a
woman. Why is that important? Woman are notable by their
absence in the microsociology of science and technology. The
glittering work that lights up the journals has been done by men;
Collins, Latour, Woolgar and Law are practically household names
in the discipline. These analysts emphasise the importance of
acquiring native competence to a sociological study of science
and technology. What they do not describe, however, is what it is
like to be an observer in a lab.6 As a reader of their work I was
left with the feeling that native competence was acquired by dint
of being clever or the result of some mystical process. I wish to
be more concrete and describe what it was like being a woman
doing participant observation and how gender bears on native
th ro u g h o u t this thesis I have tried to include details of how the collaborators saw 
me. It seems odd (and incongruous with their approach) that those theorists 
concerned with the way scientists and technologists see and manipulate the 'social' 
and 'natural' worlds should exclude from their studies the way technologists or 
scientists view (or don't view) the 'observer'.
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competence.
One of my earliest introductions to the world of Alvey and 
new technology was at a conference designed to bring together 
academics and business - big and small - to d iscuss the
programme and its importance in rescuing the poor position of the 
UK in the international technology stakes. Since it was one of my 
first encounters to the world of business and technology I
expected it to be incomprehensible. But it was very familiar. The
first speech explained that with the Alvey programme the UK 
would no longer be the 'proud' owner of the 'booby' prize for 
technology anymore at which point the speaker took from a 
carrier bag an 'outsize' bra. This started the ball rolling.
Subsequent speakers sought to wind the joke into their own talks. 
Each was a desperate attempt to upstage the preceding one. 
Having seen the booby prize, it was clear to the Alvey director, 
Brian Oakley, why he was dealing with T h e  I n f o r m a t i o n  
T e ch n o lo g y  £_ystems of the Alvey programme. When the 
proceedings stopped for lunch I found myself eating a three- 
course, slap-up meal with many who had been enjoying the show 
so far. One man apologized to me for having a 'technical'
conversation with others sitting at the table. We reconvened and 
the banter did not relent; the last speech attempted to round off 
the whole day with a request to meet the owner of the bra, I don't 
care who she is as long as she's blonde, got good legs and is under 
30. Needless to say he brought the house down. Staying around 
for tea to discuss the conference was not something I felt 
inclined to do in order to do my 'sociological bit'. I wanted out of 
that conference room as quickly as possible. I knew very well 
what counted for a joke in this culture (Collins, 1983; Gilbert, & 
Mulkay, 1984) but at such a big impersonal venue I could choose 
not to participate - it was not vital that I spoke to anyone there. 
That was not going to be the case with my research on the 
Manufacture from Design project.
At the Callv site
The Cally team seemed to be like me. Most of us were 
around the same age. We spoke about films and t.v. But there 
were major d ifference too. When I a ttempted to hang a 
picturesque calendar on our office wall, Craig asked me, where 
are the pictures of the girls in swimsuits. And don't you like my 
new folder with the girls in swimsuits, where he kept his notes 
for the Expert Systems class. The job advert for a research post
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on the team should show, he suggested, a buxom blonde in a bikini 
wearing a sash with Manufacture from Design across it. Come to 
think of it, he added, that’s who we want on the project. I was 
also told by Craig that I would have to sit in the corridor when 
the project got the i r  '24 year old French girl researcher'. There 
would not be enough space for all of us in the one room. I was 
told that I my clothes were too dark; I was too 'school marmish': 
Why don't you dress like the girls outside, in nice bright pinks and 
purples.
My notebooks seemed 'soft' compared with the notes I 
imagined male sociologists kept. At first I did not want to write
these things down. I thought they made me look soft too. I
thought if I was a good sociologist this would not be said to me.
With the industrial co llaborators I was rebuked for not 
accepting an open door; even though I was busy talking at the time
and was not aware of this gesture. I was accused of flouting
chivalry in the face so I attempted to explain how I had not 
noticed the door incident. The meeting was delayed a good ten 
minutes while I received a lecture on the 'fairer sex' and feminist
267
women 'taking things too far.' When the meeting finally got 
s ta rted  one p a rt ic ipan t made the po in t of sa rcas t ica l ly  
addressing his remarks to 'Men, Women, the whole World!' while 
looking at me. I also had to listen to such comments in the pub 
between industrial collaborators who suggested that one of the 
female partic ipants in Manufacture from Design was in the 
project to 'find herself a man.'
In many of these circumstances I found it difficult to get 
into con fro n ta t io n a l s itua tions. I w orried  tha t it m ight 
jeopardise my acceptance and the ease with which I could be 
considered part of the project. On one occasion when I did speak 
out I experienced the 'silent treatment' from one researcher and 
this made me nervous of having jeopardised my work. I worried 
about how I should not have done this for the sake of the research!
And I was very aware of the effort I was making to smooth
things over so that he would talk to me and so that I could ask
him q u e s t io n s .7 For me the 'partic ipation ' in partic ipant
observation sometimes meant complying or being silent: I felt I
was participating in my own put down and that of other women.
7The ethnographic worker, Knorr-Cetina (1981) advises, must not be afraid to 
ask questions. I agree, however one of my attempts to question an industrial 
participant received the reply, 'don’t you worry yourself about that.'
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These comments were by no means common to the team as a 
whole. But I think it is important to discuss. Because I was 
com paring myself to men who did not write about sim ilar 
experiences I thought that sometimes I was failing. And I felt 
guilty at 'attracting' these comments. I took them to be personal 
faults - if I was a good sociologist, I reasoned, I would not be 
attracting comments like that.
Perhaps an important part of those male analysts 'ability' to 
acquire native competence is because they have a head - or more 
exactly, gender - start. They are more obviously 'one of the lads.' 
I do not want to put women off doing ethnographic work but 
neither do I wish to ignore these experiences and thereby 
continue to give the impression that native com petence is 
achieved independent of gender. The ease with which a 
researcher acquires native competence may in part be a function 
of gender, and questions of gender thus enter the methodology of 
the sociology of science and technology at the most profound 
level.
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